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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues for the continuing possibility of Adorno set against the 
backdrop of a post-modern proliferation of affects. A major theoretical 
contention is the concept of the subject: a sticking point within philosophy. 
The thesis takes this up and offers a new pathway without falling into the 
cliche of a renewal of Adomo's position. Drawing on Adorno's theoretical 
thoughts on the subject the thesis contends that the subject is that which by 
turns dissolves all eventualities or more proportionally acts like a place- 
holder for the newly emerging: structures that cannot be explained by 
recourse to the laws that govern its parts. These experiential structures 
present a surface, resistance, or solidarity that upon closer examination 
dissolve back into the ephemeral. Although such structures are profligate 
and prolific, the thesis adopts as its major concern artworks and aesthetics. 
Following Adorno, a claim is made for artworks that present open-ended 
possibilities. They are able for example to critically challenge the dominant 
hegemony the profundity that all too easily sides with the oppressors of life. 
What philosophy a critical tool in furtherance of the good life, a concept 
restaged here takes from art is not a sense of equivalence, art and philosophy 
are held apart in a creative and critical tension, but the sense of yearning that 
animates the nonconceptual side of art which the concept negates. The 
yearning, being experiential, is always embodied. Its fulfilment negates the 
immediacies, the mere appearance of life, particularly in its systematically 
reflexive form. The conclusion concurs with Adorno in the thought that 
affinity with the object is achieved not as the resultant of identity thinking, 
but through the act of definite negation of identifying schema.
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Introduction
One of the many unintended consequences of an engagement with Adorno's 
philosophical writings is the re-inscription of a changed metaphysics and a 
changed aesthetic sensibility, proof if needed of Adorno's claim that theory 
has as its addendum, embodiment and a changed praxis. What is set up and 
unfolds argues for the continued feasibility of Adorno's philosophy at this 
historic stage, by presenting his work in a manner that is, hopefully, both 
illuminating and insightful. Thus the hegemony of its object gives the 
dissertation its context: socio-historicaHy speaking no work escapes the 
market and as Adorno readily acknowledges his work is no exception. 1 
However Adorno seeks to reclaim the philosophical integrity through the 
manner of the works presentation. Adorno's works resist easy consumption 
suggesting that direct communication is weighted less than the need for 
powerful expression. In practice this marks the work as difficult for the 
casual reader and translators alike who tend to begrudge the lack of 
transparent immediacy of Adorno's thinking. Suffice it to say for Adorno 
thought is not a painless process.
'For thought there is really no other possibility, no other opportunity, 
than to do what the miner's adage forbids: to work one's way through 
the darkness without a lamp, without possessing the positive through 
the higher concept of the negation of the negation and to immerse
1 Cf. Theodor Adorno, "Dialectics not a Standpoint," Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B 
Ashton, (Great Britain: Routledge, 1996), p. 4. 'No theory today escapes the market place. 
Each one is offered as a possibility among competing opinions; all are put up for choice; all 
are swallowed. There are no blinders for thought to don against this and the self-righteous 
conviction that my own theory is spared that fate will surely deteriorate into self- 
advertizing.'
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oneself in the darkness as deeply as one possibly can.' 
Immersing oneself in the darkness could be a description of how this 
thesis has progressed with the proviso that thereafter it has sought to shine a 
light into the proverbial darkness, to check, at this historic stage the 
feasibility of Adorno's concerns. To that end and to begin to clarify the 
dilemma expressed in the above, at this juncture there is a crucial distinction 
to be made between Hegelian philosophy and the philosophy of Adorno. 
For, as will be shown in Chapter One, Hegel makes determinate negation 
vital but thereafter it passes over into affirmation and ideology; the belief 
that negation taken far enough in its reflection of itself is one with positivity. 
Adorno refuses to follow Hegel in this move. For Adorno if the 
negation of the negation is the positive then the idea already contains within 
itself the thesis of the philosophy of identity, it assumes the unity of subject 
and object a priori. The temptation is to think that by negating the negation 
one has already obtained the positive. In the move away from Hegel Adorno 
treats certain autonomous works of art as privileged opponents of reification 
and positive ideologies. The model of thought in each case is unconscious 
historiography and historical crystallization: processes and results that 
reflect the tensions and contradictions of advanced consciousness.3
2 Theodor Adorno, "Lecture Eighteen," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott, (Great Britain: Polity Press, 2000), p. 144.
3 To catch a glimpse beyond the prison of the T requires not distraction but the utmost 
tension. For Adorno the tensions and their possible resolution that transpire in the relation 
between the individual and the universal preserves the 'shudder', an involuntary aesthetic 
comportment and protosubjectivity that although it isn't immediately mimesis is the process 
mimesis sets in motion and in which, modified, mimesis is preserved. From the blind 
anxiety of the shudder subjectivity stirs in the act of being touch by the other. Viewed 
thought the lens of human immediacy, aesthetic comportment assimilates itself to the other 
rather than subordinating it. Such a constitutive relation of the subject to objectivity in 
aesthetic comportment joins eros and knowledge. The possibility and agency of just such a 
set of dynamic and dialectical relations is the main concern of this thesis. Cf. Theodor 
Adorno, "Theories on the Origins of Art," Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor,
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The material consciousness that Adomo urges upon us, one that 
exhibits the contradictions and distortions of social consciousness, of the 
way we live, envelops the negative or dissonant as the new or the discarded: 
neither are consistent with a sense of adequacy. What is divisive lends itself 
to what is decisive. Mimetic power which is effectively the power of 
qualitative distinction joins with the ratio in order to produce itself anew.4
As we shall see in the argument leading up to and including Chapter 
Four, Mimesis and Rationality, the movement the negative moment in 
consciousness is anti-foundational. Adorno is attempting the critical rescue 
of experience not the positing of psychologism or anti-psychologism as first 
philosophy. The genesis of the logical is not psychological motivation. 
Neither is logic a pure entity the ideal being of the prepositional in itself. 
Logic for Adorno is a sort of social behaviour or social process eminently 
historical and tied to material relations 'The adaptation of the ratio to its 
contrary, a state of consciousness that has not developed any fixed identity 
[...] is fully realized, however through the artifice of the name.' 5 Adorno
(United States of America: The Athlone Press, 1997), p. 331.
4 An excellent account of Adorno's use of mimesis is to be found in Martin Jay's essay " 
Mimesis and Mimetology: Adorno and Lacoue-Labarthe," in, The Semblance of 
Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno' Aesthetic Theory, edited by Tom Huhn and Lambert 
Zuidervaart, (United States of America: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 31-33. 'A first 
approximation of Adorno's use of mimesis [...], would necessarily stress its relational 
character, its way of bridging but not collapsing differences [...] Rather than producing 
hierarchical subsumption under subjectively generated category, it preserves the rough 
equality of the object and subject involved. More precisely, it assimilates the latter to the 
former in such a way that the unposited, unintended object implicitly predominates, 
thwarting the imperialist gesture of subjective control and constitution that is the hallmark 
of philosophical idealism. [...] Instead [of the word imitation] Adorno prefers the verb 
anschmiegen (to snuggle up or mould to) to stress the relationship of contiguity. [...] In 
more passively assimilating itself to the other, the subject of mimesis also preserves the 
sensuous, somatic element that the abstractions of idealist reason factor out of cognition or 
sublate into a higher rationality. [...] [M]imesis necessarily entails a crucial role for the 
body in the interaction between self and world. Equally important, it is the body as both the 
source of pleasure and the locus of pain'
5 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment," 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Gumming (Great Britain: Verso, 1997), p. 67.
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makes the claim that mimesis and the ratio have become somewhat 
disengaged in part as a result of the contemporary re-inscription of the 
aesthetic sensibility. On the subjective side the repression of mimesis takes 
the place of its metamorphosis. The declension of experience means that the 
world, in terms of its objectivity, is losing its openness. The world it seems 
has no need for a spirit defined by its openness. 6
Driven by the preponderance of its object, the theoretical seeks to 
articulate objectively the idea of aesthetic sensibility as an arena of possible
i-i
reconciliation and as such comes to inhabit a space between the experiential 
and cognitive, prepositional logic, moving in order to speak the unspeakable 
and to give expression to suffering.8
In a timely manner it will be argued that in-order for subjective 
mechanisms to lengthen the objective and with the introduction of a changed 
aesthetic sensibility, the intentional commands less attention than the 
unintentional; the new or spontaneous could hardly be something that was 
intended, its prior determination disqualifies it as such.9 The new, a topic
6 Cf. "Theories on the Origin of Art," Aesthetic Theory, p. 331.
7 Cf. "The Sublime and Play," Aesthetic Theory, p. 197. 'The ascendancy of the sublime is 
one with arts compulsion that fundamental contradictions not be covered up but fought 
through in themselves; reconciliation for them is not the result of the conflict but 
exclusively that the conflict becomes eloquent.' Cf. "Expression as Eloquence," Aesthetic 
Theory, p. 112. For the concept of being eloquent; Cf. "Notes - Semblance and Expression," 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 371. '["Sprachcharacter": There is no adequate translation for this 
concept as Adorno uses it. Its meaning, however, is partly elucidated by a group of related 
ideas in which Adorno conceives the artwork as something that is, or becomes "beredt" 
(fluent, expressive), where something comes to or finds "Sprache." This is a speech where 
language itself is not necessarily the medium. "Eloquence" has, as a potential, just this 
implication, and it has therefore been used, reluctantly, for all of the above concepts in one 
way or another. The problem is of course, that the English concept tends to emphasize the 
unconflicted sort of fluency and expression. Adorno, however, is not at all concerned with 
persuasion but rather with expression as gesture, cipher, countenance, script and speech as it 
arises out of brokenness, fragmentariness or fissuredness.[...]]'
8 Cf. "The Speculative Moment," Negative Dialectics, p. 18. '[Suffering is objectivity that 
weighs upon the subject; its most subjective experience, its expression, is objectively 
conveyed.'
9 In a move that owes a lot Kant, the unintentional can be shadowed by the wildest
8
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taken up in Chapter Four, Mimesis and Rationality, concerns itself with what 
has not yet been socially approved, the tabooed as such. Against the 
backdrop of topical and cultural preferences captured as the true, the truly 
beautiful and good, the sublime ugliness of the new, something that is not to 
be taken literally, is a challenge to the power of spiritualization. The 
appropriation of what has been ostracized, stigmatized, reveals that nature 
whose suppression is what is truly evil. 10 Dialectics does not begin by taking 
a standpoint; it is driven to do so the guilt of what it thinks.
The theoretical text explores the claim that society discloses itself in a 
more telling way from within the more marginalized cultural spheres, that's 
to say from patterns and trends read out of the contemporary experience of 
art, philosophy and individual experiences, rather than from the dominant 
economic mode of production and exchange and its concomitant social 
relations. 11 This thesis will argue that what Hegel called "objective spirit"
intention. Cf. Immanuel Kant, "The Liking that Determines a Judgment of Taste is Devoid 
of all Interest," Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (United States of America: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), p. 46. "A Judgment we make about an object of our 
liking may be wholly disinterested but still very interesting, i.e., it is not based on any 
interest but it gives rise to an interest; all pure moral judgments are of this sort. But 
judgments of taste, of themselves, do not even give rise to any interest. Only in society does 
it become interesting to have taste [...].'
10 "Dialectic of Spiritualization," Aesthetic Theory, p. 93.
11 Cf. Theodor Adorno, "Genesis and Psychology," Against Epistemology: A Metacritique, 
trans. Willis Domingo, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982) p. 76. '[Llogical propositions 
contain a deposit of social experiences such as the order of generation and property relations 
which claim priority over the being and consciousness of the individual, these relations 
constantly confront the psychological subject as something valid and compelling hi itself 
and yet as arbitrary also. This is also the case with Husserl's 'propositions in themselves' 
though much against his will.' The bonds tired in resistance have to be transcended if 
freedom is to prevail. Historically, modernist and avant-garde antipsychologism was 
socialized and made serviceable to the status quo. Protracted by subjective mechanisms, the 
protest against a social order heteronomously imposed upon its subjects became a turn 
towards the category of inwardness. According to Adorno, this move served to cultivate an 
anthropological type of dutiful servant, ready to quasi-voluntarily perform, or labour in the 
manner required by the new mode of production necessitated by the relations of production. 
Inwardness is marked by an indifference and readiness to leave things as they are. Adorno 
proposes simply to crash through such facades in order to rescue the postulate of depth from 
ideology. This is inconceivable if the mimetic element is repressed or the autonomous self 
weakened. 'Empirically it has been confirmed that inhibited, conventional and aggressive-
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the laws, customs, practices, and institutions that embody and express the 
collective identity and orientation of a people, has been rationalized in 
accordance with the needs and autonomous mechanisms of capitalist 
reproduction. Hence life has become estranged through the determinations 
of objective powers that determine individual life through and through. This 
thesis will develop the claim that life has passed into an ideology where 
means and end are inverted: no longer production as the means to life, but 
life as the means to production.
The above hegemonic conception takes it as a given that the horizon 
open to the future is determined by expectations in the present that guide our 
access to the past. Past experiences orientated towards the future are said to 
preserve an authentic present as the locus of innovation and tradition. As this 
radical and modern time consciousness accelerates, as more is drawn into its 
orbit, the distance that opens between past experience and the horizon of 
expectation lends itself a Utopian quality, even as it closes off the future as a 
source of disruption.
In practice what can be characterized as effective or critical history 
grounds itself and circles around assumptions about certain kinds of cultural 
goods. The hegemonic conception of radical and modern time consciousness 
place culture towards the centre of its analysis, culture as lived or
reactionary individuals tend to reject "intraception" self-awareness in any form, and 
along with it expression as such as being all too human. They are the ones who, in a context 
of general estrangement from art, declare themselves with particular resentment against 
modernism. Psychologically they obey defence mechanisms with which a weakly 
developed ego repudiates whatever disturbs its restricted functional capacity and may, 
above all, damage its narcissism. This psychological posture is an "intolerance to 
ambiguity, " an impatience with what is ambivalent and not strictly definable; ultimately, it 
is the refusal of what is open, of what has not been predetermined by any jurisdiction, 
ultimately of experience itself Cf. "Dialectic of Inwardness; Aporias of Expression," 
Aesthetic Theory, pp. 115-116.
10
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professionally produced tends to elicit a certain kind of response: naturalism 
or immediacy in regards to the appropriation of psychic configurations and
i odiscourse. The lived experience of such comportment leads up to and 
includes Chapter Five, Reflection/Reflexion.
Coded in the extreme and in proportion the thesis title, "Experiential 
Embodiment and Human Immediacy: Adorno's Negative Affinity" more 
generally refers to mediations of the given: the processes, practices, and 
behaviours, which now and then surround, invest with qualities, the life that 
becomes the object of philosophical concern. In order to comprehend the 
object, the philosophical life, or more succinctly the good life, the thesis 
endeavours to grasp a particular "something" in its development: a fragment 
assessed in the light of the standards it crystallizes or precipitates. To this 
end the philosophy of Theodor Adorno is the occasion and not the point of 
the thesis. A thesis moreover from which, upon reflection and then even 
more generally, there arises the question of what it means to live in the rich, 
educationally and technologically advanced twenty first century.
In an engaging restaging it will be argued, by way of a reflection on 
the philosophy of Adorno, that whereas life in its resistance and opposition 
has an ephemeral appearance, much as the subject itself, much of what was 
regarded as the true field of the philosophical teaching, that's to say the 
good-life, has since philosophy's conversion into mere method, lapsed into 
neglect. Life, rather than being the preponderance of the organic; vital; 
moral; and ethical, has come to mean the sphere of private existence and
12 Cf. Jtirgen Habermas, "Excursus on Benjamins's Thesis on the Philosophy of History," 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence, (Great Britain, Polity 
Press: 2002), pp. 12-13.
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consumption, an appendage of the process of material and technical 
production without autonomy or substance of its own. The achievement of 
the technological culture industry is standardization and the mass production 
of a hierarchical range of products. On the definition of substance and 
quality, activity and suffering, being and existence, technology, which does 
not work by directing concepts images or fortunate insights, is silent. 
Technology refers to method, the exploitation of others work, and capital. Its 
rationale is that of domination, its nature is coercive.
To give expression to suffering and convey the objectivity of 
experience requires language and the contextual setting of this becomes the 
concern and content of Chapter One: Language, Authenticity, Being. Chapter 
One, articulates the nature of language in Adorno's thinking on language, its 
distinctive use and ultimately its materiality. The implication being that in 
the idealistic and naive idea that rational drafts might pre-design the 
structure, abundance, and fullness of Being, what is lost is the 
preponderance of the object. 13 The concrete setting is the physical and 
material, the ethical and universal, the lived human world, a world plagued 
by barbarism and its rationalized acceptance. Seeking to clarify Adorno's 
position as against the demands of a bureaucratizing scientific rationality 
and an obscurantist fundamental ontology, the chapter concludes with the 
claim that philosophy, rather than inhabiting the poetical, is to be constituted
13 For an example of the idealistic turn to the subject in modern philosophy, Cf. "The 
Actuality of Philosophy,' The Adorno Reader, Editor. Brian O'Connor, trans. Benjamin 
Snow, (India: Blackwell, 2000) p. 27. 'With Heidegger, at least in his published writings, 
the question of objective ideas and objective being has been replaced by the subjective. The 
challenge of material is reduced to the realm of subjectivity, within the depths of which it 
searches for what it was not able to locate in the open fullness of reality. It is thus no 
accident, in the philosophical-historical sense as well, that Heidegger falls back on precisely 
the latest plan for a subjective ontology produced by Western thinking: The existentialist
12
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out of a nexus of concepts. 14
This claim becomes the interpretive setting and context of Chapter 
Two: Concept and Constellation. According to Adorno, philosophy in order 
to interpret unintentional reality has to bring its elements into changing 
constellations or trial combinations until they fall into a figure.
'The task of philosophy is not to search for concealed and manifest 
intentions of reality but to interpret unintentional reality, in that, by the 
power of constructing figures, or images (Bilder), out of the isolated 
elements of reality.' it negates (aufhebt) questions, [...].' 15
The images or figures are contributions from subjective experience that are 
not images of something, and according to Adorno they are essentially 
collective and precisely the way art is mediated to experience.
'By virtue of this experiential content [Erfarungsgehalt], and not 
primarily as a result of fixation or forming as they are normally 
conceived, artworks diverge from empirical reality: empiria through 
empirical deformation. This is the affinity of the artworks to the 
dream, however far they are removed from dreams by their law of 
form.' 16
The affinity between interpretive philosophy, materialism and art 
becomes the context under which the chapter develops it concerns, in the 
process negating the question of whether there is such an affinity. Ideas 
would be at the same time historical images the configuration of which, 
rather than appearing in history as intention, constitute unintentional truth. 
The assemblage and its interpretation are resolved dialectically. The change- 
causing question of the constellation provides the image of the resolution
philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard.'
14 Cf. "Lecture Nine," Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, p. 68. For Adorno the 
philosophical concept alone in-itself is worthy of critical rescue: in times of despair 
concepts provide, if not the 'consolation of philosophy,' then at least a 'consolation for 
philosophy.'
15 "The Actuality of Philosophy," The Adorno Reader, p. 32.
16 "Image Content is Collective," Aesthetic Theory, p. 86.
13
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which material praxis alone has access. 17As Chapter Two develops 
interpretation succeeds through a juxtaposition of small and unintentional 
elements divorced from a role in the great problems from the philosophical 
tradition. Construction out of small and unintended elements is thus a basic 
assumption of philosophical interpretation turning away from the traditional
1 o
and symbolic to the "refuse of the world" (Abhub der Erscheinungswelt).
In order to derive meaning objectivity tries to admit as many 
possibilities, as many connections as may arise: an alternative path or 
possibility is always transmitted objectively. The productive imagination 
that finds its orientation through objective interests and reflections, feeds on 
impulses from the historical, which are one kind of association. The 
intellectual experience affects the conceptual form. Hence another theme of 
the work becomes Adomo's attitude to objectivity and the suffering 
objectively conveyed. 19 Chapter Three, Objectivity, turns to historically 
manifested truth in its attempt to critically rescue the embodied subject from 
its immanent spatiality and ordination. At the present historical stage 
objectivity finds its substance in the factual, its being in the neutral and 
impartial. Adorno's methodological constellation critically reframes the 
concept.
The objectivity of the experiential content as unconscious 
historiography, overgrows what was subjectively intended and comes to 
resemble or act as if it were itself the subjective moment. Breaking through 
the subjective shell, objectivity makes it appear as if the expressed is the
17 Cf. "The Actuality of Philosophy," The Adorno Reader, p. 32.
18 Cf. "The Actuality of Philosophy," The Adorno Reader, p. 32.
19 See above, footnote 8.
14
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experiential content. But that is not the case. The expressive element, what is 
expressed, is an attempt to articulate experience, intellectual experience: that 
which wants to come out into the open but cannot except as concepts, which
Of\
are basically its opposite.
The overwhelming objectivity of the historical movement in the 
present consists so far only in the dissolution of the subject, without yet 
giving rise to a new one. Individual experience necessarily basis itself on the 
now historically condemned old subject which is still for-itself but no longer 
in-itself. Hence considerations that start out from the subject remain false to 
the same extent that life has become appearance. Contemporary 
consciousness is sustained by the unthinking inertia of the appearance. As 
false consciousness it does not recognize the contradictions in the subject. It 
affirms the given situation without recognizing the problematic nature of its 
criterion: A corollary of false consciousness is reification. Reification means 
the perception of what is qualitative as quantitative. In the reduction unique 
qualitative characteristics are missed or glossed-over. Reification is 
produced by the particular structure of exchange society. The exchange 
imperative has the power to influence consciousness.
Rather than responding openly to the object reified consciousness 
judges unreflectively through categories or alternatives established a priori. 
The belief that subjectivity has the power of mastery over its environment 
stems from this categorical performance. The nonidentity between the 
concept and object which would facilitate a new judgement goes 
unrecognized. Subjectivity for Adorno, describes a contradiction, neither
20 Cf. "Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 138.
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sovereign nor autonomous but constituted by society, it defines individuals 
themselves by the roles that are required for the preservation of that 
society.21
Following Adorno, Chapter Three argues that if objectivity, a concept 
unavoidably bound up with language and memory, is the self-unconscious 
schema under which the subject brings its otherness, then objectivity 
identifies, and if this identity is to pass into its other then it cannot be denied 
for the greater glory of abstract identity or naked self-preservation, it must 
be preserved in its resistance and its schema definitively negated.
The reason for this, reflected upon up to and throughout Chapter 
Three is that the less affinity to things objectivity tolerates, the more 
ruthlessly will it identify. For Adorno affinity is not a positive ontological 
definition of the other. Rather it is the determinate negation of objective 
schemata. Affinity, without which there is no truth, emerges by way of 
reflection and points to the preponderance of the object. Objectively 
speaking there is always an excess, a refusal to sanction things as they are, 
which means a process of questioning the immediate, immanent act of being 
touched by the object. Being touched, embodied as aesthetic comportment is 
the shudder in which subjectivity stirs and in light of which mimesis and 
rationality can be said to complement each other. This claim forms the basis 
of Chapter Four, Mimesis and Rationality.
Developing its theme Chapter Four argues that rationality is 
synonymous with the justified and well founded. Abolishing reason's sense 
of unity in favour of a pluralistic rationality, returns reason as ratio an
21 Cf. "Introduction," The Adorno Reader, pp. 12-14.
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expanded sphere of rational significance. As rationalised reason and 
instrumental reason become total the semi-cultivated state cancels the other, 
cancels mimesis.
The one and only route to recovery is the artwork itself. Art, a refuge 
for aesthetic comportment, appears as the historical voice of suppressed 
nature. Art refers the human to areas of experience not available to 
instrumental rationality and as such it is the purveyor of vital experience. 
The nature of that experience is looked at in the concluding chapter, Art and 
Aesthetics.
In Chapter Four, the claim is made that in order to do justice to the 
artwork requires knowledge of it. In mimetic apprehension we entertain the 
hypothetical or the possible and all the incipient commitments and defences, 
expectations, which occur in experiential knowledge but are absent from 
propositional or conceptual knowing. Mimesis successfully conveys the 
object in a way that deepens our experiential knowledge of it. Conceptual 
knowledge is increased by addition and elaboration of proposition. 
Experiential knowledge grows by intensification, a deepening of 
acquaintance. It does not lend itself to the summary form. To sum up a life 
or a lover or an event like Auschwitz stirs a concomitant sense of injustice. 
The experiential is usually expressed, not in propositions, but in simple 
nouns, images, concrete universals that display as much of the concrete 
particular or instance as is possible.
The argument that artworks, being non-conceptual are best able to 
express objectively something of the experiential whilst at the same time 
stimulating the faculty of apprehension and engagement is a claim
17
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developed through out up to and including Chapter Four, Mimesis and
*70
Rationality. Artworks recuperate what was once literally and directly 
experienced, but was expulsed by spirit. Autonomous artworks, even the 
most sublime, take up a determined attitude to empirical reality by stepping 
outside its constraining spell not once and for all but for ever and again. The 
productivity and explosive power of this basic aesthetic experience is that of 
a subjectivity liberated from the imperative of purposive activity.
Curiosity draws its strength from experience of the multitudinous, 
from digression and salvation. The self loses itself in order to find itself 
anew. The estrangement from nature is also abandonment to nature. As with 
art, as new dimensions emerge they refuse older ones, the over elaborated 
and highly developed forms of reaction and false richness. Adomo settles his 
charges with a challenge, to glimpse a changed production and changed 
preponderance of relations, a change more worthy of the human. Removing 
the self from its supposed logical course are dangerous temptations, the 
allurement of new experience.
'I would just point out that perhaps one of the clearest manifestations 
of what I am concerned with here is the way in which certain names 
can vouch for that [metaphysical] experience. [...] [O]ne has the 
feeling: if only one were there, at that place that would be it. This 'it'- 
what the 'it' is - is extraordinarily difficult to say; one will probably 
be able to say, [...] that it is happiness. When one later reaches 
such places, it is not there either, one does not find 'it'. [...] But the 
curious thing is that, even if the 'it' is not there, if one does not 
find [...] any of that fulfilment which is stored up in its name, 
nevertheless, one is not disappointed. The reason, if I am interpreting 
it correctly, is that [...] one is, as it were too close, one is inside the 
phenomenon, and being completely inside it, one cannot actually catch 
sight of it. Once, many years ago, in Minima Moralia I wrote about 
thanking and gratitude, which have their dignity, [...] because the 
giving of thanks is the only relationship that consciousness can have
22 Cf. A. D. Nuttal, "The Dissolution of Mimesis," A New Mimesis: Shakespeare and the 
Representation of Reality, (Great Britain: Methuen, 1983) pp. 75-78.
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to happiness, whereas the person who is happy is to close to it to have 
any standpoint towards it within consciousness.[...] I would 
say, therefore, that happiness - and there is an extremely deep 
constellation between metaphysical experience and happiness - is 
something within objects and, at the same time, remote from.' 23
Philosophy, thinking that goes beyond, into the open, into openness its 
openness to, that, precisely, according to Adorno, is metaphysics, itself a 
curious characteristic of philosophy. With some sense of precision Adorno 
describes metaphysics as the unity of a critical and rescuing intention. 
Metaphysics, he says,
[...] 'is always present where enlightened rationalism both criticizes 
traditional notions and ideas, ideas existing in themselves, as 
mythological, and at the same time - and not out of an apologetic 
need, but out of concern for truth - wants to save or restore these 
concepts, which reason has demolished, precisely through the 
application of reason, or even to produce them anew from within its
i i24
own rational resources.
Where mimesis, the nonconceptual affinity for the other, is touched by 
reason the impulse is true. Rationality on the other hand defines, determines 
and masters it object: for rationality the object is control, domination and 
power.
'Black shrouds cover the horizon of a state of freedom that would no 
longer require repression or morality, because drives would no longer
23 "Lecture Eighteen," Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, p. 140. Cf. "Happiness and Idle 
Waiting," Negative Dialectics, p. 373. 'What is a metaphysical experience? If we disdain 
projecting it upon allegedly primal religious experiences, we are most likely to visualize it 
as Proust did, in the happiness, for instance, that is promised by village names like 
Applebachville, Wind Gap, or Lords Valley. One thinks that going there would bring the 
fulfilment, as if there were such a thing. Being really there makes the promise recede like a 
rainbow. And yet one is not disappointed: the feeling now is one of being to close, rather, 
and not seeing it for that reason. [...] To the child it is self-evident that what delights him hi 
his favourite village is found only there, there alone and nowhere else. He is mistaken; but 
his mistake creates the model of experience, of a concept that will end up as the concept of 
the thing itself, not as a poor projection from things.' For Adorno the feeling of Deja vu 
would be another stratum of these experiences. It is noteworthy that negative dialectics too, 
does not begin by taking a standpoint. 'Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity. It 
does not begin by taking a standpoint. My thought is driven to it by its own inevitable 
insufficiency, by my guilt of what I am thinking.'
24 "Lecture Eight," Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, p. 51
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have to be expressed in destruction. It is not in their nauseating 
parody, sexual repression, that moral questions are succinctly posed; it 
is in lines such as: No man should be tortured; there should be no 
concentration camps while all of this continues in Asia and Africa 
and is repressed merely because, as ever, the humanity of civilization 
is inhumane toward to the people it shamelessly brands as uncivilized. 
But if a moral philosopher were to seize upon these lines and to exult 
at having caught the critics of morality, at last caught them quoting 
the same values that are happily proclaimed by the philosophy of 
morals his cogent conclusion would be false. The lines are true as an 
impulse, as a reaction to the news that torture is going on somewhere. 
They must not be rationalized; as an abstract principle they would fall 
promptly into the bad infinities of derivation and validity.' 25
That such experience is in danger of being trivialized or sacrificed to a 
rationality enthralled by the distortions of socio-economic power and 
domination is the starting point for Chapter Five, Reflection/Reflexion.
Although the orientation of philosophies of reflection is towards ideas 
of knowledge, conscious awareness, self-consciousness, production and 
exchange relations, identification with philosophies of praxis continue to 
dominate. It is production and its concomitant relations that constitute an 
object or content for normative rules. Hegel had anticipated this logic. 
Hegel's objective idealism because of its identification of existence with 
spirit has as its object the actual power that existence holds over people. 
Spirit is to concede to existence in actuality. It is a small step, a minor 
adjustment that gives us the materialist version of this.
What Hegel calls world spirit is the spirit that asserts itself despite 
people's wishes: it is the primacy of the flow of events that they find 
themselves caught up in or impinge on them no less than facts. 
Reflection/Reflexion, develops the notion that prior to judgement and 
understanding there is in a sense a choice between heteronymous
25 "On the State of Freedom," Negative Dialectics, p. 285.
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objectifying elements, the intelligibility of the matter which the subjective 
judgement discovers there and makes manifest. The objective emphasis is a 
reflexive response, a specification, a will. Critical argument is specifically 
the exchange of alternative specifications. At its most serious level the 
argument is an analysis of how the really basic conditions of life, pertaining 
to physical existence and survival, are perceived, selected, and interpreted.
All philosophies are interwoven with arguments that support a world 
view: a particular account of experience. Reflexivity is the critical stance 
required by critical theory. Experience has a structure of reciprocity and 
transformation in the medium of conceptual reflection. Reflection, Reflexion, 
itself reflects the manner in which Adorno seeks to rescue experience, the 
experiential whereby a subject is affected and changed by its engagement 
with an aspect of objective reality, from a range of basic assumptions to be 
found throughout the spectrum of modern philosophy. 'Understanding has to
*7 f\find a foothold in the gap between experience and concept.' Artworks are 
one of the means that bring to light the distortions of the dominant 
rationality. Chapter Five reveals how it is possible to question the given and 
recognize the distortions of experience by the dominant rationality.
Chapter Six, Art and Aesthetics, makes the claim that art's immanent 
historicity as dialectic of nature and domination is of the same essence as the
/~)'7 _
dialectic external to them. The subject feels sure of its autonomy but the
26 Theodor Adorno, "Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel," Hegel: Three Studies, trans. 
Shierry Weber Nicholson, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), p. 138.
27 Cf. "Dialectic of Integration and the Subjective Point," Aesthetic Theory, p. 29. 'The 
power of the aesthetic subject to integrate whatever it takes hold of is at the same time its 
weakness. It capitulates to a unity that is alienated by virtue of its abstracmess and 
resignedly casts its lot with blind necessity. If the whole of modern art can be understood as 
the perpetual intervention of the subject, one that is at no point disposed to allow the 
unreflected governance of the traditional play of forces within the artwork, the permanent
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nullity demonstrated to the subject is already overtaking the form of 
subjectivity itself. Subjective reflection and lamentation over the course of 
the world have a sentimental and anachronistic feel to them and are to be 
rejected not for their good faith but because the lamenting subject threatens 
to becomes arrested in its condition and so in turn fulfils the law of the 
world's course.
The subjectivity that Adorno seeks to rescue, and explored in Chapter 
Six, comes about as a consequence of reflection upon the objective subject 
matter. Beyond subjective intention formal and technical reflection reveals 
the human subject through the productive tension between the planned and 
the spontaneous. 'Fidelity to one's own state of consciousness and 
experience is forever in temptation of lapsing into infidelity, by denying the
Oftinsight that transcends the individual and calls his substance by name.' The 
socialization of society enfeebles and undermines the individual who has 
otherwise garnered much differentiation, vigour and richness which, 
encountered in the decay, contributes once more to knowledge that had 
become obscured in the dominant category construed as the self. 29
Hegelian dialectical theory which argued against the being-for-itself 
of subjectivity abhors anything isolated, particular. Individuation and drive 
are given an inferior status in the construction of the harmonious whole. 
With that Hegel forgets his own demand to be in the matter and not always 
beyond it. In an individualistic society social analysis can learn much from
interventions of the ego are matched by a tendency of the ego to abdicate out of weakness. 
[   ] [T]his abdication takes the form of reification of subjective achievements, effectively 
locating them exterior to the subject and mistaking the abdication of the subject for a 
guarantee of ironclad objectivity. Technique, the extended arm of the subject, also leads 
away from the subject.'
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individual experiences: the converse of the large historical categories of 
patriarchal meagreness. Critical thought in its distance from affirmative 
culture seeks a changed production and a change in the relations of 
production, an experiential move towards something that is more worthy of
human beings.
Arts formal autonomy requires criticism in order to release its 
resistance to conceptual and rational determination. Even this gets turned 
into coin. All reflections on art are disturbed in this way. The claims of 
romantic art privilege the idea that it gives access to non-conceptual truth 
and this is fully exploited by commercial society. The artwork's truth is its 
critical content. This is the critical thrust of Chapter Six. The claim is made 
that an artworks success in the aesthetic tradition is indicated by its setting
itself against society.
The truth content of this claim emerges in negative terms. Through the 
immanent and primary play of forces the artwork converges with external 
reality. Where the sensuous pleasing gives access to the alluring
28 "Dedication," Minima Moralia, p. 16.
29 Cf. "Dedication.,'" Minima Moralia, pp. 16-17
30 Cf. "On the Relation of Art and Society," Aesthetic Theory, p. 5. 'The aesthetic force of 
production is the same as that of productive labour and has the same teleology; and what 
may be called aesthetic relations of production all that in which the productive force is 
embedded and in which it is active are sedimentations or imprintings of social relations of 
production. Art's double character as both autonomous and fait social is incessantly 
reproduced on the level of its autonomy.'
31 Cf. 'Only by virtue of opposition to production, as still not wholly encompassed by this 
order can men bring about another more worthy of human beings.' "Dedication," Minima 
Moralia, p. 15.
32 Cf. "Exhibitionist," Minima Moralia, p. 212. 'Artists do not sublimate. That they neither 
satisfy nor repress their desires, but transform them into socially desirable achievements, 
their works, is a psycho-analytical illusion; incidentally, legitimate works of art are socially 
undesired. Rather, artists display violent instincts, free-floating and yet colliding with 
reality, marked by neurosis. Even the philistine's dream of the actor or violinist as the 
synthesis of a bundle of nerves and a tugger of heart-strings, has more truth than the no less 
philistine economic theory of instincts according to which the favourite children of 
renunciation get rid of the stuff hi symphonies and novels. Their lot is rather a hysterically 
excessive lack of inhibition over every conceivable fear; narcissism taken to its paranoiac
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sensuousness of pain by transfiguring into its antithesis, the immense 
importance of dissonance is revealed as an archetype of ambivalence. 
Dissonance elicits from within the work social alienation: congealing into 
indifferent material a new form of immediacy. Without memory trace of its 
own development and what it developed out of it becomes anonymous. 
Without its place in society the aesthetic fragments into, on the one hand, a 
reified cultural possession and on the other a subjective source of pleasure 
that has little to do with the object itself.
Chapter Six, Art and Aesthetics, develops the notion that the happiness 
given through art's escapism is accidental and less essential than the
happiness in its knowledge. The concept of aesthetic pleasure as 
constitutive of art is to be superseded.
'If [...] all feeling related to an aesthetic object has an accidental 
aspect, usually that of psychological projection, then what the work 
demands from its beholder is knowledge, and indeed, knowledge 
that does justice to it: The work wants its truth and untruth to be 
grasped.' 34
Through their denial or transcendence of the magical, artworks claim 
rationality and retain an intentionality, the domination of nature, the aim of 
all rationality, that without the explication of its means, mimesis, mimetic
c
impulses, is not rational.
limit. To anything sublimated they oppose idiosyncrasies.'
33 See below, p. 217.
34 "Aesthetic Hedonism and the Happiness of Knowledge," Aesthetic Theory, p. 15.
35 The means art utilizes is mimesis. This term is somewhat divisive among philosophers. 
To those loosely called poststructuralist it is akin to imitation. The Frankfurt school were 
generally more sympathetic and found much that was good in their use of the term. Marcuse 
does give us a good example of the opposing viewpoint. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, "The New 
Forms of Control," One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial 
Society, (Great Britain: Ark Paperbacks, 1986), pp. 10-11. 'Mass production and mass 
distribution claim the entire individual, and industrial psychology has long ceased to be 
confined to the factory. The manifold processes of introjection seem to be ossified in almost 
mechanical reactions. The result is, not adjustment but mimesis: an immediate identification 
of the individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole. This
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Intentions, without which form would not exist any more than it 
would without the mimetic impulse, have their locus in the dialectic between 
the mimetic pole of artworks and their methexis in enlightenment. The line 
drawn by intent, rational identity:
'[...] whether in our consciousness, theoretically and in the resulting 
practice, we maintain that identity is the ultimate, that it is absolute, 
that we want to reinforce it or whether we feel that identity is the 
universal coercive mechanism which we, too, finally need to free 
ourselves from universal coercion, [...].' 36
hi art, intention, the immanent form of the principle of identity, has its locus 
not only in being the subjectively moving and organizing force but also in 
the objectivity of the artwork itself. The subject's subjective synthesis 
objectively mediated by the individual bearer of intentions extinguishes 
itself in the artwork through an inner process of identity which is essentially
that between the material and intention. As the material is resistant to the 
artworks otherwise pure identity, no intention is assured of being realized in 
the work. The surplus of intentions, that which is not extinguished and 
flickers in the artwork, reveals that the objectivity of artworks cannot be 
reduced to mimesis. 'It is by way of concepts that art sets free its mimetic,
immediate, automatic identification [...] reappears in high industrial civilization; its new 
"immediacy," however, is the product of a sophisticated, scientific management and 
organization. In this process, the "inner" dimensions of the mind in which opposition to the 
status quo can take root is whittled down. The loss of this dimension, hi which the power of 
negative thinking the critical power of Reason is at home, is the ideological counterpart 
to the very material process in which advanced industrial society silences and reconciles the 
opposition. The impact of progress turns Reason into submission to the facts of life, and to 
the dynamic capability of producing more and bigger facts of the same sort of life. The 
efficiency of the system blunts the individuals' recognition that it contains no facts which 
do not communicate the repressive power of the whole.' In the same context Adorno tends 
to use words like "mimic," "super-ego" or more commonly just plain "immediacy."
36 Cf. "On the Dialectics of Identity," Negative Dialectics, p. 147.
37 Cf. "Intention and Meaning," Aesthetic Theory, p. 151. Although it is inherently 
problematic and evidently not all there is to art works '[t]he objective bearer of intentions, 
which synthesizes the individual intentions of artworks into a whole, is their meaning.'
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non-conceptual layer.' 38
The organic adaptation to others and the organized control of mimesis 
is replaced, in the historic phase, by rational practice, by work and self- 
assertion. What is sought in nature is the key to its domination and use. 
Nature is disqualified as chaotic at the same time becoming a matter of mere 
classification, the possession of an all powerful and sovereign self. 
Domination of inner and outer nature aims at liberating people from fear and 
establishing rationality. In the process the sensuous mimetic elements are 
blocked, replace by an abstraction and instrumentality of absolute 
difference. Something like an address is made to rescue the subject through 
art.
'It is not through the abstract negation of the ratio, nor through a 
immediate eidetic vision of essences, that art seeks justice for the 
repressed, but rather by revoking the violent act of rationality by 
emancipating rationality from what it holds to be its inalienable 
material in the empirical world.' 39
The hegemony of the object and the concomitant deformations of 
social and enlightened thought are, as an axiological orientation of 
modernism, made manifest through its most estranged forms. For example in 
the world of contemporary music, high modernism is one of these estranged 
forms. In this instance high modernism means the progressive, 
technologically grounded, mathematized, computerized, and future 
orientated. The sort of thing exemplified by IRCAM, the state funded, 
internationally renowned, Paris based research institute connecting music 
with acoustics, technology with theory.
38 "Art Beauty," Aesthetic Theory, p. 96.
39 "Coherence and Meaning," Aesthetic Theory, p. 139.
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The high modernist avant-garde is so complex and unconventional 
that it is unapproachable by everyone bar the specialist or the curious. In the 
absence of validation by the market or public in order to secure the future for 
this cutting edge music, high modernism, like other science based projects, 
retreats into institutions: subsidized arenas where legitimacy becomes a 
question after the accumulation of cultural authority. The technological 
wields its cultural power and marshals its forces against other disparate 
groups eager for some of that subsidized power. English opera, for one, 
could tell a different story about life in the subsidized zone. Beyond the 
question of funding what this example illustrates is a particular time- 
consciousness or understanding of time. Tying and untying these little knots 
of thought, as a kind of intentional problem within the thesis, is part of its 
dialectical conception and negative movement. A sense of negative affinity 
concomitant with de-systematization or contradiction, the process not the 
transcendental residue or resultant, can be said to inform to a degree all 
aspects of the work.
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Chapter One: Language, Authenticity, Being.
'Philosophy lives in symbiosis with science and cannot 
break from it without dogmatism and ultimately relapsing 
into mythology. Yet the content of philosophy should be to 
express what is neglected or excised by science, by the 
division of labour, by the forms of reflection entailed by 
the bustle of self-preservation. For this reason 
philosophy's progress simultaneously recedes from the 
goal of its progress; the force of experience that 
philosophy registers is weakened the more it is honed 
down by the scientific apparatus. [...] Philosophical 
progress is deceitful because, the tighter, the airtight and
unassailable its propositions become, the more it
40 becomes identity-thinking."
-Theodor W. Adorno
According Adorno philosophy cannot neglect the demand for clarity or deny 
the possibility of its existence. 41 To paraphrase Adorno, that the expression 
fit the matter expressed should be the case even where the matter at hand 
does not conform to the norm of what can be indicated clearly. Clarity and 
distinctiveness are not themselves given and are not characteristics of what 
is given. Clarity is not self evident. To evaluate the worth of knowledge by 
how clearly and unequivocally items of knowledge present themselves 
belongs to a reified consciousness that freeze frames objects in order to 
make them available for science and praxis. Problems, in which the concepts 
used are not clearly defined, for example the concept of freedom, are choked 
off by a semantical taboo: preliminary considerations that degenerate into a 
ban on consideration. Accordingly means gain primacy over ends.
What may or may not be reflected on is regulated by approved modes 
of proceeding, methods of exactitude inappropriate to the goals of
40 Theodor Adorno, "Progress," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, trans. 
Henry W. Pickford (United States of America: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 158.
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cognition.42 For Adorno philosophy is concerned with something that has no 
place within the pre-given order of ideas and objects, something that cannot 
simply be mapped on a system of coordinates.
'Wittgenstein's maxim, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must 
be silent,"43 in which the extreme of positivism spills over into the 
gesture of reverent authoritarian authenticity, and which for that 
reason exerts a kind of intellectual mass suggestion, is utterly 
antiphilosophical. If philosophy can be defined at all, it is an effort to 
express things one cannot speak about, to express the nonidentical 
despite the fact that expressing it identifies it at the same time.'544
Philosophy which in-itself doesn't balk when confronted by the equivocal is 
faced with a paradox: to say clearly something that is unclear and does not 
accommodate reiflcation, to say it in such a way that the unfixed or not 
accessible are indicated with the utmost distinctiveness. Philosophy must try 
to explain the limits of clarity itself by reflecting on material concreteness, 
definition, and fulfilment: language and its relationship to the matter at hand. 
The goal to be pursued and insisted upon is to utter the unutterable. For 
Adorno:
'The plain contradictoriness of this challenge [for transparent 
language] is that of philosophy itself, which is therefore qualified as 
dialectics before getting entangled in its individual contradictions. The 
work of philosophical self-reflection consists in unravelling that 
paradox. Everything else is signification, second hand construction, 
pre-philosophical activity, today as in Hegel's time.' 45
In general one does not understand philosophy by eliminating 
contradictions, something all significant philosophies contain. 'One 
understands a philosophy by seeking its truth content precisely at the point
41 "Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 101.
42 ""Pseudoproblems"," Negative Dialectics, p. 211.
43 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Harcout Brace, 
1992), p. 189.
44 "Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 101.
45 "The Concern of Philosophy," Negative Dialectics, p. 9.
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where it becomes entangled in so-called contradictions.' 46
According to Adorno, the central contradiction the specific 
problematic of Aristotle's work is that, on the one hand, form [eidos] the 
principle of organization of a thing which leads it to have its particular 
existence, is supposed to be something immanent, mediated, inhering in an 
existent and yet, on the other, form is made into something which has being 
in itself. For Adorno Aristotle raises the problem of mediation between the 
immediately given and its form, he raises the problem but doesn't solve it.
Aristotle understands the existent as composed additively of form and 
matter, as a conjunction of these two moments, an interrelatedness that is 
almost a quantitative agglomeration. How the two moments are not 
perceived is as abstractions each of which needs the other through their own 
concept. He conceives the relation between the categories such that although 
neither could exist without the other they are not dependent on each other in 
terms of their meaning and constitution. Because of this they appear as 
absolutely separate.47 According to Adorno, Aristotle posits the sensibly 
certain as primary for us, and the pure forms as primary in themselves: as the 
metaphysically primary pure movers of everything.48
Untenable as the idea of mutually exclusive moments each postulating 
something certain and primary actually is, the sensible given and its 
abstraction do lead on to considerations concerning the concept of 
mediation, a concept that, as utilized by Aristotle, is significantly different
46 "Lecture Eight," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 53.
47 Cf. Aristotle, "Book Two, Chapter One, Soul as Form," De Anima, trans. Hugh Lawson- 
Tancred (England: Penguin, 1986), p. 156.
48 "Lecture Seven," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 44.
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49from the Hegelian.
'To put this paradoxically, one might say that in Aristotle mediation is 
not itself mediated. [...] He was a mediating thinker in the sense that 
his concern was always to find an intermediate position between two 
extremes, so that existence is to be understood here as a middle term 
between form and matter. But this mediation is really only something 
existing between the extremes, and not that which is implicit in the 
meaning of the extremes and is accomplished through the extremes 
themselves. [...] I would say that he is the mediating thinker par 
excellence, yet one lacking the idea of the dialectic.' 50
The difference from Aristotle lies in the fact that for Hegel the two moments 
of the extreme are no longer rigidly contrasted. They produce and reproduce 
each other so that one can no longer find something immediate that is not 
mediated. The two moments are forged anew at each stage before vanishing 
reconciled in the unity of the whole. Thus a particular and concrete thing 
grounded in sense-certainty is sublimated [aufheben] via the abstract 
universal concept of perception becoming in its transcendence and 
immanence grounded as a thing of concrete universal perception: a moment 
in the absolute. This dialectical movement is then repeated via the 
understanding eventually to become knowledge, and with the Marxist 
addendum history.
According to Adorno, Hegel renews a controversy between Kant and 
Aristotle on a higher level. In Kant possibility is not separate from form. For 
Aristotle possibility is a definition of matter and this potentiality can be seen 
as the real foundation of every synthesis. This idea was misunderstood by 
epistemology and only reappears in Hegel's dialectic. In effect the idea 
states that every form depends on its material as much as material depends 
on its form. 'There is no categorical form to which there is not a
49 "Lecture Seven," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 43.
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corresponding moment in matter which calls for it.' 51 On the other hand 
since Kant's Copernican turn matter tends to be thought of as conditioned, 
so to speak, by form: spirit lays down the laws followed by nature, objects 
conform to knowledge not knowledge to objects. 52
For Aristotle syntheses the bringing together of facts in concepts, 
judgements, and conclusions, are not mere adjuncts to matter, they have a 
corresponding moment in matter. Matter is defined as mere possibility or 
potentiality because it must always have within it the possibility of attaining 
its reality or form. It is therefore a dynamic energetic principle not static and 
unchanging. Matter is conceived in an objective dialectic as a principle 
which has an inherent tendency to move ideologically or purposively 
towards a higher form. 53 Aristotle concludes from this that the prime mover 
is pure form or the absolutely perfect: Form is the perfect being and matter 
the imperfect. In the later idealist doctrine '[...] the matter of cognition is 
absolutely indeterminate, receiving all its determinates and thus all its 
content through form, that is, through subjectivity.'
Hegel's work could be described as an idealist reprise of Aristotle, the 
reason being that in the dialectic, movement is produced, caused, or 
triggered just because matter opposes its own potential, is in contradiction to 
it. The static ossification of mere existence or the special rigidity of social 
conditions is made the actual cause of the opposed, radical development.'
Aristotle conceives matter as a kind of autonomous principle that
50 "Lecture Seven," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 47.
51 "Lecture Nine," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 66.
52 Cf. Immanuel Kant, "Preface to Second Edition" Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1929), p. 25.
53 Cf. "Lecture Nine," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 63.
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makes it possible for the lowest generic concepts [e.g. the general concept 
"human being"] to be divided into multiplicity of individuals. The result is a 
conception of the concrete existing thing as the sum of the absolutely 
indeterminate on the one hand and its concept on the other.
'It might be said with some exaggeration that matter is the principium 
individuationis in Aristotle, and not, as we are inclined to think, form, 
which is that which determines a particular thing as a particular. For 
him, however, individuation itself is founded precisely on this 
particularization - the lack of identity, or full identity, of an existent 
thing with its form.' 56
Individuation is thus something negative in Aristotle, a thesis basic to all 
western metaphysics. It reappears for example in Kant, where cognition 
means the determining of an object in its generality and necessity, and in 
Hegel:
'[...] where only the universal manifesting itself through individuation 
is the substantial - whereas anything which lies outside the 
identification with the universal principle is regarded as absolutely 
insignificant ephemeral and unimportant. [...] The universal 
manifesting itself as pure form is, of course, the existing form of 
social dominance in abstractor and according to definition the bigger 
battalions in world history are justified in advance. You have here the 
equation of the universal with the good.' 57
By tirelessly mediating the immediate Hegel never relinquishes the effort to 
speak the universal. To speak the universal, instead of just reiterating its 
impossibility, Hegel's philosophy refuses to be intimidated to renounce the 
hope of coming to know the whole of reality and its contents. Hegel's 
version of the dialectic seems in constitution counterintuitive and raises 
doubts as to its possibility. The anticipation of moving in contradictions 
throughout projected into the region of the mind seems to teach a mental
54 "Lecture Seven," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 49.
55 Cf. "Lecture Eleven," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 79.
56 "Lecture Eleven," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 79.
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totality and is therefore part of the identity thesis that sees particulars as one-
CO
sided and wrong.
For Hegel the dialectic, totalizing in its momentum and direction, is 
to move towards the absolute through higher levels of abstraction. In 
practice the universality of its reason is the product of particular interests. 
What the individual maintains as irrefutably absolute and primary is derived 
and secondary even down to the immediacy of the sensory given. As itself 
the whole is not itself alone: it has its moments. Not until their synthesis or 
identification with each other will the moments be non-identical. This is why 
in the critique of positive negation ' [t]he non-identical is not to be obtained 
directly, as something positive on its part, [...].' 59 The truth of the whole, 
without which the dialectic would lack motivation, is preconceived and 
conditioned by society which is the objective determinant of the spirit.
For Hegel whose dialectic finds its ultimate truth to be its own 
impossibility thanks to its unresolved and vulnerable quality, the 
quintessence of the conditioned is the unconditioned, the absolute. The 
absolute is literally something utterly detached and gives a suspended, up in 
the air, hovering quality to Hegel's philosophy.
'Only so far as reflection has connection with the Absolute is it 
Reason and its deed a knowing. Through this connection with the 
Absolute, however, reflection's work passes away; only the 
connections persist, and it is the sole reality of the cognition. There is 
therefore no truth in isolated reflection, in pure thinking save its 
nullification. But because in philosophizing the Absolute gets 
produced by reflection for consciousness, it becomes thereby an 
objective totality, a whole of knowledge, an organization of 
cognitions. Within this organization, every part is at the same time the 
whole; for its standing is its connection with the Absolute. As a part
57 "Lecture Eleven," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, pp. 79-80.
58 Cf. "The Antagonistic Entirety," Negative Dialectics, p. 10.
59 "Critique of Positive Negation," Negative Dialectics, p. 158.
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that has other parts outside of it, it is something limited, and is only 
through the others. Isolated in its limitation the part is defective; 
meaning and coherence it has solely through its coherence with the 
whole.' 60
For Hegel the disparate and distant have, as elements of the whole, a 
relation. However if the Hegelian whole exists at all it does so as the 
quintessence of the partial moments which always point beyond themselves 
and are generated from one another. Hegel recognizes the primacy of the 
whole over its finite parts which are inadequate and in relation to the whole, 
which does not exist as something beyond them, contradictory. Hegel's 
category of totality is incompatible with any tendency to harmony. As a 
critic of Romanticism Hegel knows that the whole realizes itself through its 
parts, through discontinuity, sudden change, alienation, and reflection. 'This 
is what his category of totality is intended to convey.' 61 A dialectics that 
subsumes under identity, the "use value" in Marxist terminology, still retains 
the ineffable. The ineffable remains a possibility and therefore part of the 
Utopia that defies subsumption.
In the light of this concrete Utopian possibility, '[...] dialectics is the 
ontology of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be free 
of it: neither a system nor a contradiction.' 62 The mind that reflects on 
contradictions in the thing-itself because it, the mind, is the thing itself 
driving beyond any particular as one-sided and wrong is both the epitome 
and the negation of the subject.
According to Adorno, Hegel's deluded impulse to elevate spirit draws
60 G. W.F Hegel, Difference Between Fichte 's and Schelling 's System of Philosophy, as 
quoted in, "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 61.
61 "Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 4.
62 "The Antagonistic Entirety," Negative Dialectics, p. 11.
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strength from a resistance to the experience of post Kantian German 
Idealism, the narrow compartmentalization of life, the accumulation of dead 
knowledge and reified consciousness that he both dissolves and in 
opposition to romanticism salvages. The sense of desperate conceptuality 
and objectivity is mistaken for something positive by idealism. 'Their own 
reason, unconscious like the transcendental subject and establishing identity 
by barter, remains incommensurable with the subjects it reduces to the same 
denominator: the subject as the subjects foe.' 63 In society subjects are 
unknowable and incapacitated, hence the desperation, because the object of 
a mental experience is an antagonistic system in-itself.
According to Adorno, the system is not of the absolute it is of the 
conditioned spirit which in its unresolved part, the part unreconciled with the 
subject, is the subjective preconception of the material production process in 
society. The material production process in society is, according to Adorno, 
'basically different from its theoretical constitution.'
An achieved reconciliation, derived not from a seamless system but 
from a unity derived from un-reconcilable violence, gains ascendancy 
through production and exchange relations which, in all their moments, 
depend on certain social conditions of production. Production realizes the 
primacy of the whole over its parts and verifies the desperate impotence of 
the individual. Everything stands under the dominion of those who hold 
social production at their disposal. The self-forgetfulness of production that 
forgets human aims and unleashes the insatiable and destructive expansive 
principle of exchange into society, means that everything is to exist only for
64
63 "The Antagonistic Entirety," Negative Dialectics, p. 10.
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something else and not for its own sake. This systematic characteristic of a 
radicalized society is what is reflected in and anticipated by Hegelian 
metaphysics.65
Except [e contrario] where he talks of it in others,66 for Hegel clarity is 
never made thematic. According to Adorno, Hegel's formulations often 
sound like doctrine but they neither can be nor are intended to be conclusive. 
Hegelian texts are not fully worked because their intellectual medium is also 
not fully worked out. According to Adorno, Hegel's work and method, 
which cannot be separated from the matter at hand, is less subjectively 
individuated than one might think. In his own time Hegel provided key 
words for the reader and interpreters of his work. 'Entrances, as it were, such 
as occur in music.' 67 Husserl derived from the stubborn immediacy of the 
philosophy of reflection a distinction that acquiesces between fixed and 
mobile concepts. He accords to philosophical concepts as mobile concepts a 
distinction from exact concepts. The distinction is made by virtue of the 
nature of what the descriptive and exact sciences attempt to grasp. Hegel is 
far more vigorous: less exacting, more descriptive. According to Adorno, he 
attempts to construct concepts in such a way that the life of the thing itself 
shines out of them or is made manifest in them. Hegelian concepts are not 
constructed to accord with the abstract epistemological idea of clarity. Such 
a construction has a tendency to repel troublesome thoughts. 68
64 Ibid.
65 Cf. "Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 27.
66 G.W.F. Hegel, History of Philosophy III, p. 176. 'The obscurity of this philosophy 
[Heraclitus'], however, chiefly consists in there being profound speculative thought 
contained in it; the concept, the idea, is foreign to the understanding and cannot be grasped 
by it [...].' Quoted in, "Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 102.
67 "Skoteinos, or how to read Hegel," Hegel: Three studies, p. 110.
68 Cf. "Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 104.
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According to Adorno, the divergent, dissonant, and negative will 
appear so for just as long as the structure of our consciousness makes totality 
or unity the measure for whatever is not identical with it. This rule of law is 
not a cogitative law it is real, a product of the administered world and the 
world's abstract monotony, raised to a concept. 69 Cognition must bow to this 
concept. It's full legitimating moves beyond the qualitative moment of 
discrimination in the concept. Discrimination is where the experience of the 
object turns into a form of subjective reaction. Discrimination "gaps" the 
presentation of an object; presents structures that upon reflection are not 
final and do not directly communicate the object. What is different from the 
concept, the remainder, has no other stage than that which concepts 
suppress, disparage, and discard. To reach for the nonconceptual the concept 
must transcend the concept, the preparatory and concluding element; it must 
go beyond whatever the truth concepts cover in their abstract range. 'To 
change this direction of conceptuality, to give it a turn towards nonidentity, 
is the hinge of negative dialectics.' 70 All concepts refer to nonconceptualities 
because the reality that requires conceptual formation does so mainly for the 
control of nature. 7 '
The motion of the concept that exempts it from the reality it is in turn 
harnessed gives the concept the semblance of being-in-itself: a self- 
sufficient totality. But what conceptualization appears to be in its sphere of 
engagement cannot be taken for what it is in itself. Inwardly in motion the 
concept is experienced as nonidentical, it is no longer purely itself: in
69 "Reality and Dialectics," Negative Dialectics, p. 6. 'Its agony is the world's agony raised 
to a concept
70 "Disenchantment of the Concept," Negative Dialectics, p. 12.
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Hegelian terminology, it leads to its otherness, an otherness it cannot absorb 
as the concept is defined by that which it is not.
According to Adorno, 'Objectively, dialectics means to break the 
compulsion to achieve identity, and to break it by means of the energy stored 
up in that compulsion and congealed in its objedifications.' 72 The otherness 
defines the concept but doesn't exhaust it. The concept is not itself alone. It 
is an element of dialectical logic and surviving in it is the nonconceptuality 
that has conveyed it by way of its meaning. To interpret the concept naively 
as the master of its own domain would be tantamount to a fetishistic 
viewpoint over which philosophical thought has no power. 
The form of the copula, the "is," pursues the object in order to pinpoint it. 
According to Adorno, philosophy provides a corrective to this.
Philosophical language, marked by its own impossibility, is a 
language in opposition to language. 73 Language that obeys formal logical 
rules proceeds immanently: its assertions are measured by its 
presuppositions. For science the word is a sign. As a system of signs 
language is required to resign itself to calculation in order to know nature: 
mathematics is the model.74 Language is susceptible to empirical 
confirmation; claims are to be followed by the leisurely marshalling of 
evidence rather than by further ambitious and ambiguous claims. By humbly 
deferring to mere existence thought fails to come to grip with nature and 
abandons the moment of freedom, spontaneity. In order to know nature 
science must discard the claim to be like her. Positive and reified language
71 Cf. "Disenchantment of the Concept," Negative Dialectics, p. 11.
72 "Synthesis," Negative Dialectics, p. 157.
73 Cf. "Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 100.
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presented in terms of first principles, that is, as static, invariant, and self- 
identical, is a system of detached signs devoid of any intention that would 
transcend the system. In this way thought seals itself off more from 
whatever does not emanate directly from its posited moment of truth. In 
contradistinction, for Adorno, the philosophical notion of truth-content 
consists in the negation of appearance; it seeks to transcend the immanence 
of appearance. To that end critical theory apprehends claims to immediacy 
or objectivity at the point where they effect to screen their social and 
historical mediation. Adorno contends that dialectics involves the attempt to 
provide a 'critical rescue' 75 of the rhetorical aspect of language, alongside 
the expressive and performative aspects of language.
Parallel to his understanding of social music as something that shocks 
the audience into a more active engagement, Adorno's philosophical 
writings intentionally thwart the efforts of the casual and passive reader. 76 
This is most evident where, in order to wrest language from the reductive 
shackle of ordinary and disciplinary language, Adorno uses paratactical 
devices as a principle to organize paragraphs. Parataxis avoids the use of 
either coordinating or subordinating elements. The result is a certain 
ambiguity, interplay of attractions and aversions and transmutations. The 
essay, another of Adorno's favoured procedures, is anti-dogmatic and 
permits spontaneity in its method which is unmethodical. Thought is to arise
74 Cf. "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 17-18.
75 "Rhetoric," Negative Dialectics, p. 56.
76 Cf. Theodor Adorno, "On The Social Situation of Music," trans. Wes Blomster; revised 
by Richard Leppert, Essays on Music, (United States of America: University of California 
Press, 2002), p. 393. 'Social postulates are offered [by music, which in this process stands 
equal to theories], the relationship of which to praxis might be, to be sure, extremely 
mediated and difficult or which, at any rate, cannot be generalized without great difficulty. 
It is these postulates, however, which decide whether and how the entrance into social
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from the material and less from the concepts that precede and threaten to 
overwhelm it. In the essay discreetly separated elements crystallize into a 
readable context, a configuration, a force field that doesn't eliminate those 
irritating and dangerous elements that live within concepts. The essay as 
arena of intellectual experience doesn't simplify for the sake of its edifice: 
the clarity of its structural presentation. The essay draws its impulse from 
experiences and memories: it takes them seriously rather than sacrificing 
them for the sake of precision. The essay form also takes the matter of 
presentation seriously more seriously than those procedures that atomize, 
build a continuum of operations and separate material from method. In the 
essay aspects of an argument interweave and according to Adorno, the 
fruitfulness of thought depends on the density of this texture. The essay 
takes the anti-systematic impulse into its own procedure and in doing so it 
drives beyond itself: The essay abrogates indisputable certainty as an ideal. 
It seeks to illuminate the object by being open to it: it is praxis, a movement, 
not a static cognitive ideal. 'The essay is determined by the unity of its 
object, together with that of theory and experience which have migrated into 
the object.' 77 Mediation between different kinds of activity and 
consciousness is within the object itself, not between the object and that to 
which it is brought.
The subjectively created context, the assembled thought, resembles 
writing through its conversion into objectivity by way of language. 
Language lends objectivity to concepts through the relations it enters into,
reality might be made.'
77 " The Essay as Form," The Adorno Reader, ed, Brian O'Connor (India: Blackwell
Publishing, 2006), p. 105.
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the potentiality it has for determining the objects interior. As this model of 
experience will end up as the concept of the thing itself it serves the intent of 
the concept to express itself and it's meaning unreservedly. This would fulfil 
the concept of the concept. Ideology is to be recognized in what fails to 
become substantial, what remains empty gesture, affirmative and one sided. 
Every impulse not yet comprehended in the immediacy of the collective 
schemata recollects what cannot be admitted to consciousness and so is 
repressed. Where impulses of anxiety and pain, vehement passions, have 
grown to an extreme degree they can no longer be controlled by the 
individual psyche and repression becomes a necessity. It is this state of 
repression, often appearing, in a positive light as a state of modesty and self- 
discipline which stands behind the rejection of expression, and that is itself 
one with suffering. What is needed is for expression to win back the density 
of experience. 79
The concept of metaphysics clings to the promise of happiness, of 
fulfilment, the frank exchange of a highly individuated reconstruction of 
experience which the world of the reigning universal denies. Experienced 
naively the joyful experience suggests acceding to the terms of the empirical 
world as in the final analysis it is they alone that can give metaphysics the 
chance of transcendence. The concept of metaphysics in its objective 
moment, a requirement of all metaphysical experience, is antithetical and 
antinomical and cannot be assimilated to the particular conditions of 
metaphysical experience, its fallibility and absolute presence in the living
78 Cf. "Constellation in Science," Negative Dialectics, p. 165.
79 "The Aging of the New Music," trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor and Frederic Will, Essays 
on Music, p. 191.
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subject. 'Happiness, the only part of metaphysical experience that is more 
than impotent longing, gives us the inside of objects as something removed 
from objects.' 80 The existing is overstepped by means of a universal derived 
from the existing order itself. The power of mere existence constantly 
threatens to reassert itself. Through the absolute rule of negation the 
movement of thought becomes implacably positive, an unambiguous, 
exclusive pattern of immanent antithesis.81 Despite the objectivity of 
metaphysical categories congealed in society a metaphysics proclaimed and 
imposed without recourse to the subjective experience of an immediately 
present subject fails to impresses. This is a version of the problem of the 
incommensurability between abstract, impersonal norms and the individual 
motivation for respecting them. The autonomous subject can simply refuse 
what it cannot understand. Negatively, metaphysics holds out in the demand 
"Can this be all?" tangible as a sense of waiting in vain. 82 The two motifs 
together, the objective and metaphysical, form what Adorno calls the 
'dialectical figure,' or the 'dialectical image.' 83 'Dialectical images: these are 
the historically-objective archetypes of that antagonistic unity of standstill 
and movement that defines the most universal bourgeois concept: 
progress.' 84
The norm of progress, what is generally understood by way of the 
concept, is economic development. Everything is subsumed under the
80 "Happiness and Idle Waiting," Negative Dialectics, p. 374.
81 "Bequest," Minima Moralia, p. 150.
82 "Happiness and Idle Waiting," Negative Dialectics, p. 375.
83 "Lecture Eighteen," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 142.
84
"Progress," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 160. There is a kinship as 
well as a contradiction between the concept of a metaphysical system that is static, 
concludes, brings to a standstill, and the dynamism of a pure, autarkic, subjective generation 
that establishes all philosophical systematics. Cf. "The Twofold Character of the System,"
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principle economic phases that have historically shaped society. From 
hunting and gathering to agriculture and industry, from fear of demons to 
reason, from deprivation to provision against epidemics, famine, tyrants, etc, 
without the overall improvement in living conditions progress would have 
no content. Reconciliation, the telos of all progress measured by finite 
criteria, is wedded to the immanent process of enlightenment that removes 
fear by holding up the human and humanitarianism as the answer to human 
beings' questions. At times progress, which is not identical to society, is its 
own opposite. For Adorno this means humanity becomes aware of its own 
inbred nature and strains to halt the domination it exacts upon nature and 
through which the domination of nature continues.85
A dialectical treatment of metaphysical experience today cannot 
suppose that the immutable is the true and the transient is the inferior. 
Historical compassion prevents one from presupposing such immutability. 
Historical experiences change the content and experience of metaphysics. 
The mutual indifference of the temporal world and ideas can no longer be 
maintained.
According to Adorno, there are isolated motifs scattered in the history 
of ideas, which hint at this. They are essentially heretical deductions of the 
infinite relevance of the intra-mundane and thus historical to the concept of 
transcendence. The metaphysics of the immutable is constantly confronted 
with evidence showing that it has abstracted its eternal values from the 
mutable and from experience. As far as they are able murderous apologetics 
attempt to keep such evidence at bay. A metaphysics that fulfilled its own
Negative Dialectics, p. 25.
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concept, that acknowledged its constellation of form and content, would 
have to assimilate the relevance of the temporal to its own concept. What is 
to be realised is that the separation of existence from the concept of being is 
only apparent and arbitrary.
The assimilation of the element of content into the concept of 
metaphysics changes its core values. By keeping and regarding everything 
that has happened as beneath it, everything earthly and human, metaphysics 
sided with the inhuman. For Adorno the inhumanity that necessarily presents 
itself as positive in its meaning and purpose has become intolerable. The 
metaphysical orientation towards divine principles of truth, beauty and 
goodness, which philosophers have concocted, mock the victims and their 
torment: torture and brutality continue to exist as a permanent institution. In 
a secret order of being all this will have had some kind of purpose or 
meaning.
'[T]he assertion of a purpose or meaning which is formally embedded 
in metaphysics is transformed into ideology, that is to say, into an 
empty solace which at the same time fulfils a very precise function in 
the world as it is: that of keeping people in line.' 86
Adorno directs his thesis against the attitude of the naive, unreflecting 
consciousness that refuses to countenance any change hi the objective 
content of metaphysics. Temporal elements that decisively affect thought 
centred on the metaphysical are dismissed as purely subjective, how one 
happens to feel towards metaphysics today.
That difficulties do exist for the subjective experience of metaphysics 
is not denied but given the entwinement between subjective and objective
85 Cf. "Progress," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, pp. 148-150
86 "Lecture Fourteen," Metaphysics, p. 104.
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experiences the truth cannot be as neatly separated as is claimed. In the 
development of a train of thought the dialectic between word and thing and 
between individual words and their relation to other words becomes self- 
conscious. Philosophical language transcends dialectically in the "more" 
formed by the mediation of the conceptual constellation. 'By themselves, 
constellations represent from without what the concept has cut away from 
within: the "more" which the concept is equally desirous and incapable of 
being.' 87 In the contradiction between truth as what is and thought as what is 
more or supplementary the dialectic overcomes itself. In the process what is 
true of the true is its untruth.
Language by being expressed manages to transcend the dynamic of its 
own structure.
'Speech though it deludes physical force, is incapable of restraint. Its 
flow is a parody accompanying the stream of consciousness, thought 
itself, whose unswerving autonomy acquires an aspect of 
foolishness manic foolishness once it enters reality in the form of 
discourse, as if thinking corresponded with reality, when in fact the 
former is superior to the latter merely by virtue of distance. But this 
distance is also anguish. Therefore it is intelligent tongues (contrary to
QO
the proverb) that are always ready to talk by the dozen.' 
Forever escaping what it judges the blithering and irresponsible volatility of 
thought are elements from the unbarbaric side of philosophy. On the other 
hand Adorno proffers a cautionary note: Too much talk will allow force and 
injustice to prevail as a principle. The clever man is objectively conditioned 
to affirm the non-existent superiority, of the word over force. Often the 
result is to prompt into action those that are to be feared. Those that perform 
the acts we should be fearful of are compelled by the mythical
87 "Constellation," Negative Dialectics, p. 162.
88 "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 68-69.
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compulsiveness of the word that is weaker than the pre-historical 
compulsion whose complement is arbitrariness. With the word 
enlightenment perpetuates or draws down disaster upon itself. 89 There is a 
situation and a method, which Adorno talks of in terms critiquing the culture 
industry, wherein the wordsmith or language manipulator is geared to 
mimetic regression, to the manipulation of repressed impulses to copy.90
The method involves anticipating the mark's or subjects imitation of 
itself, making it appear as if agreement already exists which the political 
manipulator or culture industry intends to create. 'The culture industry not 
so much adapts to the reaction of its customers as it counterfeits them.' 91 The 
culture industry is tied to a counterfacrual scenario whereby it models 
reactions to non-existent stimuli. 'Hence in the picture-house the 
enthusiastic music-titles, the idiotic nursery-talk, the winking folksiness; 
even the close up of the start seem to shout: how super!' 92 Adorno does 
provide a negative image of this process. People prepare themselves for 
terrors, the monstrous total state, etc, by familiarizing themselves with 
gigantic images. 'In its absurd readiness to accept these, impotently prostrate 
humanity tries desperately to assimilate to experience what defies all
89 Ibid.
90 Adorno uses the term 'culture industry' in preference to 'mass culture' in order to exclude 
the possibility of an interpretation that points to culture as the spontaneous expression of 
'the masses.' Theodor Adorno, The Culture Industry, Selected essays on Mass Culture, ed, 
J.M. Bernstein. (United States of America: Routledge, 1991), p. 98. Cf. "The Schema of 
Mass Culture," The Culture Industry, p. 63. 'A poetic tremor is expected of every example 
of emphatic objectivity [...]. The tremor lives off the excess power which technology as a 
whole, along with the capital that stands behind it, exercises over every individual thing. 
This is what transcendence is in mass culture. The poetic mystery of the product, in which it 
is more than itself, consists in the fact that it participates in the infinite nature of production 
and the reverential awe inspired by objectivity fits in smoothly with the schema of 
advertising.'
91 "Service to The Customer," Minima Moralia, p. 200.
92 "Service to The Customer," Minima Moralia, p. 201.
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experience.' 93 Where the object of experience is of a magnitude whose 
relation is out of all proportion to the individual, then the individual doesn't 
really experience it at all. The object of experience is registered directly as 
something external, incommensurable, in concepts divorced from intuitive 
knowledge. In such situations people report that they were surprisingly free 
from fear. Psychologically this is explained by the lack of preparedness for 
fear, of a lack of psychic and bodily atrunement.94
In a stable environment the culture industry can count on the 
agreement approval of its models as people in that situation aspire more to 
adapt to others and the whole. It is not only because the unconscious wishes 
horrors to come about. The culture industry doesn't produce the agreement it 
reiterates it ritualistically. The populaces own ideological sense of 
exaggerated equality and social impotence will itself invoke a kind of 
Popular Front of the "right thinking" presenting good-will as if it were 
enough to remove society's faults.
' [T]he practical spirit of the message, the tangible demonstration of 
how things can be improved, joins forces with the system in the fiction 
that a subject encompassing the whole of society, such as does not at 
present exist, can put right if only everyone will sit down together and 
make up their minds about the root of the trouble. It is very agreeable 
to be able thus prove ones capacity/'95
By enthusiastically setting out to clean and put the house in order the 
foundations on which it is built can be can be forgotten. On the proving 
ground of capacity, where the faculty, tendency or effort to actualize 
something is translated into action, determined to do so by external
93 "Mammoth," Minima Moralia, p. 115.
94 Cf. "Just hear, how bad he was." Minima Moralia, p. 179.
95 "Grey and Grey," Minima Moralia, p. 203.
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conditions,96 the idealists message, escape to freedom, is different from that 
promulgated by the psychological sciences that, in their fixity, school one in 
freedom from flight.
The differing schools of thought that circle around questions of 
repression and freedom ply their wares and chart their course against a 
backdrop of legality and history. For the idealist, as for most of the 
philosophical tradition, abstract universal freedom is spiritualized as being 
beyond nature: freedom is freedom from causality, heteronomy,97 the body, 
the human, etc. With the greater freedom comes greater responsibility. 
Inevitably this will lead to guilt as in practice the theory fails: the subject 
was never endowed with an unabridged autonomy. More persuasively, in the 
psychological realm subjects are fixed with their own physical nature. They 
are rationalized by way of a natural causality.
Objectivations performed by psychological science are reflected upon 
the subject and with that comes a loss of legal responsibility. For Adorno it 
is the nature controlling sovereignty and its social form, domination over 
people, which suggest the opposite state of consciousness: the idea of 
freedom. 'What makes the subjects aware of the bounds of their freedom is 
that they are part of nature, and finally, that they are powerless against 
society, which has become independent of them.' 98 The universality of the 
concept of freedom, a concept shared by those oppressed by their own
96 Similar to the way the possibility or potentiality of forming judgments is actualised under 
sensory stimulation.
97 For Adorno heteronomy, only apparently the counterpart of fetishism, is the principle of 
exchange, '[...] and in it dominion is masked.' "Reception and Production," Aesthetic 
Theory, p. 227.
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individual nature as well, recoils against social dominion as freedom's 
model.
As purveyors of the rational general interest and by ceremoniously 
making itself the embodiment of authoritative pronouncements, a process 
that involves anticipation and calculation of probabilities, the culture 
industry becomes the irrefutable prophet of the prevailing order. Where it 
has made reconciliation a vocation the culture industry, through its 
representatives the chosen organs of society, has become the modern 
counter-part of the master, priest, and sorcerer. Every spot is peopled with 
emanations of mana, a multiplicity of sacred rites, places, and symbols that 
all perform a fetishistic function. Historically and in dread whoever harms 
the symbols of the supernatural is subject to the machinations of their earthly 
counterparts, the rational administrator privy to the nature of the sacred." 
The new hip-priests impart professional knowledge, language that renders 
constant unidentified volatile manna. The finickiness of the administrative 
authority compensates for political impotence.
Interaction with technology and its accompanying institutions and 
industries gives rise to a situation where the individual must simply presume 
the validity of innumerable propositions. In a situation where sufficient 
knowledge eludes the grasp opinion stands ready as its imitator and usurper. 
The idea of truth as something solid, objective, unchanging, self-identical 
and meaningful to unified being has been increasingly criticized as being 
mere opinion. But what is true in the above sense cannot be ascertained 
immediately and the difference from opinion is denied to the greater glory of
98 "Freedom and Organized Society," Negative Dialectics, p. 221.
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opinion. In a society which must tremble in fear before its own reason which 
is not yet reason but faith in reason the difference between opinion and well 
founded judgment becomes untenable in principle. The abstract thesis claims 
that just as the irrational person believes in their dogma so whoever acts 
rationally does so in the belief reason will prevail.
However the claim conceals its own duplicity. Belief is different in 
each case. For reason belief is an intellectual posture a movement towards 
the determinate negation of false opinion. Dogmatic belief attaches itself to 
statements that are incompatible or contrary to reason. These ephemeral 
convictions are a way of being reinforcing the subject in its immediacy. The 
individual grasp, the act of holding something as true, is inessential to 
reason. 'What interests reason is knowledge not whatever knowledge 
considers itself to be. Reason's orientation leads the subject away from 
himself [...].' 10° With the subjective appropriation of the contents of 
consciousness, the subjective confiscation of the object, the underlying 
motivation emerges concretely. Since time immemorial forms of terror have 
imposed belief. With that stubborn and blind subjective self-interest 
becomes the measure of all things. The idea of truth as mere interest, the 
concern of the interested party alone, makes the true vulnerable to the 
objection that it is one again simply opinion to which it must give way. This 
chimes with the scientific attitude that has become indifferent to the concept 
of truth and contents itself instead with the imaginative production of ideally 
harmonious classificatory systems. In such a system everything ensnared is 
to find its meaning and its place, a position concomitant with aspects of
99 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 20-21.
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traditional metaphysics.
Without judgement and thought words leave their meaning behind. 
This institutes the more of words as something auratic [atmospheric], 
immediate, authoritative. 101 Language dipped in the sacred quality of the 
authentic' talk is the trademark of societal closeness. Prior to any content it 
moulds thought and as something impossible to experience it suggests 
something higher.
'Elements of empirical language are manipulated in their rigidity, as if 
they were elements of a true and revealed language. The empirical 
usability of the sacred ceremonial words makes both the speaker and 
the listener believe in their corporeal presence."102
This obliterates the difference between the constellation, its mediated 
relations, the more which language seeks, and the in-itself of this more. The 
cult of authenticity overflowing with the pretence of deep human emotion 
confirms its mutual understanding on a higher level by excluding those that 
don't speak the same credo. Excluding what might otherwise disappoint is 
concomitant with a belief that knowledge ranks higher the less it is liable to 
failure. It may well be that this criteria excludes everything that really 
matters.
Although somewhat entrapped by its constitution and language 
philosophy nevertheless is constantly able to think beyond itself and its 
limits. 'And this thinking beyond itself, into openness - that, precisely, is
100 "Opinion Delusion Society," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 113.
101 The words aura is bolstered by the charismatic, and the sensuous particularity of object 
and image. The immediacy is that of the legal-rational and logical, the instantaneous 
connection of signifier and signified. Mediation of both these moments is through the 
authority of tradition.
102 Theodor Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will, 
(Great Britain: Routledge, 2003), p. 4.
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metaphysics.' 103 Constellated within the concept of openness are the 
concepts of possibility, fallibility and disappointment. For Adorno fallibility 
is a condition of possibility for metaphysical experience. This is why 
metaphysics seems to be attached most strongly to the weakest and most 
fragile of experiences. Given the philosophical tradition and the way it 
eulogizes conviction the doubtfulness of this thought is its strength and is 
indispensable to it, just as fallibility is too thought in general. 104
Fallibility and relativity: This critical thought runs like a thread 
through Adomo's work, not the least because it is constitutive of language. 
Language constitutes thought no less than thought language, but the fate of 
language is the history of decay of the contents embodied in language. 105 For 
the addressee there is on the one hand a kind of sensuous contemplative 
passivity or mimesis. The spirit's mimetic labours are guided by what seems 
to be the intention of the whole: something intelligible but indistinct. On the 
other hand the addressee's activity involves an immersion in the precise 
details of the wording. This involves a self-forgetting sited, paradoxically, 
where subjective associations are subsequently checked against the text.
Language, spoken, written, musical, etc, is read against itself through 
the intentions of the whole realized in the parts, and then again against the 
intentions of the other, the nonidentical. The fractures, ambiguities and 
contradictions, conflicts, inconsistencies, slips, etc, are the kind of 
philosophical details upon which Adorno focused his interpretive effort. His 
interpretive process necessitates more than the immediate experience of the
103 "Lecture Nine," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 68.
104 Theodor Adorno, "Lecture Eighteen," Problems of Moral Philosophy, ed. Thomas 
Schroder, trans. Rodney Livingstone, (Great Britain: Polity Press, 2001), p. 141.
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given, it requires the active intervention of the thinking subject. If truth 
resides in the object it is not ready at hand but requires the subject to release 
it though not at the cost of giving up the nonidentity between subject and 
object.
If individual words are authenticated by being written in an intonation 
that transcendently places them in opposition to the prepositional force and 
thought content of the sentence then their formal character translates as 
jargon. For the connotations of effect jargon takes under its own control the 
preconceptual mimetic element in language. Positioned outside of history, 
which would intrude on every word, the jargon is set to recover some 
alleged original meaning by making us believe that the existence of the 
speaker has communicated itself simultaneously and immediately with the 
subject matter thereby restoring its dignity. The jargon in this way devalues 
thought.
'The jargon makes it seem that without this surplus mimetic element 
of the speaker the speech would already be inauthentic, that the pure 
attention of the expression to the subject matter would be a fall into 
sin. This formal element favours demagogic ends. Whoever is versed 
in the jargon does not have to say what he thinks, does not even have 
to think it properly [.. .]' 106
That the whole man should speak is central to the understanding of the 
jargon of authenticity. The societal result of this idealistic tendency is to 
compress objective consciousness and historical consciousness into the 
sphere of self-experience especially in its attitudinal and qualitative aspects. 
Lofty words have become incommensurable with this experience. It is a 
characteristic of evil to appropriate the most noble and elevated words for its
105 Cf. "Lecture Sixteen," Metaphysics, Concepts and Problems, p. 123.
106 The Jargon of Authenticity, pp. 5-6.
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own use, as a screen for vileness. Situations of compulsion force people to 
think only what they need for self-preservation. Where people fear for their 
survival truth content is hopelessly compromised. 107
The stereotype of an officially sanctioned worldview reveals an 
intellectual constitution akin to the totalitarian mind which lives on in 
certain formal features of thought. Adorno names these features or 
syndromes, structures of thought. They include the eager adjustment to the 
reigning values of the moment; a two-tiered classification dividing the sheep 
from the goats, the doves from the hawks; the lack of an immediate 
spontaneous relation to people, things, ideas; a compulsive conventionalism; 
and a faith in the established order no matter what the cost. 108 At the opposite 
pole the inauthentic sound like something partial, broken or accidental; 
something critical; phenomenal; something that lacks discipline; 
commitment; mental hygiene; something fallible and limited: i.e. human.
According to Adorno, ' [t]he less human immediacy is tolerated by the 
omnipresent mediating mechanisms of exchange the more it seems a 
compliant philosophy will assert that it possesses the basis of things in the 
immediate.' 109 The reification of consciousness implied in the philosophy of 
the absolute and total subject is a particular one; an identity set against the 
abstract universality of thought itself. Without the singularity of identical 
consciousness, which to be possible at all must be supra-individual, there 
would be no universal and vice-versa. Neither moment has priority over the 
other. The reification of consciousness lends itself to the critical analysis of
107 Cf. "Lecture Sixteen," Metaphysics, Concept and Problems. P. 123.
108 "philosophy and Teachers," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 27.
109 "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 55.
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a microphysics of power and political investment in the idealized body. 
The externalization of scientific discipline, an intellectual form, is akin 
to the deployment of an ingrained conceptual apparatus that calls for the 
devotion of spirit to something opposed and alien to it, something physical 
through which alone the spirit attains freedom. This contradiction is 
reproduced in the violence perpetuated by an insatiable identity principle 
that tolerates nothing that is not like itself. The squandered image points to 
the return of the primacy of the subject or subject centred as the sphere of 
absolute origins. Between the subject and what is not its like:
'Things congeal as fragments of that which was subjugated; to rescue 
it means to love things. We cannot eliminate from the dialectics of the 
extant what is experienced in consciousness as an alien thing: 
negatively, coercion and heteronomy, but also the marred figure of 
what we should love, and what the spell, the endogamy of 
consciousness, does not permit us to love.' 110
The happiness of the reconciled condition lies in the fact that the alien is 
granted a proximity wherein it remains what is distant and different but also 
beyond the heterogeneous and beyond that which is ones own. A difference 
beyond the heterogeneous could be a unity, a fusion/confusion of elements 
thought of not in the cognitive sense that was responsible for the 
heterogeneous reproduction in the first place, but as a complex relation, 
nonidentical and nonconceptual, a determination outside of history and 
somewhat unrealisable. Open thinking points beyond itself and as such it is 
akin to a transformative praxis, a comportment that prior to all particular 
content is a force of resistance against the universal tendency to oppress.
'The happiness that dawn in the eye of the thinking person is the 
happiness of humanity. The universal tendency of oppression is 
opposed to thought as such. Thought is happiness, even where it
110 "Objectivity and Reification," Negative Dialectics, p. 191.
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5111defines unhappiness: by enunciating it/
Exemplary characters are archetypes of conforming asocial beings. 
The immediate and direct identification with stereotypical values, the 
ontological pre-structuring of existence in which true being was to be 
revealed, means that there is no longer an internal or motivational conflict to 
form a basis for the development of the tribunal of consciousness. There is 
no object left for consciousness because the individual abrogates 
responsibility in favour of a contribution to the apparatus. For the 
mythological that seeks absolute identification through typified existence, 
real "experience" through the realization of racial types or nationalistic 
exemplars, mimesis, in one of its guises, in an excellent instrument. For 
Horkheimer and Adorno the 'organized control of mimesis', 112 by an 
instrumental rationality which outlaws uncontrolled mimesis is the 
realization of nightmare politics.
The critical philosophy is said to miss a newly discovered or 
rediscovered structure upon whose staging and elaboration the jargon of 
authenticity depends. 113 Man in thinking is called to lend a hand to Being. 
Thinking as belonging to and needed by Being is the caretaking hand that 
receives and holds and shapes whatever is given to thinking to think. It rules 
in the ongoing manner in which everything that is presences is 
encountered and appears through the openness, the clearing man provides. 
What is given to thought to think can easily be overlooked, being in a sense 
what lies nearest to hand: the Being of what ever is.
111 "Resignation," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 293
112 "Elements of Anti-Semitism," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 180.
113 Cf. The Jargon of Authenticity, p. 96.
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Being not to be identified with an entity, or concept, or as an aspect or 
element of totality or known reality is said to both transcend and govern 
what is. Going beyond the particularity of its presencing, Being is the way of 
beings. Everyone, everything travels their own path but in a fundamental 
sense Being illuminates the way. 114 The inauthentic fails to click, fails to 
communicate the collective agreement. By commemorating what has been 
lost in the oblivion of Being, basically a more fundamental truth, the 
ontological real experience always takes place in the face of a lack since 
experience is the Being of beings or Being apprehended by being qua 
beings.
For Adorno the prompt immediacy of the collective coupled with the 
claim that the whole person or the authentic core speaks should make us 
wary of what is termed the "event."
'The supposition that experience is a mode of being, something that 
has presubjectively "been appropriated as event" ereignet or "been 
elucidated" gelichtet, is simply incompatible with Hegel's conception 
of experience as a "dialectical movement which consciousness 
exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its 
object" inasmuch as the "new true object issues from it.'"  'His 
[Hegel's] thought would never have ratified Heidegger's claim that 
"the new object that arises for consciousness in the course of its 
formation" is "not just anything that is true, or any particular being, 
but is the truth of what is true, the Being of beings, the appearance of 
appearance." Hegel would never have called that experience; instead, 
for Hegel what experience is concerned with at any particular moment 
is the animating contradiction of such absolute truth.' 115
The seriousness in the tone of the jargon that it itself stylises as "to occur"116 
conspires outside of context or conceptual content with the augurs of the
114 Cf. "Introduction," The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translation 
and introduction by William Lovitt (United States of America: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 
xiv-xv.
115 "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, pp. 53-54.
116 Heidegger's term Ereignis is rendered as "event" in standard translation of Being and
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sacred. 'The secret which is suggested, and from the beginning is not there, 
is a public one.' 117 Like other closed systems of thought philosophy avails 
itself of the dubious advantage of refusing all content and objective 
criticism, which would have to be argued against, by the simple expedient of 
claiming to have already factored in any such difference or criticism into its 
account. Heidegger lets this slip in the tractatus on Identity and Difference.
'But if we assume that the difference is a contribution made by our 
representational thinking, the question arises: a contribution to what? 
One answers: to beings. Good. But what does that mean: "beings"? 
What else could it mean than: something that is ? Thus we give to the 
supposed contribution, the representational idea of difference, a place 
within Being. But "Being itself says: Being which is beings. 
Whenever we come to the place to which we were supposedly first 
bringing difference along as an alleged contribution, we always find 
Being and beings in their difference are already there.' 118
Difference says: "I'm here already." 119 Difference: a determined form of 
invariance; the projection of what has congealed and become reified in 
consciousness; the eversameness of a state of unfreedom.
The starkly visible heteronomy is opposed by another heteronomy: 
consciousness recoins immutability. Reified consciousness is only a 
moment, its elevation to transcendence sabotages reconcilement to 
difference with a doctrine of invariance that on its coercive side laments the 
loss of form even as it adapts to the heteronomy of a structural ideal as
7 OA
something beyond contradiction. Man no longer oppressed by the
Time. "To occur" is a rendering ofsich ereignen, chosen by translators for lack of an 
English verb corresponding to the noun "event." Cf. The Jargon of Authenticity, p. 6.
117 The Jargon of Authenticity, pp. 6-7.
118 Martin Heidegger, "The Principle of Identity," Identity and Difference, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 62.
119 "The Principle of Identity," Identity and Difference, p. 65.
120 Cf. "Universal and Individual in the Philosophy of Morals," Negative Dialectics, p. 284. 
'The belief that forms have been lost arose from the devastation of cities and landscapes by 
planlessly expanding industry; it originated in a lack of rationality, not in its excess. Anyone 
who traces de-formation to metaphysical processes rather than to conditions of material
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heteronomous condition and who managed to save some of their freedom 
and rise above society and above the individuality that exists, would be less 
likely to be looking for self-righteous support. In the state of unfreedom no 
one has a liberated consciousness.
Where dialectical and negative distinctions are not made the positive 
mania for domination and determination takes hold. Within the concepts of 
authenticity and genuineness there dwells the notion of the supremacy of the 
first, the original over the derived, and the social legitimacy of the 
autochthonous. 121 The philosophy of inwardness sublimates the barbaric law 
of the first, the genuine and authentic, against the priority of the self and 
those who feel at home where they dwell. 122
According to Adorno, ' [w]herever a doctrine of some absolute "first" 
is taught there will be talk of something inferior to it, of something 
absolutely heterogeneous to it, as its logical correlate.' 123 The philosophy of 
inwardness confronts, comes to terms with something, literally by setting 
itself apart. Self-alienation: intellectually it means to learn by rote. On the 
other hand captured within the Hegelian notion of externalization the person 
develops through dialectic of self-abandonment and self-transformation. In 
effect this means having an open mind as well engaging in intellectual 
matters productively within ones own consciousness. 1
Through the peephole of the self [where "self means "relating itself 
to itself," a relation, whose terms are not given, and a movement] the
production is a purveyor of ideologies.'
121 Cf. "Gold Assay," Minima Moralia, p. 155.
122 Cf. "Gold Assay," Minima Moralia, p. 155.
123 "Peephole Metaphysics," Negative Dialectics, p. 138.
124 cf "Philosophy and Teachers," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 28.
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subject, as a mere moment, 125 remains imprisoned for an eternity within the 
pure in-itself: its potential, latent possibility. The heretical and obverse, the 
disparagement of the claim that all eternity is coloured by an observer, or by 
a group or species, calls upon the critique of the cognitive moment of 
subjective mediation in the objective realm to renege on the remembrance of 
the otherwise forgotten notion of the in-itself. 126 Being, in its experience and 
expression, has need of configurations of entities, ' [w]hat would lie in the 
beyond makes its appearance only in the materials and categories within,' 
otherwise the philosophical substance becomes the poor result of a process 
of subtraction. 127
The true philosophical task, according to Heidegger, would be to 
conceive Being. And yet as Adorno points out if we attempt to accomplish 
what Heidegger asks of us, to conceive Being as distinct from the concept 
which circumscribes it, we first have to deduct entity, which objectivity is in 
essence, 128 and then the categories of abstraction. This would leave us with 
an unknown quantity which, according to Adorno, '[...] nothing but the 
pathos of its invocation lifts above the Kantian concept of the transcendent 
thing-in-itself.' 129 Thinking without a concept is not thinking at all. The 
prohibition against thinking that Heidegger's objectivism aims at the subject 
is nothing less than the subject's own reverse image. To conceive a Being 
that resists any cogitative definition is false only where it claims to make 
sense. What is at the core of Heidegger's philosophy is not sense but what is
125 Subjectivity as the exclusive interiority of a personality or as a separate and one-sided 
agency for synthesizing representations are moments among others of the subject.
126 cf "Peephole Metaphysics," Negative Dialectics, p. 139.
127 cf "Peephole Metaphysics," Negative Dialectics, p. 140.
128 Cf. "The Objects Preponderance, "Negative Dialectics, p. 183.
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called knowledge of domination. Expounded as being genuinely the 
knowledge of salvation the philosophy of Being presents a promissory note 
as an echo of substance.
Without judgement there is no concept. So it cannot be said that 
judgments are a mere synthesis of concepts. The old tripartition of logic into 
concept, judgment, and conclusion is a relic: another system. Every analysis 
of judgment takes us to a subject and an object. This movement does not in 
itself create a region beyond the resulting constellation of moments.
If in the Heideggarian sense the "is" of a judgement is not a thing, not 
an entity, and not usually what we mean by objectivity then what is it? If we 
say the "is" of a judgement has no substrate no underlying surface in the 
state of facts that we mean, if we say that there is no corresponding 
individual thing we interpret it as being, we might conclude that "is" must 
indicate a third region beyond subject and object, which is Being. This 
conclusion, the result of a self-sufficient semantics, evokes a paralogism in 
the fact that we cannot conceive a supposedly pure substrate of "is". 
According to Adorno, 'Every attempt to do so runs into the transmissions130 
of which hypostatized Being would be relieved.'
Being is not simply totality or the absolute: if positivity reduces it to 
anything then it is mere factuality. The concept is unthinkable without the 
"more" that makes a language of language. What echoes in the word 
"Being" is entwinement. Everything is more than it is. Being, added to the
129 "Immanent Critique of Ontology," Negative Dialectics, p. 98.
130 Cf. "Copula," Negative Dialectics, p. 102. 'There is no entity whose determination and 
self-determination does not require something else, something which the entity itself is not; 
for by itself alone it would not be definable. It therefore points beyond itself. 
"Transmission" is simply another word for this.'
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individual entity, is not confined to the particular entity. Entity stripped of 
all qualification and all categories thereby not needing to legitimize itself as 
a concept garbs Being in the dignity of immediacy. On the other hand entity 
contaminates Being with the temporal rudiment of material ontology. 'Being 
gets its life from the forbidden fruit, as if the fruit were Freya's apples.' 132
Heideggarian Being is something added to the individual entity, 
something immediate and primary beyond subject and object. The structure 
clings to the initiates while permanently eluding them. In the end it is human 
reason that is disparaged. The cult of Being and the polemics against the 
idealistic cult of the mind do presuppose a critique of the deification of 
Being. But the result is in the end no less repressive, only less transparent 
and therefore less capable of critical reflection. What it does insure is that 
philosophy has a post-existence, but only if it makes "one and all" its 
speciality. 'The expression of Being is nothing but the feeling of this 
aura.' 133 It is an aura where the indirect element becomes isolated and so 
direct. But indirectness as a kind of first person subjectivity involves the 
direct in a different sense than the transmission of something direct. 
Indirectness cannot be hypostatised any more than can the poles of subject 
and object. The concept of Being, whose transmissions are not to be put into 
words, is stretched into a kind of non-objective objectivity. It settles into an 
imaginary realm between brute facts and talk about Weltanschauung a 
comprehensive world-view. 1
For Adorno it is neither the pure coherence of a work nor the
131 "No Transcendence of Being," Negative Dialectics, p. 105.
132 "No Transcendence of Being," Negative Dialectics, p. 108.
133 "Immanent Critique of Ontology," Negative Dialectics, p. 99.
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manifestation of the thinker's subjectivity that determines its character as 
philosophy but the degree, to which the real has entered into concepts, 
manifests itself in these concepts and comprehensively justifies them. The 
real is the binding nexus of concepts. The dialectical method has its essence 
in the recognition that the clarification of particular concepts can only be 
accomplished through analysis of the nexus of concepts it enters into. In the 
density of the nexus, similarities and differences become sharply apparent.
For Adorno the interpretation of philosophy as poetry is opposed to 
this. The poetical by turning away from the standards of the real is deprived 
the possibility of adequate criticism. Critical thought is that which allows 
philosophy to be tested historically. It is the newly emerging that confers on 
philosophy the reputation of being poetical. In the newly emerging the range 
and specificity of content as well as the articulation of form is missing. 
Everything in philosophy that was ambiguous and could or would not fit the 
requirements of scientific philosophy, that concepts be constituted as the 
distinctive characteristics of the objects subsumed by them, 135 was given the 
title of poetry.
For Adorno, dialectical concepts are the proper instrument of 
philosophy. Philosophy:
'[...] constructs ideas that illuminate and appropriate the mass of the 
simply existing; ideas around which the elements of the existing 
crystallize as knowledge. These ideas present themselves in 
dialectical concepts. As soon as this type of philosophy is tolerantly 
accepted as poetry, the strangeness of its ideas, hi which its power 
over reality manifests itself, is neutralized along with the
134 Ibid.
135 Theodor Adorno, "Poetry and Dialectical Concept," Kierkegaard: Construction of the 
Aesthetic, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, (The United States of America: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 3.
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seriousness of its claims.' 136
It is the trivial that is evil. Triviality is the form of consciousness of mind 
which adapts itself to the world as it is. It obeys the principle of inertia, the 
replacement of knowledge by the mere registering, ordering and 
summarizing of facts: truth as no more than the practicable arranging of the 
mere existent. The way out of this dilemma is to reflect on the idea of truth 
as a procedure quite different from mere registration. The impulse opposed 
to the positivist motif can only survive by adopting the principle: renounce, 
that you might gain.
'That is to say, one will not survive by preserving some so-called 
higher spheres, or what I would prefer to call nature reserves, which 
reflection is not allowed to touch, but by pushing the process of de- 
mythologizing, or enlightenment, to the extreme. Only in this, if at all, 
is there any hope that the philosopher, through his self-reflection, will 
not end by consummating triviality, the consummation of which is
absolute horror.'
According to Adorno, the joy of thought, which is the motivation to think of 
metaphysical matters in the first place, is simply the joy of elevation, of 
rising above what merely is.
According to Adorno, one of the painful afflictions of philosophical 
engagement is that, '[...] in giving way to this joy of philosophizing - in 
refusing to be bargained out of truth by mere being - one is being lured into 
a demonic situation by this very truth.' 138 The situation arises from an 
indispensable moment of philosophical speculation: that the trivial, positivist 
awareness is adequate to the spell of the world. Dialectical reason follows 
the impulse to transcend the natural context and its delusions. Dialectics is
ne «poetry and Dialectical Concept," Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, p. 4.
137 "Lecture Fifteen," Metaphysics: Concept and Problems, p. 115.
138 Ibid.
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critical reflection upon that context.
For metaphysics to have a chance it will have to cease to think that 
there is something one can hold onto and never lose, and think against itself. 
'And that means that it must measure itself against the ultimate, the 
absolutely unthinkable, to have any right to be a thinking at all.' 14°
Given the above, what has been disclosed in the countenance of Being 
and the absolute, the claim and the reflection might seem paradoxical. The 
paradox springs from norm of explication in Cartesian logic: reason for what 
follows have to be found in what goes before. This norm, according to 
Adorno, is no longer compulsory. 141 It is not the organizing drive of thought 
that brings us to dialectics. It is, rather, unreconciled matter.
139 Cf. "Noncontradictoriness not to b hypostatized," Negative Dialectics, p. 141.
140 "Lecture Fifteen," Metaphysics: Concept and Problems, p. 115.
141 Cf. "Noncontradictoriness not to b hypostatized," Negative Dialectics, p. 140.
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Chapter Two: Concept and Constellation.
'Is not memory inseparable from love, which seeks to 
preserve what yet must pass away? Is not each stirring of 
fantasy engendered by desire which, in displacing the 
elements of what exists, transcends it without betrayal? Is 
not indeed the simplest perception shaped by fear of the 
thing perceived, or desire for it?' 142
Theodor Adorno
In metaphysics all concepts, in order to refer to the subject matter of 
thought, must necessarily refer to something beyond themselves. How this 
operates at the epistemological level, how this brings forth meaning that is 
not subjective but conditioned by historical necessity working through 
mimesis, is the point of this investigation. More succinctly, carried through, 
the critique of identity becomes a groping for the preponderance of the 
object. 143
Experientially, some form of necessity, dynamic excess, compels 
philosophy to operate with concepts which are in turn entwined with the 
nonconceptual. 144 This means the concept cannot dominate or reify in the 
manner of speculative idealism; the non-conceptual survives in the concept 
as the meaning it conveys. Through the insight of negative dialectics, 
Adorno's epistemological move that rethinks the dialectic, the constitutional 
character of the nonconceptual ends the compulsive identification that 
arrives with the concept; a concept that, hi its blindness and constancy, 
corresponds to the thing-in-itself.
Reflection on the thing-in-itself is the way out for a subject that cannot
142 "Intellects sacrificial intellectus, " Minima Moralia, p. 122.
143 "The Object's Preponderance," Negative Dialectics, p. 183.
144 "Disenchantment of the Concept." Negative Dialectics, p. 11.
145 cf "Property," Philosophy of Right, p. 42. 'While so-called 'external' things have a 
show of self-subsistence for consciousness, intuition, and representative thinking, the free
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know itself directly. The subject is the object determinant of a society that is 
both the epitome and negation of that subject. 146 Concepts, virtually the idols 
of thought, are remote or removed from a subject which in effect crosses 
itself out, only to find itself returned objectified as an intra-personal 
subjectivity of socially constructed relations. As a subject-apparatus of 
sensibility and agency this subject is to be contrasted with the interpersonal 
subject whose subjectivity is always a feeling towards something from 
which, shaped as it is after the model of material, formal logic cannot erase 
the trace of entity. 147
According to Adorno, '[wjithout specific thoughts, thinking would 
contravene its very concept, and these thoughts instantly point to entities  
entities which absolute thinking in turn has yet to posit.' 148 To think means 
to think something, something that is meant or judged. The logically abstract 
form of "something" does not claim to posit a being, it dissociates thought 
from primacy and solidity. Conceptually entity represents a turn towards the 
object and materiality but at the same time by being neither abstract nor 
fully articulated it creates a cover concept that is not based on identity but on 
the fragment: Entity has a sense of indeterminacy but not as its ground and 
an objectivity that is fluid, not a historical progress: Entity takes a literal
will idealizes that type of actuality and so its truth.'
146 ££ u-j^e Nominalistic Aspect," Negative Dialectics, p. 126. 'Society precedes the 
subject. That the subject mistakes itself for an antecedent of society is its necessary 
delusion, a mere negative statement about society.'
147 Cf. "Copula," Negative Dialectics, p. 103. 'A rigorous distinction has to be made, first, 
between the purely logical subject-object relation in a judgment and the relation of subject 
and object as an epistemological-material one. What the term subject means in the two 
cases is almost contradictory. In the theory of judgments it is the basic assumption of which 
something is predicated, as opposed to the act of judgment and to what is judged in the 
synthesis of the judgment; in a sense, it is the objectivity upon which thinking works. 
Epistemologically, however, "subject" means the thinking function, and frequently also the 
entity which thinks and cannot be excluded from the concept "I" except at the price of
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translation like "yes" non-literally.
The dissociation of thought fastens it to that which it is not, something 
that is not commensurable with thinking but is none the less indelible for 
it. 149 According to Adorno,
'[t]he ratio becomes irrational where it forgets this, where it runs 
counter to the meaning of thought by hypostatising its products, the 
abstractions. The commandment of its autarky condemns thinking to 
emptiness, and finally to stupidity and primitivity.'M50
Rationality recoils into mythology and falsehood where it conceives an 
autarky of thought and makes absolute, as in free suspension, the 
dissociating thought. For Adorno the conception of a self-preserving mental 
principle as the sphere of absolute origin is an attempt to bring thought to a 
halt. The deferment of truth as a fragile temporal substance, particularly for 
utility's sake, is the consolation of a philosophy that cannot plunge into any 
abyss other than that of an agile sophistry that, for the sake of the absolute 
subject and its principle of identity, is moralistically asked to come to a 
decision beforehand.
'Only thoughts that go to the limit are facing up to the omnipotent 
impotence of certain accord: only a cerebral acrobatics keeps relating 
to the matter, for which, according to the fable convenu, [the agreed 
upon fiction] it has nothing but distain for the sake of its self- 
satisfaction.' 151
Inconclusiveness as a never-changing realm is true for untruth only. Only 
thought is true and this is set against a surplus of the world of sense. If
ceasing to mean what it means.'
148 "The Indissoluble "Something"," Negative Dialectics, p. 136.
149 "Fragility of Truth," Negative Dialectics, p. 34.
150 Ibid. In the rationalist tradition the ontological ground and epistemological reason 
[ratio} were synonymous. The reason for existence was at the same time the ground for 
existing. Hence the two fundamental principles common to being and knowledge [in 
actuality fundamental propositions], the principle of contradiction - something cannot 
simultaneously be and not be - and the principle of sufficient reason - which held that 
everything that exists has a reason or ground for doing so.
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thought defers to sense as sheer existence it will fail to grasp it and thus 
abandon freedom and spontaneity. Again, if conscious experience lacks the 
moment of self-assured and naive spontaneity of thought it will become 
unsure of itself and lose what appears as the most primary and least 
subjective of experiences. Thought that is heedless of its own active 
dependencies will become a dull copy of what the establishment expects of 
it thereby sealing itself off even more from what does not emanate from it; 
the most subjective, the immediate datum, that which eludes the subject's 
intervention. 152
As a mode of conduct that shields no metaphysical certainty the open 
thought has no protection against a decline into randomness other than the 
consistency of its performance. A definite or determined presentation or 
style stops philosophy conceding too much to relativism. In this sense and 
experientially philosophy is analogous to music, not imitative, philosophy's 
relation to the heterogeneous is virtually thematic. One has to, in a sense; 
compose it first and in a manner that from beginning to end is 
comprehensive. 'The crux is what happens in it, not a thesis or a 
position the texture, not the deductive or inductive course of one-track 
minds. Essentially, therefore, philosophy is not expoundable.' 153 This fact 
also situates the nonidentical. 'The test of the turn to nonidentity is its 
performance; if it remained declarative, it would be revoking itself. 
Accordingly the impulse that animates philosophy, is not fulfilled at once 
but rather in further articulation. Similarly music, something phenomenal, is
152 "Dialectics and Solidity," Negative Dialectics, p. 39.
153 "Fragility of Truth," Negative Dialectics, p. 33.
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a critique of phenomenality, of the appearance that substance is present here 
and now. What is common to art and philosophy is a mode of conduct that 
resists or forbids pseudomorphosis, the prepared phantasm of a whole, the 
identification and absorption into a concept as something final. Both art and 
philosophy keep faith with their own substance dialectically, that's to say 
through their opposites. Art does this by refusing to be pinned down as to its 
meaning, philosophy by refusing to clutch at any immediate thing.
'What the philosophical concept will not abandon is the yearning that 
animates the nonconceptual side of art, and whose fulfilment shuns the 
immediate side of art as mere appearance. The concept the organon 
of thinking, and yet the wall between thinking and thought negates 
that yearning. Philosophy can neither circumvent such negation nor 
submit to it. It must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the 
concept.' 155
Philosophy, which never stops reflecting its own course, determines the flaw 
in every concept thereby making it necessary to cite others. Conceptual 
mediation in the midst of nonconceptuality draws out the implicit history of 
the matter at hand, the fact that it is not simply so and not otherwise, but has 
come to be under certain conditions. Nonconceptuality, inalienable from the 
concept, by disavowing the concept's reification disavows epistemology. 
This can lead to an immediate and direct identification with stereotypical 
value scales: the apparent obviousness of the object.
'Perception [as something conceptual, figured in time and space] is 
directness at one remove, reflection [as the nonconceptual or 
indeterminate] is the seductive power of sensuality [...]. Only the 
self-consciousness labour of thought can escape from this 
hallucinatory power [...]' !p 156
It is epistemology that obliges philosophy to be substantive and deal
154 "Starting out from the Concept," Negative Dialectics, pp. 154-155.
155 "Infinity," Negative Dialectics, p. 15.
156 "Elements of Anti-Semitism," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 194.
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with historic entities as its objects. The inner historicity of thought is 
inseparable from both its content and from tradition. The texts philosophy 
deals with and criticizes are brought to it by the tradition they embody: 
Through engagement and mediation the conduct of philosophy becomes 
commensurable with tradition. According to Adorno, '[...] idealism sees in 
the inner history of immediacy its vindication as a stage of the concept, 
materialism makes that inner history the measure, not just of the untruth of 
concepts, but even more of their immediacy in being.' 157 A philosophy that 
became enthralled with the thought of supposedly immediate subjective 
data, the fictitious one-dimensional now, would de-historicize the content of 
thought. Under the spell of a pure present, the pure and timeless subject 
would seek to eliminate the traditional moments of thinking that serve to 
mediate between known objects. This theme, when taken up, turns against 
all labour and effort of the concept: Mediation is irreconcilable with the urge 
to reduction. But according to Adorno, the critique is misconceived.
'Knowledge no sooner starts from scratch, by way of a stabilizing 
objectification than it will distort the objects. Knowledge as such, 
even in a form detached from substance, takes part in tradition as 
unconscious remembrance; there is no question which we might 
simply ask without knowing of past things that are preserved hi the 
question and spur it.'5158
The hypostatization of the concept of nonconceptuality is an act that runs 
counter to its meaning. If the purpose were to posit a Prima philosophia then 
its basic philosophizing would necessarily carry with it the primacy of the 
concept. Aware that the conceptual totality is mere appearance Adorno 
claims that the concept's own concept, the way it claims to being an order-
157 "Thing, Language, History," Negative Dialectics, p. 52.
158 "Tradition and Knowledge," Negative Dialectics, p. 54.
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creating invariance, has become a problem. 159 The concept necessarily cuts 
across immanent changes in the subject, setting it on the path to unfreedom. 
Entity is no mere datum it is not immediate it is mediated through the 
concept whose basic character it dissolves: it changes the concept. As a 
static cognitive ideal the concept is at odds with the dynamism of what it 
would seek to cover.
'The concept in itself, previous to any content hypostatizes its own 
form against the content. With that, however, it is already 
hypostatizing the identity principle: that what our thinking practice 
merely postulates is a fact in itself, solid and enduring. Identifying 
thought objectifies by the logical identity of the concept.'
In light of this the deformation of spontaneity should be seen as a reactive 
adaptation to the over subscribed mythologizing and bureaucratizing of the 
administered world. Where this adaptation becomes intentional then self- 
empowerment is optimised through a mode of rational interaction. 
Adaptation is repeated adaptation, repetition of the same. A term that has 
come to represent this idea is "common-sense". In the attempt to reconcile 
reason with nature common sense retains a grain of truth. For example, 
according to Adorno, identity thinking as mimesis of the hardened and 
estranged is the reproduction of an earlier state. 'The reflexes of stiffening 
and numbness in humans are archaic schemata of the urge to survive: by 
adaptation to death life pays the toll of its continued existence.' 161 Playing 
dead, hiding out, incorporating death into life, self-sacrifice, the sacrifice of 
the other, positive freedom, etc., are expressions that point to somewhat 
paradoxical or contradictory ways of avoiding external confrontation.
159 "Dialectics not a Standpoint," Negative Dialectics, p. 5.
160 "Starting out from the Concept," Negative Dialectics, p. 154.
161 "Elements of Anti-Semitism," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 180.
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Identity thinking can lend itself to a kind of moral centralism or 
universalism the belief that there are moral principles whose validity 
logically transcends their employment in particular cases. As part of a "top- 
down" hierarchical entelechy they move to transcend even the ability to be 
put into practice, i.e. beyond the empiricism or materialism of "vile bodies". 
This unreasonable or visionary aspect has not diminished the ability to 
orientate or guide behaviours. However Adorno is adamant that the 
ingenuity as practiced by irrationalists and intellectual-baiters of all 
persuasions cannot be defended. Cunning and obscurantism remain what 
they always were, unmediated, uncomprehending and immediate lies, the 
justification of social injustice as a law of nature. Phrases like "that's just the 
way it is" or "life's like that" affirm the tacit assent and primacy of the 
general over the particular. 162 When pressed moral universalism comes 
across as not much more than a generalization of a particular specificity.
As something inescapable to thought dialectics reveals the falseness of 
all claims to identity thinking. It does this by enacting a critical 
consciousness that unfolds the inadequacy immanent to all concepts. 'The 
name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go 
into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict 
the traditional norm of adequacy.' 163
The dialectic allows for the definite negation of the individual 
moments whereby subject and object are identified with each other as 
absolute opposites. Absolute duality would be unity or total monism.
'If speculation on the state of reconciliation were permitted, neither
162 "On the Morality of Thinking," Minima Moralia, pp. 73-74.
163 "Starting out from the Concept," Negative Dialectics, p. 154.
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the undistinguished unity of subject and object nor their antithetical 
hostility would be conceivable in it; rather, the communication of 
what was distinguished. Not until then would the concept of 
communication, as an objective concept, come into its own. The 
present one is so infamous because the best there is, the potential of an 
agreement between people and things, is betrayed to an interchange 
between subjects according to the requirements of subjective reason. 
In its proper place, even epistemologically, the relation of subject and 
object would lie in the realization of peace among men and well as 
between men and their Other. Peace is the state of distinctness without 
domination, with the distinct participating in each other.' 164
Subject and object lend themselves to a bilateral unfolding, but they are not 
primary states of fact. The conceptual polarity of subject and object point to 
their being, resultant categories of reflection. The duality of subject and 
object needs to be maintained against the totalising of thought, and against 
the attendant ideological overtones concealed in all talk of synthesis that 
boasts of uniting what consciousness has arbitrarily divided.
'In truth, the subject is never quite the subject, and the object never 
quite the object: and yet the two are not pieced out of any third that 
transcends them. [...] The division, which makes the object the 
alien thing to be mastered and appropriates it, is indeed subjective, the 
result of orderly preparation; but no critique of its subjective 
origin will reunify the parts once they split in reality.' 165
The rational processes of labour are a model of this fragmentation. The 
conditions needed for the production of goods resemble the general 
conceptual procedure of synthesis.
What is so compelling about Hegel's dialectic and system and is made 
to approximate real compulsion through the principle of identity. The real 
compulsion is societal debt relations which deluded thought claims as its 
own. 166 Its closed circle brings about the illusion that it is a natural end: it
"Subject and Object," The Adorno Reader, p. 140. 
"Subject-Object Dialectics," Negative Dialectics, p. 175.
Cf. J. K. Galbraith, "The Bill Collector Cometh," The Affluent Society, (Great Britain: 
Penguin Books, 1962) p. 167. 'The process of persuading people to incur debt, and the
164
165 «
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lends itself to the metaphysical ratio between Being and beings. Negative 
Dialectics brings this appearance back to nothing. It confutes the identity 
that it attributes to the whole. This is the paradox of Adorno's dialectic. It 
utilizes a totalising critique to criticize the totality. Reason, the high point of 
enlightenment thought, is suspected of confusing power and validity claims. 
As instrumental, reason has assimilated itself to power and thereby 
relinquished its critical force. Reason collapses into understanding 
conjoining with the compulsion to categorize. This final disclosure of 
ideological critique applies to itself. In this antagonistic state the difference 
between thinking and thought seared in our theoretical awareness expresses 
the condition that the falsehood of dualism is truth.
The embittering part of dialectics, the part that disillusions and 
frustrates, is its objective contradictoriness. Within the abstract rules of logic 
objective contradictoriness designates what entity remains outside of our 
judgment, that which escapes the preformed in the definition the truth 
claimed by our subjective conceptual mechanism. Yet, according to Adorno, 
objective contradictoriness also designates something in the way we judge. 
'For what we mean in the judgment is always the entity due to be judged 
beyond the particular that is included in the judgment otherwise, according 
to its own intention the judgment would be superfluous.' 167 Particularity in 
the judgment points beyond itself, to the unresolved as such. This means that 
in the unity of consciousness or in the ideality of spirit the judgment is 
partial and as such, conceptually, it cannot rest content within itself. The
arrangements for them to do so, are as much a part of modern production as the making of 
the goods and the nurturing of the wants. The Puritan ethos was not abandoned. It was 
merely overwhelmed by the massive power of modern merchandising.'
76
Mark Walker: Experiential Embodiment and Human Immediacy: Adorno's Negative Affinity
unresolved is the non-identical to which we are reconciled. Dialectical 
cognition does not set out to construe contradictions and thereafter resolve 
them; it pursues the inadequacies of thought and thing as experienced hi the 
thing.
'Dialectical contradiction "is" not simply; it means it has the 
subjective significance that it cannot be talked out of this. In this 
meaning, this intention, dialectics aims at what is different. It is as 
philosophy's self-criticism that the dialectical motion stays 
philosophical.' 168
Identity thinking, via the concept, subsumes, represents or exemplifies 
that which it is not. Traditionally antinomy is that which thought seeks to 
overcome, the idea of something beyond contradiction, yet contradiction is 
immanent to thought itself. 'The antithesis of thought to whatever is 
heterogeneous to thought is reproduced in thought itself, as its immanent 
contradiction.' 169 The reciprocal criticism of universal and particular by 
identifying acts of judgment was formalized by idealism into an affirmative 
principle. This is reflected in the terminology. The copular affirms what 
something is, it is so and not otherwise, what is at work in such a synthesis 
is the will to identify. Negative Dialectics is part of this logic not beyond it.
'Totality is to be opposed by convicting it of nonidentity with 
itself of the nonidentity it denies according to its own concept. 
Negative dialectics is thus tied to the supreme categories of 
identitarian philosophy as its point of departure.' 170
In order to free ourselves from the universal coercive mechanism, and this is 
a question of intent, we must attain identity with the concept in order to see 
reason against its reason. 'To use the strength of the subject to break through
167 «objectjvjty of Contradiction," Negative Dialectics, p. 152.
les "objectivity of Contradiction," Negative Dialectics, p. 153.
169 "On the Dialectics of Identity," Negative Dialectics, p. 146.
170 "On the Dialectics of Identity," Negative Dialectics, p. 147.
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the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity.' 171
Adorno's partial solution to the problem of the concept is to have the 
concept enter into a constellation: A constellation of concepts. 172 
Constellation is not a formal system it does not resolve or equalize concepts 
but juxtaposes them. The specification and configuration of its moments are 
qualitatively different from a lack of ambiguity in every particular moment. 
The configuration itself is more and other than the quintessence of its 
moments. One moment sheds light on the other. Together the individual 
moments form a figure which is a legible and specific sign. 173 Whereas 
traditionally concepts succumbed to a felt need for greater and greater 
abstraction, the constellation is the specific and more than the specific. It is 
meant to illuminate specifically what to the more generalized cover concept 
is a matter of indifference.
'The history locked in the object can only be delivered by a 
knowledge mindful of the historic positional value of the object in its 
relation to other objects by the actualization and concentration of 
something which is already known and is transformed by that 
knowledge. Cognition of the object in its constellation is cognition of 
the process stored in the object. As a constellation theoretical thought 
circles the concept it would like to unseal, hoping that it may fly open 
like the lock of a well guarded safe-deposit box: in response, not to a 
single key or a single number, but a combination of numbers.' 174
The constellation as creative, spontaneous thought and action presents a 
possibility, a way to transcend the conceptual and reach the nonconceptual. 
Doing so allows us to challenge the archaic features, the subjective
171 "preface," Negative Dialectics, p. xx. Cf. "Against Personalism," Negative Dialectics, 
p. 277. 'The subject is the lie, because for the sake of its own absolute rule it will deny its 
own objective definitions. Only he who would refrain from such lies who would have 
used his own strength, which he owes to identity, too cast off the fa9ade of identity would 
truly be a subject.'
172 "Constellation," Negative Dialectics, p. 162.
173 "Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 109.
174 "Constellation," Negative Dialectics, p. 163.
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heteronomous moment in the object that cuts across the rational. It enables 
us to rethink, dialectically, how, for example, essence and appearance, 
semblance and truth, are transmitted. How they are able to point beyond 
themselves.
Remembrance of the particular in its immanent connection with other 
things, the way they came to be and the conditions under which they exist: 
The model for this is language not so much in the definitions it utilizes, 
which as simple representations of identitarian thinking seek to exhaust the 
categorical performance of the object, but in the way it lends objectivity to 
the conceptual relations clustered around the thing. 175
If the thing itself is its context, concrete context in Hegelian 
terminology, then the subjectively assembled constellation can by way of
1 1f\
language become a sign of objectivity and of spiritual substance. The 
constellation by gathering around the object looks to its possibility. It 
releases the object from the limitations historically sedimented within it. 
Constellation as an indicative device presents an image of unfulfilled 
potentialities. History may have cheated the object but the baneful spell of
175 In a different context but with the same sense, cf. Theodor Adorno., "Lecture Nine: The 
Concept of the Thing," Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone, (Great Britain: Polity Press, 2001), p. 103. 'These relations, these functional 
concepts that refer to something relatively self-subsistent and permanent - these are in fact 
what we mean by things. In this sense no distinction can be made between things and the 
concept of things; instead, the things qua laws to connect the appearances are themselves
just concepts.'
176 Cf Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Part II of the Encydpedia of Philosophical Sciences 
(1830), trans. William Wallace, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), § 378, Zusatz, p. 
3 'Spirit is not an inert being, but on the contrary, absolutely restless [ unruhig: "troubled," 
"agitated," "restless"] being, pure activity, the negating or ideality of every fixed category 
of the abstractive intellect; not abstractly simple but, in its simplicity, at the same time a 
distinguishing itself from itself; not an essence that is already finished and complete before 
its manifestation, hiding itself behind its appearance, but an essence which is truly actual 
only through the'determinate forms of its necessary self-manifestation.' As cited in, Jean- 
Luc Nancy, Hegel: The Restless of the Negative, trans. Jason Smith and Steven Miller, 
(The United States of America: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 6.
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its all embracing rationality can theoretically be broken
The static cognitive ideal is the concept that prior to any content 
hypostatises its own form. To reiterate, solid and enduring identifying 
thought objectifies by the logical identity of the concept. 177 The logical order 
of dependency, connection, progression, and union of concepts is grounded 
in the corresponding conditions of social reality and labour. The social 
characteristics of categories of thought are not expressions of social 
solidarity but marks of the inscrutable unity of society and domination. The 
supraordinated concept and the dependencies within its domain that have 
established the object in turn conceals the most real, the dependence on 
society, that is inadequately compensated by the individual thing which the 
concept covers. The concept as symbol or sign undertakes a fetishistic 
function signifying the recurrence of nature and representing the 
permanence of social pressure and paranoiac forms of consciousness. 'The 
dread objectified as a fixed image becomes the sign of the established 
domination of the privileged. Such is the fate of the universal concept 
[.. .]' 178 The social aspect in the development of thought is levelled down to 
the immediately given, to the extensive. All that is genetic, intensive, and 
uncomfortable about conceptual relationships, is rejected and forgotten. 179
Etymologically the German word for concept - Begriff- translates the 
Latin verb concipere: to take to oneself, to take and hold. 180 As a substantive 
it first appears in the philosophical vocabulary in the late seventeenth
177 "Starting out from the Concept," Negative Dialectics, p. 153.
178 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 21.
179 "Elements of Anti-Semitism," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 197.
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century; prior to this it meant a provisional sketch or rough draft of a legal 
document or agreement.
It was first used in a philosophical and epistemological context by 
Leibniz and his followers where it was broadly defined as any representation 
of a thing and was classified according to the degree of clarity, distinctness, 
completion and adequacy. The logical and epistemological ambiguities 
inherent in this usage were carried over by Kant into his critical philosophy.
In Kant there is a twofold meaning for the term concept. On the one 
hand it is a discursive concept, a universal or reflected representation of the 
act of synthesis which was common to several particular representations: the 
concept is the generic identity of several representations. On the other hand 
concept has a meaning that is much closer to its sense of grasping, seizing.
A concept [Begriff, act of seizing] is the clear or obscure 
consciousness of the unity of the act of grasping together a sensible 
manifold. The latter concept is to be understood as the consciousness of an 
act of combining and grasping that is prior to the sense of concept as generic 
identity, the universal representation formed by discursive acts of 
comparison, reflection, and abstraction. 181 Aristotle's expression "One in the 
Many" is relevant here as it recurs, according to Adorno, in almost exactly 
the same form in Kantian philosophy.
The synthesis formed by the mind, which is the act of cognition or is
180 Cf. Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, (Great Britain: Blackwell, 2000), p.l 18.
181 Cf. Beatrice Longuenesse, "The "Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept", Kant and the 
Capacity to Judge, trans. Charles T. Wolfe, (The United States of America: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), p. 46. 'That a concept should thus be understood as consciousness 
of an act, and more precisely of an act of combining and grasping together, is what Kant 
seems to be insisting upon when he calls attention to the word "concept," Begriff: for even 
more explicitly than the Latinate concept, the German fiegr^f carries the connotation of 
grasping, seizing. '
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cognition itself, is referred to as unity in diversity. Historically the unity in 
diversity has been transposed into the notion of an ordering subject through 
which this unity is produced. This idea has its origin in ontology, from the 
fact that this unity is supposed to be the unity of being itself: something prior 
to the individual and the particular. Initially Aristotle's idea of the universal 
is not substantial; it is not like the Platonic Ideas which are universal 
concepts, existing in and for itself, independently of its realization. In 
Aristotle's deliberations he does not go so far as to conceive universal 
concepts as pure abstractions in relation to the particulars subsumed under it. 
One can only speak of a universal in so far as it manifests itself in a 
particular.
For Aristotle in contrast to the universal only the particular is 
substantial: only the single, apparent, concrete phenomena is real, has 
primary being. This is the source of the debate about whether Aristotle was a 
nominalist. For Adorno to describe Aristotle thus would be a grave 
misunderstanding.
'I could say that his Metaphysics circles around this theme; that its 
problem lies precisely in the contradictory situation whereby on the 
one hand the universal is denied substantiality while, on the other, 
universal concepts are not mere abbreviations of the particulars 
subsumed under them - rather, they have an attribute which raises 
them above flatus vocis, above the mere breath of the voice' 182
For Aristotle the particular is the real. It is as a "this" that the particular has 
true being and yet in a peculiar and self-contradictory way the universal or 
form or reason has, just as it had for Plato and later Hegel, the higher reality. 
Reason which at first exists as an inner possibility is actualised 
through education and experience and by these means the external and
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outward authority is internalised: actualised. For the actual to be rational 
requires that it be a feature of some existent element of the social world, an 
institution, a mode of behaviour, a technology, etc. But this logical necessity 
is not conclusive.
According to Adorno, despite the not always conscious conformism 
encountered in the workplace and in the instruments of domination, 
language, weapons, machines, etc, that would encompass all and must allow 
themselves to be encompassed by all, there a prevails an aspect of rationality 
unreconciled with the fixed forms of the material and intellectual apparatus. 
'In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus 
imaginatively to present it to themselves but only in order to determine 
how it is to be dominated.' 183 The objectivity of means already implies the 
criticism of domination, power, knowledge, and mythology. This free live 
thought, compulsive and divisive, ultimately refers to society itself as the 
real subject of thought.
For Kant immediate perception is an unconscious synthesis, a unity 
arrived at by way of the apprehension of the fragmentary in intuition. The 
fragmentary or chaotic is framed as a simultaneous unity temporally not by 
reflection but by an act of appropriation. By thinking of it as "something" by 
claiming it the subject makes "something" its own. 1
According to Adorno, 'In the Critique of Pure Reason, sensation as 
"something," occupies the place of the indistinguishably ontical.' On the 
other hand '[...] sensation holds no higher cognitive rank than any other real
182 "Lecture Five," Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, p. 26.
183 "The Concept of Enlightenment," The Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 39.
184 "Lecture Nine: The Concept of the Thing (1)," Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. 101.
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entity.' 185 For Adorno "something" is the indispensable substrate of any 
concept. It is the most extreme, highest, or supreme abstraction of the 
subject matter that is not identical with thinking, '[...] an abstraction not to 
be abolished by any further thought process.' 186 What is presupposed in the 
"something" has to be named before it can be said in a proposition, a 
meaningful statement. The definition of the statement is to say something 
about "something" that is presupposed in the subject prior to predication. 
The object, the "What", that is postulated by every conceivable idea for a 
concept of subject, is never, as contrasted with the subject, the epitome of 
mediation, the "How", of something. 187
According to Adorno, when defining the meaning of concepts it is not 
enough to outline the main areas of subject matter, the philosophical circles 
within which they move. To make claims as to the essential content and the 
way it is treated also falls short of the mark. The understanding of concepts 
includes a moment of negation. If one seeks to understand a concept or a 
philosophy, then one needs to know what its specific rhetoric was really 
directed against.
'If one seeks to understand a philosophy purely from within itself, just 
from what is written down, one usually does not get very far. One 
needs to develop a faculty for discerning the emphases and accents 
peculiar to that philosophy in order to uncover their relationships 
within the philosophical context, and thus to understand the 
philosophy itself [...]. 188
To register the process of revealing and discerning discrimination, to claim 
"something" as mine as existing in my consciousness, means that a direct
185 "Compulsory Substantiveness," Negative Dialectics, p. 137. 
ise uj^g indissoluble "Something"," Negative Dialectics, p. 135.
187 "Subject and Object," The Adorno Reader, p. 142.
188 "Lecture Eight," Metaphysics, p. 51.
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connection to a nexus of qualities already exists prior to the indirect 
connections based on concepts such as recognition and memory. And it is 
not as if the highest precludes the lowest or the "something" precludes the 
"nothing" which may be the indeterminate, but is not only indeterminate, it 
is not absolute. That which is divested of all specific determinations may 
still crave determination and this qualifies it as possibility. 1
In abstraction possibility remains a myth. Myths intended report, 
naming, the narration of a beginning [or Beginning], presentation, 
confirmation, and explanation. Myths like the concepts they become are 
characterized by discipline and power, they become the "right mark" mainly 
through sacrifice, the labour of the un-free through the word of command. 190
The three-fold synthesis, 191 for Kant the highest point on which the 
possibility of the logical form of all knowledge necessarily depends, 192 is the 
product as well as the condition for material existence. According to 
Adorno, not until the moments of a synthesis identify with each other will 
their identity obtain that restlessness that inward shudder which Hegel calls
189 Cf. "Lecture Eight," Metaphysics, p. 53.
190 ££ "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 8.
191 The synthetic unity of apperception. The synthesis of apprehension in intuition; the 
synthesis of reproduction in a representation of imagination; and the synthesis of 
recognition in a concept. Cf. "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
p. 32. 'The three-fold schema is intended to free the present moment from the power of the 
past by referring that power behind the absolute barrier of the unrepeatable and placing it at 
the disposal of the present as practical knowledge. The compulsion to rescue what is gone 
as what is living instead of using it as the material of progress was appeased only in art, to 
which history itself appertains as a presentation of past life. So long as art declines to pass 
as cognition and thus is separated from practice, social practice tolerates it as it tolerates 
pleasure. But the Siren's song has not yet been rendered powerless by reduction to the 
condition of art.'
192 Cf. "Lecture Twenty: The Concept of the Transcendental (iv)," Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, p. 221. '[W]ith the idea of discovering transcendence at the innermost core, it 
follows that pure spirit (Geist), the 'I think' which is the end point of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, has to become an entity, an existent thing-in-itself, and ultimately an Absolute, if it 
is truly to be able to act as the precondition of everything that exists. In this sense it was 
Kant's successors, Fichte and [with some reservations] Hegel, who actually hypostatized 
the concept of spirit. By insisting that it should not derive from experience, that it should be
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becoming.
'As the concept is experienced as nonidentical, as inwardly in motion, 
it is no longer purely itself; in Hegel's terminology, it leads to its 
otherness without absorbing that otherness. It is defined by that 
which is outside it, because on its own it does not exhaust itself. As 
itself it is not itself alone.' 193
The strain of holding the I together in all its stages, along with the blind 
determination to maintain it and the temptation to lose it, has always been 
there. 194
For Adorno the sense of freedom feeds upon the memory of the 
archaic impulse, mimesis, not yet steered by any solid I. The more 
rigorously the I curbs the impulse the more chaotic and thus questionable 
will it find the pre-temporal freedom. In the philosophical concept of 
spontaneity there resounds the echo of that freedom whose control and 
ultimate destruction the I of idealist philosophy derives its idea of freedom. 
In idealism freedom is freedom from impulses that have been banished to 
the zone of unfree bondage to nature. Freedom reinforces the ego against a 
compulsive impulse.
In the case of neurosis stubborn delusion, an unfree and pathological 
state, bids consciousness to act within the circumference of its own 
immanence. Freedom is denied in its own native realm in line with laws
the absolute preconditioning element, they transformed it into a genuine transcendence.'
193 "Synthesis," Negative Dialectics, p. 157.
194 cf «Tne concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 33. Cf. Ibid. 'The 
narcotic intoxication which permits the atonement of deathlike sleep for the euphoria in 
which the self is suspended, is one of the oldest social arrangements which mediate between 
self-preservation and self destruction an attempt of the self to survive itself. The dread of 
losing the self and of abrogating together with the self the barrier between oneself and other 
life, the fear of death and destruction, is intimately associated with a promise of happiness 
which threatened civilization in every moment. Its road was that of obedience and labour, 
over which fulfilment shines forth perpetually but only as illusive appearance, as 
devitalized beauty. The mind of Odysseus, inimical to his own death and to his own 
happiness is aware of this.'
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which consciousness experiences as alien to the I. 195 'The truth content of 
neuroses is that the I has its unfreedom demonstrated to it, [.. .].' 196
To reiterate, immanent to the Kantian concept of apprehension is a 
direct synthesis that takes place before the indirect functions of reproduction 
in imagination and recognition in a concept intervene. The element of 
subject mediation, subjective preconditions in Kantian terms, that's to say, 
immediate perception as the apprehension of the fragmentary in intuition is a 
synthesis, a unity, an unconscious act of appropriation.
Successive unity is concerned to unify phenomena by regarding them 
or relating them to what we have already seen and heard. Kant unlike 
Descartes does not identify representation with conscious representation, 
and only representation by concepts is called thought.
The distinction between representations and representations of which 
we are conscious requires that the latter have been the object of a synthesis 
of apprehension that's to say has been distinguished within a manifold of 
other representations. In the formation of the I the immediacy of primary 
reactions is broken and, according to Adorno,
'[...] broken with these reactions was the spontaneity which the pure 
I, according to transcendental custom is to contract into. The centristic 
identity of the I is acquired at the expense of what idealism will then 
attribute to it.' 197
In Kant the "I think" accompanies all representations, and the 
nonconceptual abuts the conceptual in its twofold meaning. "Concept" on 
the one hand is the consciousness of the unity of a synthesis of a sensible 
manifold. On the other hand, it is a discursive concept, a universal or
195 cf uThe impuise before the Ego," Negative Dialectics, pp. 221-222.
196 "The Impulse Before the Ego," Negative Dialectics, p. 222.
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reflected representation of the act of synthesis that was common to several 
particular representations. This is what makes it possible to recognize them 
as genetic. It is this Kantian conceptual bifurcation and the Hegelian 
tripartite dialectical move, which is itself a conceptual moment, that forms, 
negatively, the background to Adorno's conceptual constellations.
Temporal relations of simultaneity and succession are objective. They 
are the actual and sensible form of empirical objectivity and this remains so 
even if the empirical content, thought of as the fulfilment or development of 
a thing, is subjective in accordance to the circumstance or empirical 
conditions. There could hardly be rules governing the order in which one 
met people and, apart from freedom of choice and decision, this accidental 
element seems to contradict the claims of freedom. With the phenomena of 
prior engagement,
'[...] a loved person refuses herself to us not through inner 
antagonisms and inhibitions, too much coldness or repressed warmth, 
but because a relationship already exists that excludes another. [...] 
Thus the priority of the fortuitous has powerful arguments on its side: 
someone ousted by a newcomer is always misused, a shared past life 
annulled, experience itself is deleted. The irreversibility of time 
constitutes an objective moral criterion.' 198
On the other hand tenderness between people can be the awareness of the 
possibility of relations without purpose. 199 Being separated from the 
immediacy of human relations leaves the way open for domination by the 
abstract principle of exchange. Adorno maintains that in order for 
metaphysics to fulfil its own concept it would have radically to assimilate 
the relevance of the temporal to the constellation of forms and contents,
197 "Reversal of the Subjective Reduction," Negative Dialectics, p. 176.
198 "Morality and Temporal Sequence," Minima Moralia, p. 78.
199 ££ "Struwwelpeter," Minima Moralia, p. 41.
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concepts and what they comprise, that make up the concept of the 
metaphysical. 200
What holds only for the self in its present state of perception is both 
contingent and somatic. According to Kant the unity of consciousness is 
both my own, a judgment of perception, and insofar as it is transcendental 
unity of self-consciousness, the conscious effort towards judgment which 
makes possible the objective temporal order, it is so constituted that it is 
capable of transcending the point of view of myself in the present state of 
perception to the point of view of everybody always, that's to say a 
judgment of experience.
The transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in effect an effort, an 
act, that draws on the universal forms of synthesis and analysis, is 
inseparable from the empirical unity of consciousness associated with ones 
own body.
That the act of grasping of taking and holding can, nevertheless, 
produce the effect of a unified representation, the homogeneity of the 
universal and the particular, is 'guaranteed by the schematism of pure 
understanding, or the unconscious operation of the intellectual mechanism 
which structures perception in accordance with the understanding.' 201
200 Cf. "Lecture Thirteen: Athens and Auschwitz," Metaphysics: Concept and Problems, p.
101.
201 "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 82. Cf. 
"Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 84. 'The true 
nature of schematism, of the general and particular, of concept and individual case 
reconciled from without, is ultimately revealed in contemporary science as the interest of 
industrial society. Being is apprehended under the aspect of manufacture and 
administration. Everything even the human individual, not to speak of the animal is 
converted into the repeatable, replaceable process, into a mere example for the conceptual 
models of the system. Conflict between administrative, reifying science, between the public 
mind and the experience of the individual, is precluded by circumstance. The conceptual 
apparatus determines the senses, even before perception occurs; a priori, the citizen sees the 
world as the matter from which he manufactures it. Intuitively Kant foretold what
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Without intellectual perception or schematism the understanding would fail 
to impress the intelligibility of the matter, which subjective judgement 
discovers there, with an objective quality prior to its entry into the ego.202
Synthesis of the manifold brings forth a cognition which at initially 
may be raw, crude and confused and in need of analysis. And yet it is 
synthesis alone that collects the elements for cognition and unites them into 
content. Synthesis is in general the result or effect of imagination, '[...] of a 
blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would 
have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom conscious.' 203
Between consciousness and "psychological darkness" smaller degrees 
obtain.204 As the non-conceptual, the non-identical, these represent moments 
of anticipation, possibility, expectation, and spontaneity in the subject. 
Confronted with these heterogeneous elements thought is driven by a sense 
of insufficiency, inadequacy and guilt to exceed its limits.
Adorno critiques synthesis, the individual act of thought which unites 
separate moments, where it is thought of as a guiding and supreme idea. 
This is a mandate to analyze, not to synthesize. The concept that is inwardly 
in motion is to be experienced as nonidentical. The measure of the turn to 
nonidentity is its performance: procedural rather than declarative the 
dialectical thought form will no longer turn its objects into immutable ones.
Hollywood consciously put into practice: in the very process of production, images are pre- 
censored according to the norm of understanding which will later govern their 
apprehension. Even before its occurrence, the perception which serves to confirm the public 
judgement is adjusted by that judgment.'
202 Ibid.
203 «Qn me p^g Concepts of the Understanding or Categories," Critique of Pure Reason, p.
112.
204 Immanuel Kant, "Second Part of the Main Transcendental Question," Prolegomena to 
any Future Metaphysics, trans. Paul Cams, revised by James W. Ellington, (The United 
States of America: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 50.
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Kant allowed no movement of practice, the totality of acts that would satisfy 
the idea of freedom, to differ from pure consciousness. For Adorno the part 
of the action that differs from pure consciousness which for Kant compels 
the action, the part that abruptly leaps out, 'this is spontaneity, which Kant 
transplanted into pure consciousness, lest the function of the "I think" be 
imperilled' 205 According to Adorno, the impulse of freedom needs something 
else, an addendum, something physical which consciousness does not 
exhaust. The addendum is the name for something conveyed to reason, is 
qualitatively different from it, and yet the two moments are by no means 
separately experienced. In general, philosophical analysis has linguistically 
tailored the phenomenon in such a way that it cannot be put otherwise: it is 
something that, as it were, is added to rationality. Adorno's concept of 
experience reverses the polarity of the relation between subject and object, 
bringing to the fore the nonidentical. The addendum is the name for that 
which was eliminated in the process of abstraction, something long past and 
all but grown unrecognizable whilst still remaining a possibility, inhabiting a 
space between the twin poles of representation.
The determinate negation of the formal and abstract as it is posited in 
the universality of the transcendental subject reveals the limitations of the 
Kantian conception: Not so much in the fact that it seems to imply that every 
subject is interchangeable, and so not really individual at all, but in the way 
it down plays more common denominators of human thought: somatic and 
historical particularity, empirical conditions and circumstance. Kant's 
formalism still expected a contribution from the individual. Thought which
205 "The Addendum," Negative Dialectics, pp. 229-210.
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relates the varied experiences of the senses to fundamental concepts was the 
result of a secret mechanism of the soul that prepared direct intuitions in 
such a way that they could be fitted into the system of pure reason.
In Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer claim that the 
secret has been deciphered, the mechanism is in effect always already 
planned for, the data of experience is pre-packaged by the power of society 
through its instrument: the culture industry. The industry robs individuals of 
their function. The schematising serves the customer. There is nothing left 
for the consumer to classify or produce. In the prearranged harmony the 
whole and the parts are alike. Atomized: there is no antithesis and no 
connection. Culture carries within its schematization an embryonic process 
of cataloguing and classification that brings it within the sphere of 
administration. Inwardly the subjective and restricted form of truth is at the 
mercy of the outwardly powerful. Amusement and pleasure, which always 
means not to think about anything, replaces higher and harder things 
determining consumption excludes the untried as a risk, and becomes the 
ideal in slogans paid for by advertising interests. Imitative style and 
obedience to the social hierarchy have become the watchwords of the 
cultural monopoly. Not to conform means to be rendered a stranger: 
excluded, powerless and blithely accused of incompetence/
For Kant, ultimately, reason is dialectical and negative. Reason is 
doomed to follow its own impulse and obey its own laws even if this lands it 
in contradictions. Kant's successors turned this necessary and inevitable 
negative element into something positive, into an organ of truth. Kant's
206
206 « The Cuiture industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," Dialectic of Enlightenment,
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dialectic with its negative connotations is transformed into dialectics as a 
method for the discovery of the truth and simultaneously as truth revealing 
itself. When, in the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant asks 
"How is metaphysics as a natural disposition possible?" he intends the 
question of how it is that people are driven to ask the kinds of question that 
Kant calls metaphysical. For Kant the natural disposition of reason to follow 
its own destiny means transcending its own finite condition. But finally, so 
as not to end up in an infinite progression reason must end unconditionally.
' [I]t must somehow postulate the existence of a frontier in the shape of 
an ultimate cause, an ultimate form of existence, an ultimate 
absolute being in which everything can be anchored. And, Kant 
asserts, this is an entirely legitimate and unavoidable need that is 
simply rooted in the impulse to ground knowledge in other 
foundations [other concepts], and hence in its logical structure. It is 
rooted in the circumstance that we have no right to judge unless we 
can provide a reason for it. But by acceding to this entirely legitimate 
and unavoidable coercion, we end up in these difficulties [the 
antinomies]. ' 207
The antinomical structure of the Kantian system, the contradictions in 
which it necessarily entangles itself, expresses something from the 
philosophy of history. Kant's critique is first of all a theory of scientific 
judgements. Its epistemological logic is concerned with exploring and 
subsuming the empirical world under laws. Latterly or post-Kant the critique 
is thought of primarily as the successful separation of valid cognition and 
metaphysics. According to Adorno, however, Kant does intend more. 
'Through the medium of epistemological reflection he answers the so-called 
metaphysical questions in a far from metaphysically neutral way: they really
_ 134-167.
507 "Lecture Four: Metaphysics (1)," Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 38-39.
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must not be asked, he tells us.' 208 And although when pressed, Kant does 
move against himself he, in this sense, anticipates Hegel's doctrine that logic 
and metaphysics are the same.209
At the same time the critique empowers the positivistic doctrine in 
which 'the hard metaphysical questions on which everything depends' 210 are 
bypassed, abolished by indirect negation. German idealism extrapolated its 
position on epistemology and metaphysics through its fundamental claim to 
be the carrier of the whole. It is by its express denial of objectively valid 
cognition of the absolute that it makes an absolute judgement. The 
consistency of thought will inevitably turn into an absolute for itself. 
Eventually German idealism came to vest its authority in "mind," in the 
absolute subject. Finite but unrestricted and resigned the critical subject 
wants to be undisturbed. Its critical function becomes positive and practical. 
Imagining the absolute becomes, if at all, an idle concern.
Questioning critique moves away from thoughts about consciousness 
in favour of thoughts about practical matters and materialism. This was 
fundamentally Marx's criticism, that, not withstanding Hegel's 
achievements,211 philosophers by starting from the standpoint of
208 "Kant's Resignation," Negative Dialectics, pp. 381-382.
209 Cf. G.W.F Hegel, "Preliminary Notion," Hegel's Logic, trans. William Wallace (Malta: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 36. 'For in point of contents, thought is only true in 
proportion as it sinks itself in the facts; and in point of form it is no private or particular 
state or act of the subject, but rather that attitude of consciousness where the abstract self, 
freed from all the special limitations to which its ordinarily states or qualities are liable, 
restricts itself to universal action in which it is identical with all individuals. [...] With these 
explanations and qualifications, thoughts may be termed Objective Thoughts among 
which are also to be included the forms which are more especially discussed in the common 
logic, where they are usually treated as forms of conscious thought only. Logic therefore 
coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts thoughts 
accredited able to express the essential reality of things.'
210 Ibid.
211 Cf. Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and General Philosophy, " Selected 
Writings, ed, David McLellan. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 101. 'The
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consciousness and not the world had in fact inverted the world. For Adorno, 
following Hegel, thought is always accompanied by talk about a material 
that it knows to be distinct from itself. 'For thought is always accompanied 
by the moment of violent exertion, a reflection of the dire necessities of life, 
that characterizes labour: the strains and toils of the concept are not 
metaphorical.' 212 The move to distance philosophy from the preponderance 
of rationalism is in part what had motivated Kant, awakened him from his 
philosophical slumber213 with contradictory and circulatory results.
In the Critique of Pure Reason the regulative idea, as against concept, 
of the "I think" was Kant's formula for a lack of distinction between logical 
identity and productive spontaneity: that's to say between judgments of 
perception which are particular and contingent and judgments of experience 
which are necessary and common to all. According to Kant 'it must be 
possible for the "I think" to accompany all my representations.' 214 But for 
Kant not all representations are conscious and only representation by 
concepts is called thought.215 Representations of which we are conscious are 
those that have been the object of a synthesis of apprehension, claimed or 
distinguished within a manifold of other representations. Conversely those 
of which we are not conscious, while we know that we have them are 
representations we do not apprehend but can still conclude are somehow 
present. Some of the representations considered may become conscious,
outstanding achievement of Hegel's phenomenology, ,the dialectic of negativity as the 
moving and creating principle, is [...] that he [...] grasps the nature of labour, and 
conceives objective man (true, because real man) as the result of his own labour.'
212 "Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 21.
213 «preface," Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, p. 5.
214 "The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception," Critique of Pure Reason, p. 152.
215 Cf. "The Logical Employment of the Understanding," Critique of Pure Reason, p. 106. 
'Thought is Knowledge [cognition] by means of concepts.'
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their apprehension lies in the future, while others may have apprehended in 
the past but are now lost. Yet others may never reach the threshold of 
consciousness. According to Longuenesse, Kant [in the Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View (1798)] gives various examples of representations 
we do not apprehend, while we know that we have them:
'[...] the features of a house from afar, the individual notes of a chord 
struck in the course of a musical improvisation, the representations 
excluded from our attention in favour of other representations (an 
exclusion due perhaps to our sense of decency, to operations of 
abstraction necessary for the formation of general concepts, or any 
other reason).' 216
For Adorno that which takes a stand and posits itself as I is an example of an 
ideological reification of the abstract centres of domination: epistemological 
categories are turned into moral ones.217 Kant's notion of the individual 
spontaneous knowing subject maintains both the I and the view that 
experience of the object is conditioned and structured by subjective forms 
and categories. For Kant the pre-designed unit underlying every identity, 
every individual human consciousness, is the guarantor of solid identity.218 
The categorical object in this formulation is something that is essentially 
identical to the transcendental subject.
The Kantian systematic calls for an orderly organization and 
presentation of thoughts consistent with the structure of topical disciplines. 
'The precedence of consciousness which is to legitimize science, as 
presupposed at the start of the Critique of Pure Reason, is then inferred from
216 "The Kantian "Cogito,"" Kant and the Capacity to Judge, p. 65. Cf. "The Kantian 
"Cogito"," Kant and the Capacity to Judge, p. 66. "To sum up: according to Kant we 
certainly have many representations of which we are not conscious; among our conscious 
representations there are some we just apprehend without reproducing them or reproduce 
without subjecting them to the rules of synthesis that allow them to be reflected under 
concepts, that is, to be thought." 
2n "Against Relativism," Negative Dialectics, p. 35.
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procedural standards that confirm or refute judgments in line with scientific 
rules.' 219 The processes of consciousness are reduced to the scientific 
cognitive ideal of step by step verification the test of which is subjectively 
accentuated and retroactive: '[...] judgments are retroactive treatments of 
already constituted facts, under the norms of their subjective 
intelligibility.' 220
What Kant and scientific systems fail to do, from the object's point of view, 
is insist upon the inner unity of its aspects as something that in-itself wasn't
spawned in Abdera.
The Critique of Pure Reason is a theory of science. The precedence of 
consciousness, which is to legitimize science as presupposed at the start of 
the Critique of Pure Reason, is then inferred from procedural standards that 
confirm or refute judgments in line with scientific rules. The Critique of 
Pure Reason reflects the path the cognitive subject takes in judging.
For Adomo what confounds the thesis of subjective apriority is the 
fact that '[h]e to whom something is given belongs apriori to the same 
sphere as the given thing.' 222 Materialism finds its place in critical 
philosophy through its dissolution of things understood as dogmatic: the 
segregation of body and mind, which in idealistic philosophy was 
tantamount to the supremacy of mind. Historically in the evolution of 
rationality the two have come into opposition. The logic of 
noncontradictoriness baulks at the idea that neither is without the other. But
218 "Starting out from the Concept," Negative Dialectics, pp. 154-155.
219 "Materialism and Immediacy," Negative Dialectics, p. 196.
220 "Materialism and Immediacy," Negative Dialectics, p. 197.
221 Democritus of Abdera (c. 460 c. 370 BC) along with Leucippus, founded classical 
atomism.
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that logic is logic insulated against itself it is a validity that has submerged 
its own genesis.
Freedom for Kant was freedom from sensation, freedom in the 
abstract universal concept of things "beyond nature" is freedom spiritualised 
into freedom from the realm of causality. According to Adorno, despite and 
for all his categorical localization of freedom in the sphere above 
psychology there is something narcissistic in Kant's argument.
'According to his Foundation for a Metaphysics of Morals, everyone 
including, including "the most arrant knave," need only be "shown 
examples of honest intent, of constancy in following good maxims, of 
compassion and of general good will," to wish that he too were so 
minded. He can expect no "gratification of desires" from this "no 
condition that would satisfy any of his real or otherwise conceivable 
inclinations, but only a greater inner worth of his persons... But he 
believes that he is a better person when he puts himself on the 
standpoint of a member of the intelligible world a move he is 
involuntarily compelled to make by the idea of freedom, i.e., 
independence of determining causes from the sensible world. ..' 223
Freedom for Kant is coupled with the need for self-exaltation, reflection on a 
person's practical and moral reason and worth. Yet the more freedom is 
ascribed to the subject itself the greater the responsibility and guilt: in 
practice the subject has never been endowed with the unabridged autonomy 
accorded to it in theory.
What makes the subject aware of the limits of its freedom is the fact 
that it is a part of nature and at the same time its powerlessness against a 
society which has become independent of it.224 According to Adorno, it 
didn't occur to Kant to ask whether freedom, an eternal idea for Kant, might
222 "Materialism and Immediacy," Negative Dialectics, p. 196.
223 «preedom and Organized Society," Negative Dialectics, p. 220.
224 cf "Freedom and Organized Society," Negative Dialectics, p. 221.
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be essentially historic, not just as concept but in its empirical substance. 225 
Before the formation of self-conscious individual in the modern sense, 
meaning both the biological human being and the one constituted as a unit 
by its own reflection, it is an anachronism to talk of freedom.
Freedom or unfreedom is not as primary as it is made out to be by the 
transcendental principle founded in the subjective consciousness. 'Whole 
epochs, whole societies lacked not only the concept of freedom but the 
thing.' 226 Society destines the individual to be what they are, indicative of 
historical and material existence.
The task of materialist criticizing is to judge, along with their 
dynamics, the subjective and objective share. The criticism denies the false 
objectivity of concept fetishism by reducing it to its social subject. On the 
other hand it denies the false subjectivity of the "all in the mind" by 
revealing it as a parasitic fraud, as well as demonstrating its immanent 
hostility to mind. By way of its critique materialism turns philosophical, 
despite and because of its criticism of philosophy. According to Adomo, 
'the only way to pass philosophically into social categories is to decipher the 
truth content of philosophical ones.' 227 This is what materialism achieves. 
The truth or untruth of philosophical teaching has more to do with social 
conditions, objective structures, objective truth and its cognition; less the 
sociologically inspired analysis of society as nothing but the average value
97&
of individual reactive modes.
According to Adorno, where Hegel no longer opposes production and
225 «pyeeciom and Organized Society," Negative Dialectics, p. 218.
226 Ibid.
227 "Dialectics not a Sociology of Knowledge," Negative Dialectics, p. 198.
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deed to matter, as subjective accomplishments but looks for them in 
specific objects, in concrete material reality, he recalls the affinity the 
cohesive force which objects have for each other outside the surrogate 
schemata: outside the postulation of an equivalence and a unity which, itself, 
is bound up with the presupposition that all things in being are identical with 
the cognitive principle.
'What the objects communicate in  instead of each being the atom it 
becomes in the logic of classification  is the trace of the objects' 
definition in themselves, which Kant denied and Hegel, against Kant, 
sought to restore through the subject.' 230
Unity and unanimity are indirect, oblique projections coordinated along the 
lines of a pacified, no longer agonistic, supremacist, oppressive thinking. It 
is the transcendental quest for unity that turns dialectical difference into a 
dialectical contradiction.
'What we differentiate will appear divergent, dissonant, negative for 
just as long as the structure of our consciousness obliges it to strive for 
unity: as long as the demand for totality will be its measure for 
whatever is not identical with it. This is what dialectics holds up to our 
consciousness as a contradiction.' 231
Once delivered from the systems thought is transposed, it enters the open 
realm of definition by individual moments. According to Adorno, Hegelian 
logic was not altogether alien to this procedure. To perceive the individual 
moment in its immanent connection with others is reflected in the tendency 
to recall how they came to be, the cohesive force, the sense of objectivity, 
which the idealistic systems had signed over to the transcendental subject
228 Ibid.
229 The abstract self-identical relation and formless substrate of things, an undifferentiated 
compound of faculties, cognitions, and emotions, etc,.
230 "The Twofold Character of the System," Negative Dialectics, p. 25.
231 "Dialectics not a Standpoint," Negative Dialectics, pp. 5-6.
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and its sense of subjectivity/
According to Adorno, for the Hegel of the Phenomenology, in whom 
the consciousness of spirit was a living dynamic activity, immediacy and 
spontaneity are mediated by an objective spirit which itself is none other 
than social labour, labour that by its nature transcends the contingency of the 
individual subject.233 Hegel construes his Unitarian principle, the spirit, as a 
simultaneous being-in-itself and pure becoming. The relationship of spirit to 
what is given manifests itself on the model of a social process. Spirit must 
work its passage: physically labour its concept. 'The path natural 
consciousness follows to the identity of absolute Knowledge [Wissen] is 
itself labour.' 234
The implausibility of this construction lies in its contradiction, the fact 
that it concludes, and thus brings to a standstill, whilst within the conceptual 
dynamics of pure, autarkic, subjective generation. Subjective generation and 
ontology, nominalism and realism, syncopated at the Archimedian point will 
prevent the resolution of the tension immanent to the system.
'The microanalysis of individual categories, which simultaneously 
appears as their objective self-reflection, was to let each concept pass 
into its otherness without regard to an overlay from above; to Hegel, 
the totality of this movement meant the system.'
The movement of the concept, separated from the thing in the original form 
of objectifying definition, was from the beginning the product of dialectical 
thinking: everything is always that which it is, only because it becomes that
232 Cf. "The Twofold Character of the System," Negative Dialectics, p. 26. 'What the 
conception of the system recalls, in reverse, is the coherence of the non-identical, the very 
thing infringed by deductive systematics.'
233 Cf. "Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, pp. 17-18.
234 "Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 21.
235 "The Twofold Character of the System," p. 25.
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which it is not, a product of socialization and historical circumstance. 236
'We know that Hegel, in his chapter on master and servant, develops 
the genesis of self-consciousness from the labour relation, and that he 
does this by adjusting the I to its self-determined purpose as well as to 
heterogeneous matter. The origin of the "I" in "Not I" remains 
scarcely veiled. It is looked up in the real living process, in the 
legalities of the survival of the species, of providing it with 
nutriments. Thereafter, Hegel hypostatises the mind but in vain.' 237
Hegel exalts into transcendence the coextensive historical objectivity and 
popular spirit. Within this frame individuals can differ from other 
individuals but not from the popular spirit and the level of adjustment it 
facilitates: the submission of the weak to the more powerful.
The sense of duty and world history as divine plan that pervade 
Hegel's thought and which he puts into philosophy's mouth is on a par with 
the gilding of the heteronomous and substantial universal. Adorno thinks 
Hegel apes Heidegger in advance: '"For reason is the perceiving of the 
divine work." The omnipotent thought has to abdicate and to make itself 
complaisant as mere perceiving.' 238
hi the Philosophy of Right Hegel controversially comes out against 
the notion that all, as individuals, should share in deliberating and deciding 
on political matters of general concern. 239 Marx reacted to this notion by 
opening up another perspective on the self-organization of society.
'The actual individual man must take the abstract citizen back into 
himself and, as an individual man in his empirical life, in his 
individual work and relationships become a species-being; man must 
recognize his own forces as social forces, organize them, and thus no 
longer separate social from himself in the form of political forces.
236 Q£ u-j^g Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 15.
237 "The Concept of Mind," Negative Dialectics, p. 198.
238 "The Supramundane Character of the Hegelian World Spirit," Negative Dialectics, p.
324.
239 G.W.F. Hegel, "The State," Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, (United States of
America: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 200.
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Only when this has been achieved will human emancipation be 
complete.' 240
This perspective, praxis philosophy's determination of modernity, is guided 
by the intuitive thought that, however complex and functionally constraining 
social systems become, it still makes sense to try and realize an ethical 
totality. By ceaselessly fastening human consciousness to points it wants to 
get away from, points that link it to a world objectively set for totality, this 
kind of thinking will be so much less the prey of the historic form of its 
problems than a thinking that heedless of history begins again anew.
The model of modern philosophy is driven by two subject object 
relationships. In one the emphasis falls on a knowing subject which forms 
opinions capable of being true about something in the objective world. The 
other emphasizes the acting subject whose purposive activity is measured by 
its success in bringing about something in the objective world. Between 
knowing and acting there is, posited in philosophical concepts, a mediating 
function of formation processes. 241
For Hegel mediation is never a middle element between extremes, a 
mistaken depicted since Kierkegaard's time, instead mediation takes place in 
and through the extremes.242 In the movement of thought to one extreme or 
another there arises a moment where the extreme and one-sided convicts 
itself of its own absurdity, i.e. form without content. In the dialectic the law 
of contradiction means the contradiction between fixed concepts and 
concepts in motion.
240
241
"On the Jewish Question," Karl Marx: Selected Writings, p. 57.
Cf. "The Continuation of the Hegelian Project in the Philosophy of Praxis," The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 63. 
242 " Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 8.
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Concepts are both pinned down, so as to remain concepts, and set in 
motion, altered by the dictates of the object. Therefore for knowledge's sake 
and for the concept to remain true to its own meaning as an instrument of the 
intellect it must change, animate in consciousness both the identity of and 
the difference between the concept and thing expressed: naive realism and 
its negation. 243
According to Habermas:
'The philosophy of reflection, which accords to knowledge a 
privileged status, conceives the self-formative process of the spirit (on 
the model of relation-to-self) as a process of becoming conscious. 
Praxis philosophy, which accords privileged status to the relationship 
between the acting subject and manipulable worldly objects, conceives 
the self-formative process of the species (on the model of self- 
externalization) as a process of self-creation. For it, not self 
consciousness but labour counts as the principle of modernity.' 244
Forces of production; technological; scientific; artistic, are derived from this 
principle. Marx's philosophy of praxis assimilated labour to the normative 
content of the aesthetic. This allows him to differentiate between an 
obj edification of essential powers and their alienation. On the aesthetic 
model the artist externalises her essential powers and appropriates the 
product, the artwork. For alienated labour this process is interrupted. The 
products of alienated labour cannot be realized or developed in the self. 
Impeded, fractured, and fragmented, the concrete function of labour is 
transformed into an abstract performance or functional contribution to the 
formation and self-realization of capital. However Marx's theory of labour 
and purposive rationality derived from the normative content of the aesthetic 
model is ambiguous and problematic. It gives rise to different Marxist
243 "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, pp. 70-71.
244 u-pjjg Continuation of the Hegelian Project in the Philosophy of Praxis." The
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traditions. Some see the development of productive forces, scientific and 
technological, as progressive, as means to revolutionize and rationalize 
society.
Technological progress in the rationalization of society is not the same 
as progress in humanity. The stated concentration on the survival of the 
species carries with it an implication that humanity in general already exists, 
and therefore can progress. Whereas it fact it may yet have to be 
established.245 If effective humanity is something that remains trapped in the 
totality it has it-self fashioned then no progress has taken place at all.
The totalized subject presupposes as principles of subjective thinking 
noncontradictoriness and causal relation. On the other hand dialectical logic 
respects that which is to be thought, the object, the analysis of which is 
tangential to the rules of thinking. Thought, without abandoning it, need not 
be content with its own legality: the object does not heed the rules of 
thinking. Thought can think against itself.
According to Adorno, that it is subjectivity that presupposes facts 
while objectivity presupposes the subject is unbearable only to one who 
hypostatizes subjective principles as a hierarchical schema, an objective 
order summoned from outside.246 With that the positivistic sense of 
objectivity shines as the brightest star in constellation. Rescuing the 
rhetorical element in such a configuration is initially the next concern.
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 63.
245 £f "progress," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 145.
246 cf «Noncontradictoriness not to be Hypostatized," Negative Dialectics, pp. 140-141.
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Chapter Three: Objectivity
247 
'All obj edification is a forgetting.''
-Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer
'Objectivity is the self-unconscious schema under which 
the subject brings its otherness. The less affinity to things
5.48
it tolerates, the more ruthlessly will it identify. '
-Theodor W. Adorno.
'The only way to make out objectivity is to reflect, at each historic and 
each cognitive step, on what is then presented as subject and object as 
well as on the mediations. [...] The objective content of individual 
experience is not produced by the method of comparative 
generalization; it is produced by dissolving what keeps that 
experience, as being bias itself, from yielding to the object without 
reservations - as Hegel put it: with the freedom that would relax the 
cognitive subject until it truly fades into the object to which it is akin, 
on the strength of its own objective being.' 249
Rending the veil, breaking with the formal and violent exertion the subject 
usually weaves around the object is an act whereby knowledge of the object 
is approached passively, fearlessly. Trusting itself to its own experience the 
primacy of the object shimmers through where subjective reason scents 
subjective contingency. The subject is not the objects constituent it is the 
objects agent. Primacy of the object over the subject is legitimated only 
when that primacy is somehow definable. To grasp the object as something 
definitive its subjective qualities are not to be eliminated by subjective 
reduction. The object of undiminished experience is more objective than the 
ideal of depersonalizing knowledge by deducting the subject. The object's 
subjective qualities are much more an element of objectivity if the subject 
has an objective core.
Objectivity itself is what stops objectivity from becoming cognitive in
247 "Idle Horror,' Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 230.
248 "Causality as a Spell," Negative Dialectics, p. 270.
249 "Subject and Object," The Adorno Reader, p. 146.
250 "Subject and Object," The Adorno Reader, p. 143.
106
Mark Walker: Experiential Embodiment and Human Immediacy: Adorno's Negative Affinity
a subject that can never from the point of view of objectivity be objective 
enough. 251 The superiority of objectivity in the subject is also that which 
stops subjects from becoming subject. Thought, a compulsive mechanism of 
nature becomes illusionary where it seeks to deny its divisive function of 
distancing and objectification.
In order to transmit and illuminate objectivity requires the 
emancipation of the embodied subject from its inherent limits, its immanent 
spatiality and ordination. Subjective mechanisms of mediation serve to 
lengthen the objective ones: the subject remains harnessed to everything
^) ^10
objective it thinks. By reflecting on the historical and cognitive 
development of what is presented at the cognitive stage as subject and 
object, objectivity can be realised. The subject, as a socially engaged entity, 
is possible because the subject is itself an object of a certain kind. Its 
subjective qualities, unity and meaning, are essential to what it is as an 
object. Defining the object means that something objective is subjectively 
captured by means of a fixed concept. Reflection is cut short for the sake of
251 "The Critical Philosophy," Hegel's Logic, pp. 67-68. Objectivity 'First, it means what 
has external existence, in distinction from which the subjective is what is only supposed, 
dreamed, &c. Secondly, it has the meaning, attached to it by Kant, of the universal and 
necessary, as distinguished from the particular, subjective, and occasional element which 
belongs to our sensations. Thirdly, as has been just explained, it means the thought- 
apprehended essence of the existing thing, in contradistinction from what is merely our 
thought, and what consequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in 
independent essence.'
252 Cf. "Introduction," The Philosophy of Right, p. 32. ' (a) The will is purely and simply 
objective in so far as it has itself for its determination and so is in correspondence with its 
concept and genuinely a will; (P) but the objective will, being without the infinite form of 
self-consciousness, is the will absorbed in its content or condition, whatever the content of 
these may be; it is the will of the child, the ethical will, also the will of the slave, the 
superstitious man, &c.; (y) Objectivity, finally, is the one-sided form opposed to the 
subjective volition, and hence is the immediacy of existence as external reality; the will first 
becomes objective to itself hi this sense through the fulfilment of its aims.' 252 Cf. 
"Introduction," The Philosophy of Right, p. 43. 'As a person, I am myself an immediate 
individual; if we give further precision to this expression, it means in the first instance that I 
am alive in this bodily organism which is my external existence, universal in content and 
un-divided, the real pre-condition of every further determined mode of existence.'
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conceptual flexibility.
The cognitive function for its part has arisen historically. Without the 
cognitive function there would be neither difference nor unity of the subject. 
The subject's reflection upon its own formalism is reflection upon society: 
society is immanent to experience. 'Nothing but the social self-reflection of 
knowledge obtains for knowledge the objectivity that will escape it as long 
as it obeys the social coercion that holds sway in it, and does not become 
aware of them.' 254 That the captive cognitive subject is dependent on space, 
time, and concomitant forms of thought marks out its dependence on the 
species. The species finds its continued expression in these formative 
constituents.
The categorical captivity of individual consciousness is something 
posited and thus, "merely subjective." But subjectivity becomes a moment 
that is held fast and endures because the primacy of the object requires both 
reflection upon the subject and subjective reflection. 'The primacy of the 
object proves itself in that it qualitatively alters the opinions of reified 
consciousness that are smoothly consistent with subjectivism.' 255 That the 
object becomes something at all arises from its being determinate. If the 
determinations seem to be merely affixed to it by the subject then it is the 
subject's own objectivity that comes to the fore, framed in the image of the 
object which it constitutes.
According to Adorno;
'What transmits the facts is not so much the subjective mechanism of
253 Cf. " Subject and Object," The Adorno Reader, pp. 138-139.
254 "Subject and Object," The Adorno Reader, p. 143.
255 "On Subject and Object," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 251.
256 "On Subject and Object," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 250.
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their pre-formation and comprehension as it is the objectivity 
heteronomous to the subject the objectivity behind that which the 
subject can experience. This objectivity is denied to the primary realm 
of subjective experience. It is preordinated to that realm.' 257
That thinking is mediated by objectivity, that society comes before 
individual consciousness and all its experience does not negate thinking nor 
the objective laws that make it thinking.258 Subjectivity is always indirect it 
is always by way of mediation that we know it. The subjective moment is 
framed in the objective moment as its limitation.259
It is the fetishization and isolation of the subjective element of 
historical movement, its spontaneous moment that increases the objective 
impotence of theory. This in turn motivates the transition to praxis without 
theory. At the moment it expresses its incapacity for self-conscious 
reflection and exempts itself from reality-testing the sanctioned delusional 
praxis becomes a fawning and malicious servant of the pleasure principle.
'Wherever, in the current manner of speaking, judgment is too
257 "Indirectness by Objectivity," Negative Dialectics, p. 170.
258 For the kind of thing Adorno's thinking here, Cf. Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard, "The 
"Subjective"," Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, (United 
States of America: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 17. 'In place of what will be the 
quantity of a determinate judgment, reflection can already compare givens under the 
"heading" (Titel) of their identity or their difference, and in place of what will be the 
modality of a determinant judgment, it can compare givens under the "heading" of their 
determinability or determination. The distortion or the monstrosity that affects the 
categories by means of which the analysis of taste proceeds, results from the fact that here 
the movement of reflective anamnesis works from the objective to the subjective.'--"The 
Heuristic," Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, p. 27. These "headings" 
[identity/difference; agreement/ opposition; inner/ outer; determinable (or matter) / 
determination (or form)] regroup the spontaneous ways of synthesizing givens. One might 
say that they all respond to the question, What does (this given) remind us of? They are 
always comparisons.'
259 Cf. "Introduction," Philosophy of Right, p. 31. 'The subjective, in relation to the will hi 
general, means the will's self-conscious side, its individuality hi distinction from its implicit 
concept. The subjectivity of the will means therefore (a) the pure form of the will, as the 
absolute unity of self-consciousness with itself (a unity in which self-consciousness, as I = 
I, is purely and simply inward and abstractly self dependent), the pure certainty, as 
distinguished from the truth, of individuality; (p) the particular will as the arbitrary will and 
the contingent content of optional aims; (y) in general, the one- sided form of the will for 
which the thing willed, whatever its content, is but a content belonging to self consciousness 
and an aim unfulfilled.'
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subjective at the present historical stage, the subject, as a rule, will 
automatically parrot the consensus omnium. To give the object its due 
instead of being content with the false copy, the subject would have to 
resist the average value of such objectivity and free itself as a subject. 
It is on this emancipation, not on the subject's insatiable repression 
that objectivity depends today.' 260
The deformation of spontaneity is a reaction to the administered 
world. By blinding itself to the totality and claiming and behaving as if it 
stems immediately from people spontaneity tows the party line: the objective 
practice of progressive dehumanization. The rigidified institutions are 
dialectically the result and the determinative of the way the subjective 
aspects of spontaneity have atrophied in the historical process. Without 
spontaneity the moment of immediacy, a bonus from the subjective thought 
that looks beyond the dialectical structure and the law of immanent context, 
dialectics would be the totality that goes back to the identity principle.
According to Adorno, instead of thrashing about indiscriminately or 
abstractly 'spontaneity, which would be animated by the neediness of the 
object, should attach itself to the vulnerable places of rigidified reality, 
where the ruptures caused by the pressures of rigidification appear externally 
[,..].' 261 This represents the rational element in Adorno's understanding of 
spontaneity: its entwinement with society [civil society, the state, etc] as a 
determinant of the excess of rigid generality in every particular that comes 
into being. His pessimism is reflected in the thought that this might not be 
enough, that it would be illusory and idealistic to think that it might be when 
set against societal omnipotence.
This is a charge Adorno levels at Existentialism and existentialists. To
260 "Indirectness by Objectivity," Negative Dialectics, pp. 170-171.
261 "Marginalia to Theory and Practice," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p.
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posit an isolated, allegedly ontological concept of the subjectively 
spontaneous is too optimistic even as an act of desperation.262 Even where 
Existentialism split with fundamental ontology by entering into political 
commitments it remained in idealistic bonds. 'To Existentialism as to Fichte, 
any objectivity is a matter of indifference.' 263 Sartre's philosophy is most 
effective where it stresses the moment the reigning practice will no longer 
tolerate, spontaneity, organized according to the old idealistic category of 
the free act of the subject. Kant had posited '[...] absolute self-activity 
(freedom)' 264 a thought taken up by Fichte and Schelling.
For Adorno the notion of an absolute freedom of choice is as 
illusionary as Fichte's notion of the absolute and immediately certain I 
who's Tathandlung [literally a "deed-action"] is the source of the world: for 
Fichte the notion of the Being of the world independent of our thinking can 
make no sense.
Subjectivity as a being-for-itself and as the sole substantial being, 
posits as a mere fact of existence the isolated individual, but this absolute 
subject cannot get out of its entanglements, the bonds of dominion, which 
are as one with the principle of subjectivity as the formalism such thinking 
will relapse into. Subjectivity indirect and mediated by history has an open 
side.
'What man ought to be as such is never more than what he has been: 
he is chained to the rock of his past. He is not only what he was and is, 
however, but equally what he can come to be, and to anticipate that, 
no definition suffices.' 265
266.
262 ££ "Progress," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 155.
263 "Existentialism," Negative Dialectics, p. 50.
264 "The Antimony of Pure Reason," Critique of Pure Reason, (A 418/B 446) p. 392.
265 "Existentialism," Negative Dialectics, p. 51.
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Identity is a self-reflexive relation that grounds itself through the negation of 
its absolute essence. Put another way Rational identity or necessity grounds 
itself or perhaps grinds itself out of the in-itself of its own reason, something 
which it is just as capable of losing. 'The strain of holding the I together 
adheres to the I in all stages; and the temptation to lose it has always been 
there with the blind determination to maintain it.' 266 Historically, thinking 
through the concept of temporal possibility and indirect mediation in the 
context of what something may become, reason had resorted to the
^f\n 
symbolic. The symbol is as much an active force in life as the symbolized 
thing itself. Allegorical like the symbol doesn't necessarily have to express 
what it symbolizes.
The symbol or allegorical figure as the representation of a hidden 
significance can suggest meanings other than its intensive, anticipatory, and 
intimating realization suggests. Impulsive, arbitrary, singular, multitudinous, 
fractured and fragmented, the I or transcendental subject is by turns 
conceptual and symbolic, direct and indirect, and in the immediacy and
^)f.Q
immanent necessity of it embodiment, very real.
266 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 33.
267 In the Critique of Judgement Kant's approach to the concept of indirectness, mediation, 
or second reflection is explicated through the concept of Hypotyposis [exhibition]. This 
consists in making a concept sensible and this is either schematic or symbolic. Schematic 
hypotyposis contains direct exhibitions of the concept, determinate judgments, the intuition 
corresponding to it having been given a priori. With symbolic hypotyposis there is no 
adequate sensible intuition and the concept is supplied with an intuition or form that is an 
analogy. This artistic doubling of the productive imagination allows Kant to make the claim 
that for example, the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good; a hand-mill a symbol 
analogous to a despotic state. Cf. § 59, "On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality," Critique of 
Judgment, pp. 225-228.
268 Cf. § 17, "Introduction," The Philosophy of Right, p. 28. 'An impulse is simply a uni- 
directional urge and thus has no measuring rod in itself, and so this determination of its 
subordination or sacrifice is the contingent decision of the arbitrary will which, in deciding, 
may proceed either by using intelligence to calculate which impulse will give most 
satisfaction, or else in accordance with any other optional consideration.'
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According to Adorno, the concept transmits itself immediately 
according to its own nature. As rational intuitive immediacy this is not an 
infallible mark of objective validity and truth. There is no transmitted thing 
without the indirectness of something direct. Indirectness always refers to 
the direct thing without which there would be no directness. For this 
mediation is essential. To think mediation is to think the impossibility of 
keeping the determinacies isolated. However, '[...] the fact that indirectness 
is universal does not entitle us to reduce all things between heaven and earth 
to its level, as if transmitting an immediacy were the same as transmitting a
^/^Q
concept.' Subjective mediation does not exhaust the direct thing.
Indirectness involves the direct in a way that is different from the way 
the direct involves the indirect. 'The transmission of something direct refers 
to its mode: to knowledge of it, and to the bounds of such knowledge. 
Immediacy is no modality, no mere definition of the "how" for a 
consciousness' 270 Immediacy in this sense is objective: its concept points to 
that which is non-identical in its concept, that which mediation makes no 
claim to cover or exhaust according to its own concept. If immediacy was 
wholly indirect it would become totalised in a subject that perpetuates the 
absolute rule of the subject. But objectively and dialectically the concept of 
immediacy points to that which cannot be excised in the concept, the 
difference spirited away in the problematic concept of a total and unified
271identification.
In epistemology the transcendental subject, the subject considered in
269 "Indirectness by Objectivity," Negative Dialectics, p. 171.
270 "Indirectness by Objectivity," Negative Dialectics, p. 171-172.
271 Ibid.
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terms of the conditions of its possibility, discloses the precedence of the 
abstract, rational relations that determine the real conduct of people. The 
word "abstract" is equivocal and this is what causes the opposite poles of 
cognition to be equated at the expense of their qualitative difference. The 
abstract negates the particular through its concept. In that sense the word 
"abstract" is still too abstract it cuts short what cannot be directly named and 
replaces this with identity. 'This negative, wrong, and yet simultaneously 
necessary moment is the stage of dialectics.' 272
Psychological individuals are deformed by this mechanism that was 
then philosophically transfigured into the transcendental. For Adorno, there 
is a sense in which the transcendental subject far more determines the 
conduct of people and society than the psychological subject or empirical 
subject. 'The transcendental subject faithfully discloses the precedence of 
the abstract, rational relations that are abstracted from individuals and their
conditions and for which exchange is the model.' The living human 
individual is forced to act out a role for which she has been internally 
marked. As the incarnation of homo oeconomicus the individual is closer to 
the transcendental subject than the immediacy of the living individual.274
The living individual person constrained to act is turned into an 
appendage of the social machinery: What they are for themselves, what the 
individual immediately thinks they are, is secondary. In the Phenomenology 
of Spirit Hegel develops the genesis of self-consciousness from labour 
relations, the relation of master and servant. On Hegel's account the I adjusts
272 "Particularity and the Particular," Negative Dialectics, p. 173.
273 "On Subject and Object," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 248.
274 Ibid.
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to its self-determined purpose as well as to heterogeneous matter. In this the 
origin of the I in not-I is scarcely veiled. It is as a palliative for the subject's 
suffering in society that, the not-I moving ahead of the I, the subject 
becomes an ideological screen for society's objective function.
According to Adorno, prior to its partial emancipation the subject was 
in a sense more immediately social than integrated. The subject's growing 
independence from the immediacy of social controls is ultimately bound up 
with the social structure. Subsequently known as the historical and 
philosophical emancipation of the individual its singular origins remain 
somewhat opaque. People had to do fearful things to themselves before the 
self-identical and purposive was formed. Something similar recurs in every 
childhood. The social hierarchy is ultimately dependent on force. Mastery 
over nature is reproduced within humanity which equates spiritual freedom 
with oppression. Women, Jews, children, the oppressed aboriginal 
inhabitants of distant lands all bear witness to the emotion that corresponds 
to the practice of oppression: contempt, not reverence.
According to Adorno, Christianity's attempt to ideologically 
compensate for the oppression of women by means of reverence and 
ennoblement, to cultivate rather than suppress the memory of an archaic age, 
reverses into resentment of the ennobled women and the theoretically 
emancipated pleasure. 'Woman arouses the primitive anger of the half- 
converted man who is required to revere her, just as the weak individual 
awakens the enmity of the superficially civilized strong man who is 
supposed to protect him/5275
275 "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 111.
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Fear and weakness, and the greater affinity to nature, enrages the 
strong who alienated from nature must always suppress their fear. In society 
nature is the product of history: really a second nature. Woman's alleged 
nature denaturalizes her. Man as ruler and oppressor denies woman the 
honour of individualization.
'Socially, the individual is an example of the species, a representative 
of her sex; and therefore male logic sees her wholly as standing for 
nature, as the substrate of never-ending subsumption notionally, and 
of never-ending subjection in reality.' 276
The allurement of a state of nature, the attraction of the physiological, 
biological, national, and social underdog reanimates in the dominant the 
cruelty of an aborted civilization: barbarism is the other face of culture. In 
light of its failings, its weaknesses, the dominant returns possibly crueller 
than ever. This time the annihilation allows of no exception. 'The will to 
destruction is totalitarian.' 277
Society, in a sense, becomes totalised through the problems it faces, 
the problems it creates. An ego unreflective and weakened by its own 
rigidity reproduces, even in its symbolic and aesthetic sensibility, an identity 
that is reactively-aggressive. According to Adorno, being reconciled to the 
nonidentical would pave the way for a multiplicity of different things, a
77Rdiversity of objects.
'It is not up to philosophy to exhaust things according to scientific 
usage, to reduce phenomena to a minimum of propositions [...]. 
Instead, in philosophy we literally seek to immerse ourselves in things
276 Ibid.
277 "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 112.
278 ££ "Lecture Six", Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, p. 57. '[W]hat I have in 
mind here above all is what might be called the philosophical substance of Holderlin's 
thinking. He foremost among others, interpreted this idea of absolute nature of the one and 
of unity in such a way as to insist that the true unity was the reconciliation of the many, and 
not a mere identity which came into existence by riding roughshod over the many of which 
it is composed.'
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that are heterogeneous to it, without placing those things in 
prefabricated categories. We want to adhere as closely to the 
heterogeneous as the programs of phenomenology and Simmel tried in 
vain to do; our aim is total-relinquishment.' 279
To attempt the above would require relinquishing any claims to possession 
of a finite, conclusive philosophy. The changed philosophy would have to be 
infinite, fluid. Refusing to be pinned down in enumerable theorems the 
changed philosophy would find its substance in the diversity of objects, 
ways and means that it seeks or which impinge upon it. 'Disenchantment of 
the concept is the antidote of philosophy. It keeps it from growing rampant 
and becoming an absolute to itself.' 280 The disenchantment is objective in 
the sense that a given alternative is always objective and this openness 
points to the preponderance of the object. This has social and material 
resonances that are the inverted in subjective idealism: the particular, 
singular thing is subsumed in the universal.
The dialectics of speculative idealism resolves the difference between 
the particular and the universal from the viewpoint of the universal. Nothing 
is to escape this positive move toward the universal, everything is grist for 
the dialectical mill that would grind all differences into the same; for Adorno
o Q i
such differences cannot be tidied away, subsumed under the concept. The 
contents of experience are not to be reduced to cases of categories.
Adorno's reconfiguration of the dialectic is negative; it highlights 
oppositional tensions and refuses to affirm underlying identity or final
279 "Infinity," Negative Dialectics, p. 13.
280 Ibid.
281 Cf. "Noncontradictoriness not to be Hypostatized," Negative Dialectics, pp. 141-142. 
'In Hegel there was coincidence of identity and positivity; the inclusion of all non-identical 
and objective things in a subjectivity expanded and exalted into an absolute spirit was to 
effect the reconcilement. On the other hand, the force of the entirety that works hi every 
single definition is not simply its negation; that force itself is the negative, the untrue.'
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synthesis. Neither hostile nor resolved to its content and independent of 
idealistic machinations, negative dialectics would allow for substantive 
insights without the predominance of an absolutist subject.
'The only way out of the dialectical context of immanence is by that 
context itself. Dialectics is critical reflection upon that context. It 
reflects its own motion [...]. Such dialectics is negative. Its idea 
names the difference from Hegel.' 282
For Hegel, 'The true is the whole. Through determinate negation of 
partial truths the whole is to be revealed.284 For Adorno, 'The whole is the
'-J O<-
false;' or put another way the socio-historical totality we have at the 
present is untrue. This is revealed through the process of determinate 
negation of various cultural phenomena. For example: art serves to disclose 
truth through its own process of determinate negation. By asking what the 
future holds for art, society and the relationship between them truth is 
revealed as a dynamic or historical process and not a fixed criterion. 
According to Adorno:
'The cultural critic makes such a distinction his privilege and forfeits 
his legitimating by collaborating with culture as its salaried and 
honoured nuisance. This, however, affects the substance of criticism. 
Even the implacable rigour with which the criticism speaks the truth 
of an untrue consciousness remains imprisoned within the orbit of that 
against which it struggles, fixated on its surface manifestations.' 286  
'The justness of the image is preserved in the faithful pursuit of its 
prohibition.' 287
This pursuit, or process of "determinate negativity", is not protected by the
282 "Noncontradictoriness not to be Hypostatized," Negative Dialectics, p. 141.
283 G W F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, (United States of America: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 11.
284 Cf. Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 51. 'But when, on the other hand, the result is 
conceived as it is in truth, namely a determinate negation, a new form has thereby 
immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made through which the progress 
through the complete series of forms comes about of itself.'
285 "Dwarf Fruit," Minima Moralia, p. 49.
286 j ^  Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society," Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry 
Weber (The United States of America: MIT Press, 1983) p. 20.
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sovereignty of the abstract concept. Also it receives no immunity against 
corrupting intuition, after the manner of total scepticism.
For Pyrrhonist's both true and false are equally vain. But determinate 
negation is not rigorism. It does not confront its object with an Idea that it 
cannot match up to. 'Dialectic, on the contrary, interprets every image as
-\ oo
writing.' That's to say the dialectic process within which determinate 
negation moves or is a moment, interprets every representation reproduced 
in imagination by imagination as a faculty or power, as writing.
The squandered image, if that is indeed the case, points to the return of 
the primacy of the subject. Dialectical thought opposes such reification, it 
refuses to affirm individual things in their isolation. Separateness, alienation,
TQQis a product of the universal.
According to Adorno, the presumptuous and self-satisfied knowledge 
that a transfiguration of negativity leads to redemption is what distinguishes 
the enlightenment from the positivist degeneracy Hegel attributed to it. By 
making the abstract totality sovereign, by making the whole process of 
negation that's to say totality in system, history and intent-into an absolute, 
Hegel contravened the prohibition against invoking the finite as infinite. He 
underestimated the power of the negative and lapsed into mythology: the 
explanation of the world as all or nothing. Yet with the notion of 
determinate negation Hegel reveals an element that, when divorced from the 
defective idea of the absolute, is part of the very texture or fabric of
287 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 24. See below, p. 146.
288 «yjje concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 24.
289 "//cw sickly seem all growing things, " Minima Moralia, p. 71.
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experience.2 'The task of cognition does not consist in mere apprehension, 
classification, and calculation, but in the determinate negation of each
901immediacy.'
To comprehend the given as something more than the mere facts of 
abstract spatio-temporal relation is to conceive them as superficies, '[A]s 
mediated conceptual moments which come to fulfilment only in the
OQO ^.^development of their social, historical and human significance.' Thought, 
before all particular content, is an act of negation. The resistance to that 
which is forced upon it has been inherited from its archetype the relation 
between labour and material.293
As the counterpart to passive contemplation philosophical thought 
moves beyond the immediately given, it heeds a potential in the object, 
whilst simultaneously making conscious the unconscious idea of making 
amends for irreconcilable thoughts.
'Accompanying irreconcilable thoughts is the hope for reconcilement, 
because the resistance of thought to mere things in being, the 
commanding freedom of the subject, intends in the object even that of 
which the object was deprived by obj edification.'294
In those places where we resolve the insoluble, we reveal a moment of 
cogitative transcendence.
To reiterate, the pursuit of images, their determinate negation, does 
not immunise thought against the objective tendency of enlightenment to 
reduce the power of the image by distancing itself, taking leave, in a
290 For Adorno determinate negation remains what it was for Hegel, a way of uncovering 
the truth. Cf. "On the Truth Content of Artworks," Aesthetic Theory, p. 129. 'Artworks have 
no truth without determinate negation; developing this is the task of aesthetics today.'
291 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 27.
292 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 26-27.
293 "Presentation," Negative Dialectics, p. 19.
294 Ibid.
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knowing kind of way.295 According to Adorno, the move does not represent 
any subjective process towards freedom from images, rather, in the 
estrangement of schemata and classificatory systems from the data 
subsumed beneath them, a second figurativeness appears that resists or turns 
against the image: its spontaneity and power of abstraction.
Hieroglyphical in appearance the little silhouettes, outsized and 
simplistic, are a triumph of representation over what is represented. They 
represent the norm, the wholly general, the average or standard model. They 
also represent the false comprehensibility of intellectual processes. The blind 
unthinking subsumption and archaic retranslation into sensuous signs arises 
out of '[...] the sheer quantity of material processed, which has become 
incommensurable with the horizons of individual experience.' 296 Schooled 
by countless precedence the particular general image is a kind of immediacy, 
the instantaneous sizing up of the situation, a predominance of the object 
devoid of meaning, a sign of a positive intellectualism and rational 
enchantment set against the negative disenchantment of a damaged life.
Nonidentity, non-conceptuality cannot stay within epistemological 
bounds. On the other hand epistemology, if defined within space and time, 
requires the contingency of different things. The epistemological thematic is 
directed towards direct knowledge of its object which dialectically is the 
finite, limited and fallible thing.
When an attempt is made to define the concept and fix its meaning it 
becomes evident that it encompasses nonidentity. That the concept and the 
thing itself are not one and the same is required by the logical form of
295 £f "Picture-book without pictures," Minima Moralia, p. 140.
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definition. Hence for the concept to remain true to itself it has to change.
Art too desires what has not yet been, though it is the case that 
everything art is has already been. Art cannot escape the shadow of the 
past.297 By wanting to give permanence to the transitory the aesthetic image 
protests against nature's fear that it will dissipate into the chaotic. We would 
be wrong, therefore, to discard the ideal of identity whilst simultaneously 
attempting to locate its particular in space and time. 'Living in the rebuke 
that the thing is not identical with the concept is the concept's longing to 
become identical with the thing.' Adomo goes on to say;
'The matters of true philosophical interest at this point in history are 
those in which Hegel, agreeing with tradition, expressed his 
disinterest. They are non-conceptuality, individuality, and particularity 
- things which ever since Plato used to be dismissed as transitory and 
insignificant, and which Hegel labeled "lazy Existence." Philosophy's 
theme would consist of the qualities it downgrades as contingent, as a 
quantite negligeable. A matter of urgency to the concept would be 
what it fails to cover, what its abstractionist mechanism eliminates,
"7Q8
what is not already the case of the concept.'
In a philosophical experience the universal is not immediately available as a 
phenomenon; it is as abstract as it is objective. We are constrained to take 
our leave from the particular remembering that we know but do not have. 
This is why Adorno, invoking Heraclitus, states that philosophical 
experience is twofold: One leading upward, one downward. The assurance 
given by the concept with regards to the determination of phenomena cannot 
be propounded ontologically, as truth-in-itself. The concept is fused with 
untruth, with an oppressive principle. The assurance and concept does not 
constitute a positive telos that would exhaust cognition.
296 "Picture-book without pictures," Minima Moralia, p. 140
297 Cf. "Methexis in Darkness," Aesthetic Theory, p. 134.
298 "The Concern of Philosophy," Negative Dialectics, p. 8.
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It is in turn the negativity of the universal which is responsible for the 
changes in the direction of thought. This turn welds cognition to the 
particular as that which is to be realised. Thoughts which claim to 
understand themselves are untrue, only thoughts which cannot understand 
themselves are true. All Philosophy carries the rudiments of unfreedom in 
the understanding of its inalienable general elements: society then prolongs 
them into existence. The coercion of thought is something inherent in 
philosophy. However, this coercive character can be critically known and 
this thereby protects philosophy from degenerating into licence.299
Hidden within the supposition of identity as posed by Hegel, is the 
truth moment of an ideological element that pledges there should be no 
contradiction, no antagonism. 'In the simple identifying judgment the 
pragmatist, nature controlling element joins with a Utopian element.' 300 For 
Adorno this Utopian element, beyond identity and contradiction, is an idea, a 
negative sign. In its way it does present an element of hope and possibility 
being a break in the form of predicative identity that comes between what 
things claim to be and what they are. '"A" is to be what is not yet.' 301 The 
ray of light this directs against the whole shows it to be untrue in all its 
moments, this for Adorno is Utopia. The Utopia of the as yet to be realized 
whole truth who's absolute distance is at the same time its absolute
  -^ 302proximity.
Rationality's rigid opposition to the particular is the untruth attacked 
by art not rationality per se. The rationalistic separation of intuition from the
299 Cf. "Substantiality and Method," Negative Dialectics, pp. 47-48.
300 »Cogitative Self-Reflection," Negative Dialectics, pp. 149-150.
301 "Cogitative Self-Reflection," Negative Dialectics, p. 150.
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conceptual is an ideology that society perpetuates and enjoins. If art 
separates out intuition and valourizes it as a particular then it endorses the 
rigidification and reification of the spiritual element.
According to Adorno, if art was in a rigorous sense intuitable then it 
would endorse the contingency of what exists sensuously and immediately. 
In point of fact the artwork opposes this with its own logic. The quality of 
the artwork is determined by its integral elaboration: the way its concretion 
is divested of its contingency. The prevalence of the doctrine of intuition is a 
reflex of social reification that establishes a sphere of immediacy that 
excludes the constitutive thing-like dimensions of the artwork: the very thing 
that is necessarily transcended in the artwork. By following the artwork's 
own immanent logic what becomes available to intuition is mediated by the 
structure of the work.
The artwork suffers from its immanent condition as a thing which 
complicit with social reification lends itself to the fetishization of process
orvo
and relation. As a condition of its aesthetic autonomy the objectivation of 
the social labour sedimented in the artwork, which is at once both a process 
and an instant, is also rigidification. 304 Consequently, and immanent to the 
epistemological tradition, the doctrine of subjectivity understands the 
subject's substance as its own possession, as something it can call 'mine'.
'Epistemological tradition places anything immediate on the subject's 
side, but as the subject's datum or affection. The subject is said to 
have power to shape immediacy insofar as it is autonomous and
302 Cf. "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," Hegel: Three Studies, p. 88.
303 Something capable of objectivation is something capable of becoming a product of 
human activity available to both producers and to others as elements of a common world. 
Cf. "Excursus on the Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm," The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, p. 76.
304 Cf. "Intuitability and Conceptualiry," Aesthetic Theory, pp. 98-100.
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spontaneous; but to be powerless in so far as the directly given thing 
flatly exists' 305
In the process the embodied subject objectifies itself it struggles to give 
shape to or overcome the otherwise dominant unconscious and unreflecting 
impulses.
In truth, at heart and in essence the effort required to realise the 
potential of conscious life defines and names who and what we become. 
This means we have a history which reflects the internal divisions and 
transformations made over time. Reflection upon this personal history 
reveals that, in terms of duration, it is expectation rather than probability that 
carries us through.
Expectation as against probability is an expression of what ought to be 
rather than what is. Where anything is possible, infinite possibility, there is 
faith in the absurd. Negative finite possibility in stating why something is 
not possible thereby points to where possibility lies. At this point we should 
highlight a difference between Adorno's philosophy and an older tradition 
which puts the question above the answer.
' [I]n philosophy the authentic question will somehow almost always 
include its answer. Unlike science, philosophy knows no fixed 
sequence of question and answer. Its question must be shaped by its 
experience, so as to catch up with the experience. Its answers are not 
given, not made, not generated: they are the recoil of the unfolded,
o A/T
transparent question.'
In philosophy question and answer are weighted differently than they are hi 
other disciplines. A given solution does not remove either, they both remain 
Open 'their rhythm would be more that of duration and oblivion.' 307 A
305 ^jjjg object not Datum," Negative Dialectics, p. 186.
306 "Question and Answer," Negative Dialectics, p. 63.
307 Ibid.
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philosophy that never delivers, that keeps owing what it promises raises 
failure to experiential levels.
Adorno's "Minima Moralia," subtitled "Reflections from Damaged 
Life", is an ironic reflection on the contemporary fate of a philosophy whose 
domain was the, 'teaching of the good life'. 308 Ironic because in a world that 
radiates disaster triumphant, 'wrong life cannot be lived rightly.' 309 In light 
of this what might be the best mode of conduct. Adomo suggests an 
uncommitted, suspended one, '[...] to lead a private life, as far as the social 
order and one's own needs will tolerate nothing else, but not to attach weight 
to it as to something still socially substantial and individually appropriate.' 310
But driven to an extreme, as a fully developed thesis, the paradox 
leads to destruction, a loveless disregard for things and people. The 
individual who can no longer rely on any firm possession clings to the self in 
its extreme abstraction as the last supposedly un-losable possession. In the 
most extreme case the self-impressed is the fascist. The fascistic are not 
accessible to reason, because for them reason lies in the other persons 
agreement with their own ideas.311 There is no argument only a choice 
between on the one hand an immediate and direct identification with 
stereotypical values and on the other death, or worst.
Inherent to the self-liberating subject is self-preservation. The wish to 
be right, in discussion, argumentation or logical reflection, is an expression 
of that spirit of self-preservation. The self-preserving subject enamoured
308 "Dedication," Minima Moralia, p. 15.
309 "Refuge for the Homeless," Minima Moralia, p. 39.
310 "Refuge for the homeless," Minima Moralia, p. 39.
311 Cf. "Why it is Better Not To Know All The Answers," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 
210.
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with its own constitution and driven by fear is in its performance cold and 
indifferent to the feelings and thoughts of others. The self-impressed and 
self-preserving subject is wary of attaching itself to a life that turns into 
something that makes it shudder and threatens its substance.
Guilt accrues in the thought that life is lived at the expense of 
another's life. 'The guilt of a life which purely as a fact will strangle other
life, [...]. Guilt haunts our consciousness; it attaches us to something that 
our waking consciousness perceives to be nonexistent. This guilt, because it 
is never fully present, reproduces itself in ways that are irreconcilable with 
living. This state of affairs, this guilt context of living is what, according to 
Adorno, compels us to philosophise.313 And what philosophy is concerned to 
break down is that expression of self-preservation manifest in the wish to be 
right unconditionally.
The grasping subject sits unconformably upon the direct datum, which 
as objectivity within the subject, a basic fact, is the form of objective 
resistance to the devouring subject.314 What is "mine" in experience, "my 
experience", is tied to ontical conditions.
The animating contradiction of experience is in no way intended to 
capture the phenomenological ur-experience nor get at something 
ontological, the truth of the true, the Being of beings, instead the dialectical 
movement between its knowledge and its object which consciousness 
exercises tragically concludes as a "something" inasmuch as the object
312 Cf. "After Auschwitz," Negative Dialectics, p. 364.
313 Cf. Ibid.
314 Cf. "Idealism as Rage," Negative Dialectics, p. 23. 'The system is the belly turned mind, 
and rage is the mark of each and every idealism.. .Nietzsche's liberating act, a true turning 
point of Western thought and merely usurped by others later, was to put such mysteries into
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issues from it.
'There is no Being without entities. "Something" as a cogitatively 
indispensable substrate of any concept, including the concept of 
Being is the utmost abstraction of the subject-matter that is not 
identical with thinking, an abstraction not to be abolished by any 
further thought process.' 315
"Something" as mimetic remnant, exists in time which is a condition of its 
possibility. There is no sequence of time save in temporality and there is no 
temporality without an entity, an "I think" that accompanies "my" 
conceptions. The pronoun "my" without which there would be no "I think" 
points to a subject as an object among objects.316
In the spirit of labour the compelling force of objective phenomena are 
reflected in the object and are sedimented in it, but not exclusively and not 
exhaustively. 'If the individual is a socially transmitted phenomenon, so is 
his form of theoretical epistemological reflection. It is unfathomable why 
"my" individual consciousness should take precedence over anything 
else.' 317
If sensation as "something" was required before the transcendental 
subject could function then it would be quasi-ontologically tied not only to
 3 j Opure apperception but also to matter its counter-pole. This undermines 
constitutive subjectivity as it adjusts to a moment not of its making and to 
which it remains part blind. "My" is a proprietary relation, but philosophy 
becomes mythology where it thinks it has found some ultimate datum. 'To 
break off reflection, to take a positivist's pride in his own naivete, is nothing
words.'
315 "The Indissoluble "Something,"" Negative Dialectics, p. 135.
316 Cf. "The Objects Preponderance," Negative Dialectics, p. 183.
317 "The Nominalistic Aspect," Negative Dialectics, p. 126.
318 Cf. "Compulsory substantiveness," Negative Dialectics, p. 137.
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else but thoughtless, stubbornly conceptualized self-preservation.' 319
If as a "something", as remnant of a copy of that which thought 
means, the "I think" that should be able to accompany all my conceptions, 
finds itself without specific thoughts and so contravenes its concept, then: 
'Its own absoluteness is the measure by which the least surplus of 
nonidentity feels to the subject like an absolute threat. [...] Subjectivity
changes its quality in a context which it is unable to evolve on its own.'
But just by positing "something" as an absolute form will not be 
enough to shake off this substantive experience of the subject which is 
paradoxically taken from objectivity.321 Mediation of the object can only be 
known as it entwines with subjectivity, but there would not be a subject 
without a moment of objectivity. According to Adorno, it is in the nature 
of the subject to also be an object but it is not necessary for an object to also 
be a subject.
'Due to the inequality inherent in the concept of mediation, the subject 
enters into the object altogether differently from the way the object 
enters into the subject. An object can be conceived only by a subject 
but always remains something other than the subject, whereas a 
subject by its very nature is from the outset an object as well. Not even 
as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an object; but we can 
conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is part of 
the meaning of subjectivity; but it is not equally part of the meaning of 
objectivity to be a subject' 322
Objectivity is the self-unconscious schema under which the subject brings its 
otherness. Thought abandons itself to the predominant impression, sensation 
bringing thought to full productivity. The more ruthless the will to identify
319 "The Nominalistic Aspect," Negative Dialectics, p. 127.
320 "The Objects Preponderance," Negative Dialectics, p. 183.
321 cf "Copula," Negative Dialectics, p. 103.'[...] something which, however generally it 
may designate that vacant place, means substantive things and requires substantive things to 
become that which it means.'
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becomes, the more intuition is turned into a direct and positive truth, the less 
affinity to things it tolerates. Affinity without which there is no truth, no 
reflection on causality is the definite negation of identifying schemata. It is 
negation, not a remnant left over after the identifying categories have been
323overcome.
The negation of impulse and moment has as its ramification freedom 
of consciousness, whose intervention in the total social constitution will alter 
the complexion of the individual. What 'is' only comes to be though the 
confrontation of expression and thing.
'The test of the power of language is that the expression and thing will 
separate in reflection. Language becomes a measure of truth only 
when we are conscious of the nonidentity of an expression with that 
which we mean. [...] Language is more than a sign only where it 
shows significative strength, where it most exactly and succinctly 
covers what is meant. It "is" only insofar as it comes to be, in the 
constant confrontation of expression and thing.' 324
The word "object", lends itself to subjectivity when we reflect upon the 
possibility of its definition. Indefiniteness is equated with the undefined as 
its definition. The undefined, synonymous with nothingness, is an 
abstraction, a purely logical relation known irrespective of factuality, and yet 
nothingness, indefmiteness, the undefined still recalls the material 
constellation of subject and object.
To define, to say what something is identification. But by placing its 
mark on the object the definition seeks to be marked by the object 
Identification also approaches that which the object itself is as nonidentical.
322 «jke objects Preponderance," Negative Dialectics, p. 183.
323 cf «causaiity as a Spell," Negative Dialectics, p. 270.
324 "The Childs Question," Negative Dialectics, pp. 111-112.
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'Nonidentity is the secret telos of identification.' 325
The non-identical is not immediate, it points beyond itself 
[Transmission is another word for this] yet as self-transmission the non- 
identical is identical in the sense that it is subject, not the subject that gets 
confused with subjectivity, subject thought of either as an agency for 
synthesizing representations or as the exclusive interiority of a personality, 
which are moments amongst others of the subject, but subject which through 
what it does, its acts, dissolves all substance. This subject is a self-relation in 
which no terms are given. What this subject does in its doing is the 
experience of the consciousness of the negativity of substance. If it were the 
case that through an archaic vestige this names something primary writ large 
and close, then resignation and delusion are its ideological components and 
the point of attack for conceiving the non-conceptual and nonidentical 
especially, although not exclusively, as epitomized in the artwork. 
Nevertheless the nonidentical is nonidentical, it is other to all its 
identifications.326 Mediation turns out to be the implicit history of the non- 
conceptual, negative dialectics its logic: A logic that refers to dialectical 
patterns of arguments that highlights tension in polar opposites and negative 
because it refuses to affirm any underlying identity or final synthesis. So for 
example perception is directness at one remove, reflection a return to the 
seductive power of sensuality, and mimesis the rememberance in the subject. 
But if either pole or any of the configurations is announced as first or
325 "Cogitative Self-Reflection," Negative Dialectics, p. 149. Cf. "Deaestheticization of Art, 
Critique of the Culture Industry," Aesthetic Theory, p. 17. 'Prior to total administration, the 
subject who viewed, heard, or read a work was to lose himself, forget himself, extinguish 
himself in the artwork. The identification carried out by the subject was ideally not that of 
making the artwork like himself, but rather of making himself like the artwork.'
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immediate it is already mediated by the announcement.
The fear that the subject might be losing its substantiality prepares the 
ground for claims that unarticulated Being, equated with substantiality, will 
survive the functional context.327 We are especially made aware of this in 
those philosophies where "Being", the totality of that which is, turns the 
copula into its object and leaves behind the beyond to which it points. 
Whereas the claim that the definition of the object is imposed leaves the 
primacy of the subject in place the forms of subjectivity are not cognitive 
absolutes. It is subjective delusion and myth that maintainprimaphilosophia 
and styles itself as absolute. For Adorno,'Prima philosophia and dualism go 
together. To escape from this, fundamental ontology must try to avoid 
defining what comes first to it.'
Objectively the subject is mediated, determined as to its identity, only 
in reference to the nonidentical. As mimetic impulse it is that excess or 
abundance that imparts a given timbre, tone or quality to the subject. If there 
was no concrete intimation or experience of nonidentity we would lose the 
possibility of reflection. Dialectically the cognition of nonidentity is 
made possible because it identifies to a greater extent and in other ways, 
than identity thinking.
'This cognition seeks to say what something is, while identitarian 
thinking says what something comes under, what it exemplifies or 
represents, and what accordingly is not itself.' 329
Adorno's use of the non-conceptual changes the traditional formalization
326 Cf. "Ontologization of the Critical," Negative Dialectics, p. 120.
327 Cf. "Affirmative Character," Negative Dialectics, p. 65. '[...] the cult of Being, or at 
least the attraction of the word as of something superior, lives by the fact that in reality, as 
once upon a time in epistemology, concepts denoting function have more and more replaced 
the concepts denoting substance.'
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and metaphysics of the concept. The force of thought that shatters 
conceptual identity by thinking the non-identical, the non-conceptual, 
disavows the concept's being-in-itself.
Outside of systematic thinking, the power of thought is delivered over 
to the realm of definition by individual moments. This recalls, from the 
object's point of view, the inner unity of its aspects and the affinity which 
objects have for each other without being obliged to fit everything into a 
surrogate and usurping schemata.
'What the objects communicate in instead of being the atom it 
becomes in the logic of classification is the trace of the objects' 
definition in themselves, which Kant denied and Hegel, against Kant, 
sought to restore through the subject. To comprehend a thing itself, 
not just to register it in its system of reference, is nothing but to 
perceive the individual moments in its immanent connection with 
others.' 330
Such anti-subjectivism seeks in the coherence of the non-identical the way 
things have come to be. Objectivity is not immediate in the sense of being 
naive realism. 'To grant precedence to the object means to make progressive 
qualitative distinctions between things which in themselves are indirect; it 
means a moment in dialectics not beyond dialectics, but articulated in 
dialectics.' 331 According to Adorno, 'Criticism of systems and asystematic 
thought are superficial as long as they cannot release the cohesive force 
which the idealistic systems had signed over to the transcendental
u  . ,332subject.
"Possibility" remains the means that negative dialectics employs for
328 "Peephole Metaphysics," Negative Dialectics, p. 138.
329 "Cogitative Self-Reflection," Negative Dialectics, p. 149.
330 «Yke Twofold Character of the System," Negative Dialectics, p. 25.
331 "The Objects Preponderance," Negative Dialectics, p. 184.
332 "The Twofold Character of the System," Negative Dialectics, p. 26.
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the penetration of the hypostatized. Hardened objects which refuse to reveal 
what, nevertheless, is still visible, frustrate the possibility for linguistic 
expression of the history congealed within. 'To represent the mimesis it 
supplanted, the concept has no other way than to adopt something mimetic 
in its own conduct, without abandoning itself.' 333 This nonconceptual 
mimetic moment of expression, the "something", is objectified by 
presentation in language. 'Dialectics literally: language as the organon  
[...] appropriates for the power of thought what historically seemed to be a 
flaw in thinking: its link with language.' 334 Linguistics is our means of 
expression; the words we use are concepts.
With critiques of language, the analysis of words to make sure of their 
truth, an attempt is made to rescue the rhetorical, the element wherein 
culture, society, and tradition animate thought, so that differences fade and 
there is a mutual approximation of expression and thing expressed.
'In dialectics, [...] the rhetorical element is on the side of content. 
Dialectics seeks to mediate between random views and unessential 
accuracy, to master this dilemma by way of formal, logical dilemma. 
But dialectics inclines to content because content is not closed, not 
predetermined by a skeleton; it is a protest against mythology. 
Mythical is that which never changes, ultimately diluted to formal 
legality of thought.' 335
The negative element in negative dialectics will not allow the rhetorical 
element come to rest as if it were totalized: closed.
Where tradition and speculation had attempted to divest itself of any 
kind of content, '[...] where immediacy has been so truly abolished as in the 
world in which we exist, the temptation is doubly strong to mistake the
333 "Infinity," Negative Dialectics, p. 14.
334 "Rhetoric," Negative Dialectics, p. 56.
335 Ibid.
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remnants of life, or even the negation of the prevailing condition, for the 
absolute.' 336 Through abstraction the ratio was to produce the order it had 
negated outside itself. 'The ego system that founds the system, the pure 
method before any content, has always been the ratio, it is not confined by 
anything outside it [...]. ' 337 In the unity of the ratio the self acknowledges 
power as the principle of all relation.
'The unification of intellectual functions by means of which 
domination over the senses is achieved, the resignation of thought to 
the rise of unanimity, means the impoverishment of thought and of
experience: separation of both areas leaves both impaired.' 
In their sovereignty over existence, but also in their alienation from it, the 
creative god and the systematic spirit are alike as rulers of nature.339 The 
subjective spirit masters a despiritualized nature by cancelling some of its 
animation and adopting some of its rigidity. Despiritualizing itself in turn, 
'[...] the ratio which supplants mimesis is not simply its counterpart. It is 
itself mimesis: mimesis unto death.' 340 By progressively distancing itself 
from the object, the ratio, the sovereignty of ideas, supplants mimesis.341
'Thought that completely extirpated its mimetic impulse the kind of 
enlightenment that does not carry out the self-reflection that forms the 
content of the Hegelian system, naming the relation of the matter at 
hand to the idea would end up in madness.' 342
336 Metaphysics-Concepts and Problems, p. 144. Cf. "Idealism as Rage," Negative 
Dialectics, pp. 22-23. 'Idealism most explicitly Fichte gives unconscious sway to the 
ideology that the not-I, I'autrui, and finally all that reminds us of nature is inferior, so the 
unity of the self-preserving thought may devour it without misgivings.'
337 "The Antinomical Character of Systems," Negative Dialectics, p. 26 'The ego principle 
that founds the system, the pure method before any content, has always been the ratio.'
338 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 36.
339 ££ »yne concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 9.
340 «jne concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 57.
341 cf "Cogitative Self-Reflection," Negative Dialectics, pp. 148-149. 'The ratio recoils 
into irrationality as soon as in its necessary course it fails to grasp that the disappearance of 
its substrate however diluted is its own work, the product of its own abstraction. When 
thinking follows its law of motion unconsciously, it turns against what has been thought, 
against that which calls a halt to the flight of subjective intentions.'
342 Hegel: Three Studies, p. 40.
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By transcending the identifying mode of thinking, that's to say egocentrism, 
by revealing what has been withheld, rational identity through its 
consciousness of the nonidentical is the palliative for reductive identifying 
abstractions.
As the systematic need, the need to achieve absolute knowledge, the 
ratio is already claimed in every concise individual judgement. But this 
need, according to Adorno, 'was more, at times, than a pseudomorphosis of 
the spirit into the irresistibly successful method of mathematical and natural 
science.' 343 The one, ratio, that takes precedence, tolerates nothing outside 
itself. And yet, for Adorno, ratio, is no more to be hypostatised or made 
subject than any other category.
'The transfer of the self-preserving interest from individuals to the 
species is spiritually coagulated with the form of the ratio, a form that 
is general and antagonistic at the same time. [...] The universality of 
the ratio ratifies the needfulness of everything particular, its 
dependency upon the whole, and what unfolds in that universality, due 
to the process of abstraction on which it rests, is its contradiction to
O A A
the particular.'
The ratio that aggregates and conceptualises phenomena into species is just 
as much the ability to discriminate qualitative differences and segregate like 
from unlike. Abstract unification, the synthetic function of thought, would 
not be possible without the qualitative moment of presentation, which, as 
discrimination, is the substrate in all quantification. Discrimination, which 
no objectivity and therefore no subjectivity or mimesis can do without, 
traces the infinitesimal, the nuance that escapes the concept. Discrimination, 
as the capacity to experience the object through a subjective reaction 
provides a haven for the mimetic element of knowledge, for the element of
343 "Attitude towards Systems," Negative Dialectics, pp. 20-21.
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elective affinity between knower and known.345 The process of 
discrimination, which blends the mimetic element with the rational, retains 
in part a chance and individual character.
How uniqueness with its own content and a history beyond abstraction 
comes out of the repetition that creates the 'something' as 'mine' implies a 
connection with the body.
'The somatic moment as the not purely cognitive part of cognition is 
irreducible, and thus the subjective claim collapses at the very point 
where radical empiricism has conserved it. The fact that the subject's 
cognitive achievements are somatic in accordance with their own 
meaning affects not only the basic relation of subject and object but 
the dignity of physicality. Physicality emerges at the ontical pole of 
subjective cognition, as the core of that cognition. This dethrones the 
guiding idea of epistemology: to constitute the body as the law 
governing the link between sensations and acts in other words, to 
constitute it mentally. Sensations are already, in themselves, what the 
system would like to set forth as their formation by consciousness.'
The embodied 'my' is mistaken for a juridical notion by experience.347 Its 
unity is derived from the concept's tendency to be constant; as is the idea of 
something immutable, identical with itself. Dialectical thought opposes such 
reification. 'It refuses to affirm individual things in their isolation and 
separateness: it designates isolation as precisely a product of the 
universal.' 348 The epistemological tradition, as a doctrine about meaning and 
understanding, maintains that all our knowledge must be of, or derive from,
344 "Historical Reason Antagonistic," Negative Dialectics, pp. 317-318.
345 Cf. "Quality and Individual," Negative Dialectics, p. 45.
346 "Passage to Materialism," Negative Dialectics, pp. 193-194.
347 Cf. Charles Taylor, Hegel, (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 85. 
'The rational thinking subject can only exist embodied. In this sense we can truly say that 
the subject is his embodiment, that, e.g., I as a thinking being am my living body. And yet at 
the same time this embodiment in life has a tendency to carry us along the stream of 
inclination, of impulse towards unreflecting unity within ourselves and with nature. Reason 
has to struggle against this in order to realize itself. And in this sense his embodiment is not 
only other than the thinking rational subject, but in a sense his opposite, his limit, his
opponent.'
348 «<-ffow sickly seem all growing things '," Minima Moralia, p. 71.
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logical propositions about our subjective experience. This claim all too 
readily lends itself an absolute status, which as the systematic ideal of fixed 
ideas and universal commitments rejects anything not already analytically 
assimilated, i.e., dissenting critical thought, as irrational.349
The way the subject has come to dominate its environment and the 
world is the premise behind Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. By being non-systematic, or rather, not straightforwardly 
historical, Adorno and Horkheimer's reconstruction of the history of 
domination attempts to avoid the reification of history and society, a 
reification that sees the movement of history as something natural, a 'second 
nature'. Second nature as imposed and distorted history perseveres with, 
preserves, and even legitimises acts of severe brutality.
'Christianity, idealism, and materialism, which in themselves contain 
truth, are therefore also responsible for the barbaric acts perpetuated in 
their name. As representatives of power they themselves became 
historical forces which could be organized, and as such played a 
bloody role in the true history of the human race: that of the
-i crv
instruments of organization.'
The systems of thought that arose in the seventeenth century were 
compensatory in purpose. The philosophies of the Baroque period, and their 
champions, had, by proselytising the ratio as principle, ultimately broken the 
domination of the feudal order and scholastic ontology. But those that came
349 Cf. M. Horkheimer, "Means and End," Eclipse of Reason, (Great Britain: Continuum, 
2004), pp. 6-7. 'Despite his philosophy [Bertrand Russell], which holds 'ultimate ethical 
values to be subjective,' he seems to differentiate between the objective moral qualities of 
human actions and our perceptions of them: 'What is horrible I will see as horrible.' He has 
the courage of inconsistency and thus, by disavowing certain aspects of his anti-dialectical 
logic, remains indeed a philosopher and a humanist at the same time. If he were to cling to 
his scientistic theory consistently, he would have to admit that there are no horrible actions 
or inhuman conditions, and that the evil he sees is just illusion. According to such theories, 
thought serves any particular endeavour, good or bad. It is a tool of all actions, but must not 
try to set the patterns of social and individual life, which are assumed to be set by other 
forces.'
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after, when faced with the ruins, were struck by fear. '[T]his fear shaped the 
beginning of a mode of conduct constitutive for bourgeois existence as a 
whole: of the neutralization, by confirming the existing order, of every 
emancipatory step.' 351 Because the process of emancipation was incomplete, 
the fear of annulment by a more advanced consciousness lead the prevailing 
consciousness to establish, by way of compensation, a rational order of 
coercive mechanisms whose origin, placed in formal thought divorced from 
content, allowed the ratio to prevail as a system. But, in the process virtually 
all qualitative definitions are eliminated. This brings the ratio system into 
conflict with the very objectivity it is meant to be able to grasp. 'The ratio 
came to be removed from objectivity the farther removed, the more 
completely objectivity was subjected to its axioms, and finally to the one
^S9
axiom of identity.'
According to Adorno, 'Hume in the name of immediacy, criticized 
identity, the principle of the I that would like to maintain itself as 
autochthonous in the face of immediacy.' 353 Yet both positions, Hume's and 
the identity theorists he criticises, seek an exclusive standard for their 
respective epistemologies. For Hume, because uncertainty is part of our 
experience, because the mind moves from one thing to another according to 
the association of ideas, fear is the ground state manifested in this restless 
action of the mind.354 According to Adorno, "Angst, that supposed
350 "Notes and Drafts," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 224.
351 "Attitude towards Systems," Negative Dialectics, p. 21.
352 Ibid.
353 "The Object Not Datum," Negative Dialectics, pp. 186-187.
354 Cf. David Hume, "Of the Direct Passions," sec. DC in A Treatise of Human Nature 
(Baltimore: Penguin, 1969).
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"existential," is the claustrophobia of a systematized society.' 355 The 
underlying disposition gives rise to single eruptive impulses or excrescences 
which show the untruth, the mania of the systems themselves.
'Whenever something that is to be conceived flees from identity with 
the concept, the concept will be forced to take exaggerated steps to 
prevent any doubts of the unassailable validity, solidity, and acribia of 
the thought product from stirring. Great philosophy was accompanied 
by a paranoid zeal to tolerate nothing else, and to pursue everything 
else with all the cunning of reason, while the other kept retreating 
farther and farther from the pursuit.' 356
With the secularisation of the principle of divine omnipotence the concept of
o ffj
the world spirit became the principle that posits unity. The relentlessness 
of the world spirit is manifest in what happens in the world, i.e., 
modernisation and the unleashing of productive forces. 'Modernization' is a 
tool of social-scientific functionalism, an abstract, spatio-temporally neutral
o co
model for processes of social development in general. This makes it easier 
for the bundle of processes, the concept to which modernization refers, to be 
foisted upon societies that sit outside the historical context in which they
developed.
So it came to pass that for many the spirit that controls nature has an 
affinity with the violent control and destruction of nature. Social forms that 
come into conflict with the world spirit and its claims to periods of harmony
355 "Idealism as Rage," Negative Dialectics, p. 24.
356 "Attitude towards Systems," Negative Dialectics, p. 22.
357 "Harmonizing with the World Spirit," Negative Dialectics, p. 305. Cf. "The Spell," 
Negative Dialectics, p. 344. 'Human beings, individual subjects, are under a spell now as 
ever The spell is the subjective from of the world spirit, the internal reinforcement of its 
primacy over the external processes of life. Men become that which negates them, that with 
which they cannot cope.'
358 £f "Modernity's Consciousness of Time and its Need for Self-reassurance," The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 2. 'The concept of modernization refers to a 
bundle of processes that are cumulative and mutually reinforcing: to the formation of capital 
and the mobilization of resources; to the development of the forces of production and the 
increase in the productivity of labour; to the formation of national identities; to the 
proliferation of rights of political, of urban forms of life, and of formal schooling; to the
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and happiness, are crushed, or overpowered by the objective spirit.
'The universality of ideas as developed by discursive logic, 
domination in the conceptual sphere, is raised up on the basis of actual 
domination. The dissolution of the magical heritage, of the old diffuse 
ideas, by conceptual unity, expresses the hierarchical constitution of 
life determined by those who are free. The individuality that learned 
order and subordination in the subjection of the world, soon wholly 
equated truth with regulative thought without whose fixed distinctions 
universal truth cannot exist. Together with mimetic magic, it tabooed 
the knowledge which really concerned the object. Its hatred was 
extended to the image of the vanquished former age and its imaginary 
happiness.' 359
The world spirit is worshiped like a deity, though, depersonalised and 
stripped of the attributes of providence and grace, it is somewhat devoid of 
qualities other than the sense of being overpowering. To experience the 
world spirit as a whole is to experience it negatively.360
To be touched by the world spirit or hear its murmurs of approval, 
above the roar of suffering and fallibility, is to become a hostage to fortune. 
If the individual mind is self-mediated in its objectivity, then, this is not 
necessarily hostile to the subject, but this changes with the dynamics of 
history and second nature. With the darkening of the world spirit and the rise 
of mediocrities, the advanced thinker, who, still in harmony with the world 
spirit, is misunderstood, upon being ruined feels that all was not in vain. The 
individual reflects a fortune beyond individual misfortune.361 'The instants 
in which a particular frees itself without in turn, by its own particularity,
secularization of values and norms; and so on.'
359 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 14.
360 cf "Harmonizing with The World Spirit," Negative Dialectics, p. 305. 'This was the 
point of Schopenhauer's critique of the official optimism a critique that remained as 
oppressive, however, as the Hegelian theodicy of "this world". That mankind lives only in 
concatenation, that it may have survived only thanks to that concatenation, this did not 
refute Schopenhauer's doubts whether to affirm the will to live.'
361 ££ "The Spell," Negative Dialectics, 'This much of Hegel's insistence on the 
universality of the particular is true: in its perversion, as impotent individualization at the 
universal's mercy, the particular is dictated by the principle of perverted universality.' p.
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confining others these instants are anticipations of the unconfined, and 
such solace radiates from the earliest bourgeoisie until its late period.' 362
Obdurate particularity is reflected in the individual as self- 
preservation. This is more than just preservation of the species. It reflects a 
moment wherein pleasure is constituted as an end. Pleasure remote to 
meaning, impervious to reason, which alone could prove the means, reason
to be reasonable, transcends subservience to nature. Once pleasure is 
disparagingly consigned to a cunning form of reason, ostensibly to aid the 
survival of the species, then the truth located in blind somatic pleasure is lost 
and with it the involuntary and beneficent annulment of the self in wild 
erotic abandon. This indictment of society is part of art's dark message. It 
highlights the moral tensions that exist between the individual and society. 
Indeed, what goes to make up the problems of morality is the divergence 
between particular interests, the interests of particular individuals, and 
universal interests: the interests of society.
Conflicts remain even after the introduction of a reconciling ethical 
dimension, an existential cult of the personality, that profligates the good life 
or right action through the notion that one should act according to the way 
one is, one's ethos; nature; constitution; all which, supposedly, becomes the 
measure of one's behaviour. As a philosophical apologetic, this kind of 
sociological reductionism and relativism reduces the possibilities inherent in 
so-called "forms of consciousness" and in the process becomes an
344.
362 "The Unleashing of Productive Forces," Negative Dialectics, p. 306.
363 ££ "This side of the Pleasure Principle," Minima Moralia, p. 61.
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ideological doctrine of subjective idols.364 The resultant would be a 
diminishment in the experiential truth content of philosophical categories or 
even an end to materialist dialectics and philosophy per se.365
That which posits itself as T is caught up in its own reflective 
hierarchy. It is indeed an ideological prejudice but necessarily so as its 
removal makes the residue vulnerable to the demands of rationalization: 
Instinctual renunciation and adaptation to the prevailing reality principle.
'Narcissism, deprived of its libidinal object by the decay of the self, is 
replaced by the masochistic satisfaction of no longer being a self, and 
the rising generation guards few of its goods so jealously as
selflessness, its communal and lasting possession.'
Selflessness is the well functioning I [something of a contradiction] 
successfully adapted to sheepish, standardized consciousness.
According to Adorno, aesthetic experience as a model of 
consciousness can break through the spell of obstinate self-preservation in 
order to reach a stage of consciousness in which the I no longer has its 
happiness in its interests or in its reproduction. The self in aesthetic 
experience is not completely adapted or is less successful in its adaptation to
dominant instrumental rationality.
The priorities of self-interested society shows signs of having arisen 
from sublimation of the brutal and barbaric whereby whatever was first or 
whatever is strongest has the greatest rights. In the return to this natural 
primitiveness inwardness binds itself all the more tightly to the man-made,
364 /~\f «
365
Cf. "Dialectics not a Sociology of Knowledge," Negative Dialectics, p. 198.
Cf. Ibid, 'The excuse of the sociology of knowledge  that the truth or untruth of 
philosophical teaching has nothing to do with social conditions  remains undisturbed; 
relativism allies itself with the division in labour.'
366 cf «Ego is i<j5» Minima Moralia, p. 64.
367 "Always speak of it, never think of it," Minima Moralia, p. 65.
368 Cf. "Aesthetic Experience as Objective Understanding," Aesthetic Theory, p. 346.
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to commodities and exchange, thereby revealing its contempt for the 
world.369
The self is entwined with and owes its existence, literally, to the 
object relations of society. Here in the bosom of society the self shines 
basking in those relations. But inherent to the self-liberating subject, driven 
by fear and enamoured of its own constitution, is a separation through which 
the self becomes in its performance cold and indifferent. It is here that 
questions of authenticity in relation to the self arise.
'Genuineness is nothing other than the defiant and obstinate insistence 
on the monadological form which social oppression imposes on man. 
Anything that does not wish to wither should rather take on itself the 
stigma of the inauthentic. For it lives on the mimetic heritage. The 
human is indissolubly linked with imitation: a human being only 
becomes human at all by imitating other human beings. In such 
behaviour, the primal form of love, the priests of authenticity scent 
traces of the Utopia which could shake the structure of domination ' 37°
The concept of genuineness, the authenticity of self, rooted as it is in the 
Enlightenment's glorification of the factual, clears a path to the denunciation 
of anything made of foreign metal, base coinage.
Anything that cannot show genuine worth or rectilinear succession is 
designated and therefore appears as waste product, eccentric, derisory, 
irrelevant, against which the heroic and authentic individual is meant to 
make its stand, and yet what appears in the blind spots is the potential that 
develops out of them, that which cuts across the laws of historical
371
movement.
'If a stroke of undeserved luck has kept the mental composition of 
some individuals not quite adjusted to the prevailing norms a stroke 
of luck they have often enough to pay for in their relations with their
369 Cf. "Gold Assay," Minima Moralia, p. 155.
370 "Gold Assay," Minima Moralia, p. 154.
371 Cf. "Gold Assay," Minima Moralia, p. 153.
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environment-it is up to these individuals to make the moral and, as it 
were, representative effort to say what most of those for whom they 
say it cannot see or, to do justice to reality, will not allow themselves 
to see. Direct communicability to everyone is not a criterion of 
truth. ,372 
Society insists on control, the exerCIse of will, which in practice 
means work, the work ethic. Only love is supposed to be involuntary and 
spontaneous: the pure immediacy of feeling. Love and longing supposedly 
transcend society's demands and promises time off from work. 373 But 
established as a principle, loves very involuntariness contributes to the 
whole and as such, the truth of the former is 'perverted' into the untruth of 
the latter. 
'The love. however, which in the guise of unreflecting spontaneity and 
proud of its alleged integrity. relies exclusively on what it takes to be 
the voice of the heart, and runs away as soon as it no longer thinks it 
can hear that voice. is in this supreme independence precisely the tool 
of society. Passive without knowing it, it registers whatever numbers 
come out in the roulette of interests. In betraying the loved one it 
betrays itself. The fidelity exacted by society is a means to unfreedom, 
but only through fidelity can freedom achieve insubordination to 
., d ,374 SOCIety s cornman . 
By holding fast to love, by finding strength to go beyond the immediate, 
beyond an immediacy which, according to the dialectic. is already mediated, 
sublimated, and preformed by society; to persist unto permanence, even 
obsession, to hold out against a sanctioned economic order that makes' [ ... ] 
now this, now that person seem spontaneously attractive [ .. .]', to resist in 
order for love to represent a better society; all this, '[ ... ] demands precisely 
the element of voluntariness that the bourgeois, for whom love can never be 
372 "The Privilege of Experience," Negative Dialectics. p. 41. 
373 Cf. "After Auschwitz," Negative Dialectics, 'People, of course, are spellbound without 
exception, and none ofthem are capable of love, which is why everyone feels loved too 
little,' p. 363. 
:17-1 "Constanze," Minima Moralia, p. 17'2. 
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natural enough, forbid it. ,375 
In the above Adorno's difference from Hegel is manifest in the way 
the different "truths' within society, partial truths that reflect different 
standpoints, remain unresolved. Hence the claim, the truth of the untrue 
whole is revealed through the tensions and fractures that permeate society. 
Adorno's philosophy of the fragment and the particular is a 
philosophy of excess and the inconceivable totality. 
'The contents of philosophical thinking are neither remnants after 
deducting space and time nor general findings about spatial temporal 
matter. Philosophical thinking crystallizes in the particular in that 
which is defined in space and time: 376 
Immanent to the above is the experiential free spirit whose open thought 
attempts to consume the standpoint. Standing against this, epistemological 
exclusivity is a situation that would like to rig the standards of 
conclusiveness in advance. It seeks to extract from the object what it has 
already prepared in thought. 'In immediacy, the direct datum and the equally 
directly given forms are tailored so as to complement each other.,377 
However what is indirect, the mediated object, is as much part of the 
subject-object dialectics as is immediacy. 
'Unconsciously, so to speak, consciousness would have to immerse 
itself in the phenomena on which it takes a stand. [ ... ] If thought 
really yielded to the object, if its attention were on the object, not on 
the category, the very objects would start talking under the lingering 
eye. [ ... ] The interpretive eye that sees more in a phenomenon than it 
f h .. I . h . ,378 is-and sorely because 0 w at It Is-secu anses metap YSlcs. 
Hegel's absolute identity, the presupposition of a process whereby the 
subject yields to the object, the thing itself, contains a truth, which acts 
375 Ibid. 
376 "Compulsory Substantiveness," Negative Dialectics, p. 138. 
377 "The Object not Datum," Negative Dialectics, p. 187. 
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against presumptive idealism. '[T]he object, the positive expression of 
nonidentity, is a terminological mask.' 379 The subject does not create the 
object; instead, aided by the cognitive, it passively "looks on". The object's 
objective determination is the measure of this process.
'He who wants to know it must think more, not less, than the point of 
reference of the synthesis of diversity, which is the same at bottom, as 
not to think at all. And yet the thing itself is by no means a thought 
product. It is nonidentity through identity. Such nonidentity is not an 
"idea," but it is an adjunct. The experiencing subject strives to 
disappear in it. The truth would be its demise a demise merely 
feigned, to the greater glory of the subject objectified in a scientific 
method, by the subtraction of all specific subjectivity in that 
method.' 380
The object, as object of cognition, is understood epistemologically by way 
of a process of reduction.
For Adorno, the object takes precedence in ways that differ from the 
empiricist's account. 'Ever since the surface of life, the immediacy it makes 
available to people, has become ideology, naivety has reversed into its 
opposite; it has become the reflex of reified consciousness to a reified 
world.' 381 However, despite the sensualistic reduction of things to facile 
appearance, custom and habit, empiricism, through the sensory 'given', does 
register something of the objects preponderance. '[Tjied to the factitious 
character of immediacy and sceptical of the subject qua creator; in spite of 
everything, it [empiricism] remained rudimentarily 'realistic." 382
Supposedly freed by this process of abstraction from the ideology of 
the subject, empiricism, and all those who supposedly philosophise
378 "The Antinomical Character of Systems," Negative Dialectics, pp. 27-28.
379 "Passage to Materialism," Negative Dialectics, p. 192.
380 "The Object not Datum," Negative Dialectics, p. 189.
381 "Draft Introduction," Aesthetic Dialectics, p. 336.
382 "The Object not Datum," Negative Dialectic,, p. 187.
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objectively, move the not-I ahead of the I. 383 In a society moving towards 
total administration the not-I becomes the concrete other the purveyor of a 
categorical structure which if accepted uncritically as extant and absolute 
lends itself to the unreflective immediacy of method. Method, reduced to a 
set of axioms or formulas, is inherently subjectivistic. The subject presumes 
that, in all probability, aspects of the world are arranged in accordance with 
its own preferences and postulates of thought. When every possible 
perspective and interest is approached from the single viewpoint of the 
knowledgeable subject, then reason becomes instrumental and identity the 
subject of domination. Where the single aspect viewpoint is bureaucratic and 
instrumental the impression is given that'[...] to be is to be relative to other 
persons and things, and to be irrelevant in oneself 384 Nonidentity thinking 
in this scenario is the means to engage a political critique against one-sided 
and repressive domination.
383 Cf. "Incapacitation of the Subject," Negative Dialectics, p. 67. 'In Heidegger's 
philosophy the fact is detoured but registered; in his hands that historical primacy becomes 
an ontological precedence of "Being" pure and simple over all ontical and real things.'
384 Cf. "Affirmative Character," Negative Dialectics, p. 65.
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Chapter Four: Mimesis and Rationality.
'The sentimentality and debility of almost the whole 
tradition of aesthetic thought is that it has suppressed the 
dialectic of rationality and mimesis immanent to art. [...] 
The two points of view are actually complementary. [...] 
The survival of mimesis, the nonconceptual affinity of the 
subjectively produced with its unposited other, defines art 
as a form of knowledge and to that extent as "rational." 
For that to which the mimetic comportment responds is 
the telos of knowledge, which art simultaneously blocks 
with its own categories. Art completes knowledge with 
what is excluded from knowledge and thereby once again 
impairs its character as knowledge, its univocity' 385
Theodor Adorno
In attempting to shed light on the constellation of concepts and practices that 
surround mimesis and rationality, we will turn to consider, amongst other 
things, the insights into the nature of these two concepts that unfold within 
the pages of Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. Adomo 
and Horkheimer set out with the worthy aim of discovering, '[...] why 
mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a
o o/r
new kind of barbarism.'
Casting a wary eye at the verification zeal of the traditional 
disciplines, the assertion and assumption of fixed judgments and definitions 
which arrest thought at a point determined by societal needs on the one 
hand; and on the other coupled with the mythical, the false clarity of 
irrational and compulsive language and thought, Adorno and Horkheimer 
were led to consider how their own organized control of mimesis, as the 
organized adaptation to others, could escape the entanglement of blind 
domination.
385 "Mimesis and Rationality," Aesthetic Theory, p. 54.
386 "Introduction," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. xi. Cf. "Great and Small," Minima 
Moralia, pp. 125-126. 'Philosophy retained the barbarism of immediate quantity as a legacy 
from its earlier alliance with administration and mathematicians: whatever does not bear the 
stamp of the world-historical bustle is handed over to the procedures of the positive 
sciences.'
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'The dilemma that faced us in our work proved to be the first 
phenomenon for investigation: the self destructive aspects of the 
Enlightenment.[...] In the enigmatic readiness of the technologically 
educated masses to fall under the sway of any despotism, in all its 
self-destructive affinity to popular paranoia, and in all 
uncomprehended absurdity, the weakness of the modern theoretical 
faculty is apparent. We believe these fragments will contribute to the 
health of that theoretical understanding; [.. .]' 387
The Dialectic of Enlightenment can be considered a genealogy of 
modern enlightened reason that seeks to demonstrate how the preponderance 
of a single aspect, instrumental rationality, has stained or left its mark upon 
all relations. The ideal of Enlightenment is a system, coherent and 
predicable, from which everything follows. Although the individual schools 
of thought might disagree on how they interpret the axioms they live by the 
rationalist and empiricist versions of Enlightenment are structurally the same 
in that, in advance, they recognize as being and occurrence only what can be 
apprehended in unity. In the progression towards unity the multiplicity of 
forms, the mythological that had prevailed from earlier times was reduced to 
the formal logic of a unified science. 388
Formal logic provided the Enlightenment thinkers with a schema of 
the calculability of the world. Rationality is reproduced in the realization of 
the whole. At the same time the symbols of the new knowledge undertake a 
fetishistic function. Objectified and fixed the image or sign in its 
permanence and recurrence, reflects through its hierarchy and coercion not 
an expression of social solidarity but the established domination of the 
privileged. The particular individual is indebted to universals i.e. thought, 
even for the possibility of its existence. To that extent the individual is a
387 "Introduction," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. xiii.
388 ££ c^g concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 7.
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societal relation and, alienated from the self, is thereby subjected to the rule 
of inhuman conditions and elements by the whole organization of society.
'What is done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of 
individuals by the many: social repression always exhibit's the mask 
of repression by a collective. It is this unity of collectivity and 
domination, and not direct social universality, solidarity, which is 
expressed in thought forms.' 389
According to Adorno, and Horkheimer, ultimately what survives of the 
metaphysical after the Enlightenment consumed its symbols and their 
successors, universal concepts, is the abstract fear of the collective from 
which it arose. 390
Knowledge, synonymous with power and theoretically available to 
everyone, has as its essence technology. According to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, technology does not work by concepts and images or fortunate 
insight. On the definition of substance and quality, activity and suffering, 
being and existence it is silent. Technology refers to method, the 
exploitation of others' work, and capital. 'A technological rationale is the 
rationale of domination itself. It is the coercive nature of society alienated 
from itself.' 391 The achievement of the technological culture industry is 
standardization and mass production of a hierarchical range of products.
'The culture industry as a whole has moulded men as a type 
unfailingly reproduced in every product. [...] The stereotyped 
appropriation of everything, even the inchoate, for the purposes of 
mechanical reproduction surpasses the rigor and general currency of 
any real style, [...]. Every detail is so firmly stamped with sameness 
that nothing can appear which is not marked at birth, or does not meet 
with approval at first sight.' 392
389 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 22.
390 cf uThe concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 23.
391 "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
p. 121. Cf. "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 4. 'What men 
want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men. That 
is the only aim.'
392 "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," Dialectic of Enlightenment,
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The formal procedure of classifying, organizing, and labelling consumers 
advances the rule of complete quantification. Culture monopolies are weak 
and dependent in comparison to the most powerful sectors of industry. 
Culture through the artwork as an expression of suffering and contradiction 
attempted to grasp the good life. Expression is dissonance the consonant and 
harmonious seek to eliminate it.
Enlightenment's dissolvent rationality presses for conformity, the rule 
of computation and utility, the triumph of factual mentality. Whatever does 
not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one, is deemed suspect, mere 
subjective projection, anthropomorphism, literature, or illusion. In terms of 
idealism in relation to identity the move towards formal logic represents a 
point of indifference between logical and psychological moments. 'The 
individual I is one I solely by virtue of the generality of the principle of 
numerical unity; the unity of consciousness itself is a form of reflection of 
the logical identity.' 393 Imitation of anthropomorphized man is consciously 
contrived adaptation, in which the rationalized mode of apprehension 
awakens to a self that acknowledges power as the principle of all relations. 
Submitting to the occurrence of the self means ruthlessly extinguishing any 
trace of self-consciousness, every resistance encountered merely serves to 
increase the power of dissolvent rationality.
'Renunciation, the principle of bourgeois disillusionment, the outward 
schema for the intensification of sacrifice, is already present in nuce in 
that estimation of the ratio of forces which anticipates survival as so 
to speak dependent on the concession of one's own defeat, and, 
virtually, on death.' 394
pp. 127-128.
393 "Noncontradictoriness not to be Hypostatised," Negative Dialectics, p. 142.
394 "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 57.
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The struggle for survival is gained at the price of self-abasement and 
mortification of the instinct for happiness.
Coincidental with the disenchantment of the world and the extirpation 
of animism the myths which fell victim to the calculative and factual were 
its own product. 'Myth intended report, naming, the narration of the 
Beginning; but also presentation, confirmation, explanation: a tendency that 
grew stronger with the recording and collection of myths. Narrative became 
didactic at an early stage.' 395 Myths are characterized by their discipline and 
power. Ritualised, the words of the myths became commands or magical 
influences creating or subjugating the world after the image of man.
Horkheimer and Adorno argue that in order to secure itself against the 
return of the mythical, enlightenment anticipates the identification of the 
wholly conceived and mathematized world with truth. In advance 
mathematical procedures are the ritual of a thinking objectified and 
automatic, a self-activating process that mimics the machine that will 
replace it. 'When in mathematical procedure the unknown becomes the 
unknown quantity of an equation, this marks it as the well-known even 
before any value is added.' 396 Thought is turned into a fetish, a thing, an 
instrument for the principle of equivalence whereby the dissimilar is made 
comparable by being reduced to abstract quantities.
In the patriarchal climate of domination man knows things in so far as 
he can manipulate them: make them fit his own ends. With the arrival of the 
logos proper this becomes a question not of intent but relatedness.
395 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 8.
396 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 24.
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Everything unknown, alien, primary or undifferentiated in the intricacies of 
its nature transcends the limitations of experience and is named by the gasp 
of surprise that accompanies it. Originating in human fear the expression, 
the gasp or cry, marks the unknown in its relation to the known. Terror as 
sacredness equips the transcendence of expression by explanation with 
echoes of the real supremacy of nature in men: the separation of animate and 
inanimate. Thus are the first lines drawn between subject and object, concept 
and thing.397
In a radical reversal of the mythological, enlightenment compounds 
the animate with the inanimate. Its ultimate product, a universal taboo, seeks 
to secure the sovereignty of ideas. Everything is to be drawn into its 
compass, nothing is to remain outside because even the mere idea of an 
outside, an unknown, is a source of fear. The annihilation of fear through 
knowledge would be enlightenment's ultimate end.
'In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment 
has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their 
sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster 
triumphant. The program of the Enlightenment was the 
disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the 
substitution of knowledge for fancy.' 398
Art is not immune from this process. According to Adorno, art is a 
stage in the process of disenchantment. Entwined with technique, 
rationalization is the source of art's means and methods of production. 
Development, for example, is one of art's means, part of its autarchy. And 
yet the absorption and development of art alien techniques, external to art
397 cf «The concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 15. 'But this 
dialectic remains impotent to the extent that it develops from the cry of terror which is the 
duplication, the tautology, of terror itself.'
398 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 3.
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but originating in society, is not necessarily progressive in the sense of 
enlightenment universally opposed to domination. Art's blind economic 
tendency allows the perpetuating injustice to be measured. In the flight from 
necessity, in progress and civilization, mankind cannot hold the course 
without abandoning knowledge itself.399
Instrumental reason or subjective reason is concerned with the means 
to ends that are more or less taken for granted. Strategies for coping with 
nature and getting technology under control point to self-preservation. The 
more intense the concern with things the more those things come to 
dominate. Hence submerged people are cajoled and conditioned to imitate 
their superiors.
Blatant advertising or educational appeals that exhort them to the 
cultivation of personality are at once hypocritical and condescending. 
Celebrated ontologies that emphasize the value of the harmonious 
personality have an element of coldness about them. Within the macrocosm 
of the universe the microcosm of the personality is said to correspond to an 
immutable social and natural hierarchy. The positing of an infinite and 
immutable order implies a static view of history, one which precludes the 
hope of a progress emancipation of the subject from eternal childhood, in 
nature and in society. For this reason the transition from objective to 
subjective reason was historically unavoidable: a necessary process.400 Real 
history is the history of real suffering and this has not lessened in proportion 
to the growth of the means for its abrogation.
399 cf «Tlie concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 40.
400 Cf. M. Horkheimer, "Rise and Decline of the Individual," Eclipse of Reason, (New
York: Continuum, 1996), pp. 87-90.
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True revolutionary practice, emancipation of the subject, requires the 
intransigence of theory, a movement and a reorientation that flies in the face 
of the insensibility, the rationalisations and retrograde conclusions within 
which society allows thought to ossify.401 Technique in the arts is mobilized 
and points in a diametrically opposite direction from Enlightenment's 
rationalist domination. 'Artworks do not repress; through expression they 
help to make present to consciousness the diffuse and elusive without, as 
psychoanalysis insists, "rationalisation."'.402 Psychoanalysis furnishes 
concrete mediating links between the structure of artworks and the social 
structure.403
Enlightenment and art are not simply antithetical or mutually 
exclusive. According to Adorno, the ideology of cultural conservatism 
which claims Enlightenment and art are antitheses overlooks the moment of 
enlightenment in the genesis of beauty. Not merely content with dissolving 
all the qualities that beauty had traditionally adhered to, Enlightenment 
originally posits the quality of beauty.
'The disinterested pleasure that according to Kant is aroused by works 
of art, can only be understood by virtue of historical antitheses still at 
work in each aesthetic object. The thing disinterestedly contemplated 
pleases because it once claimed the utmost interest and thus precluded 
contemplation. The latter is a triumph of enlightened self- 
discipline.' 404
Hegel excluded natural beauty from his account of the aesthetic. For Hegel 
things in nature are beautiful when they are viewed as art or as human 
products. Things are beautiful or have certain effects if they appear to
401 cf «Tne concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 40-41
402 "Mimesis and Rationality," Aesthetic Theory, p. 55.
403 cf "critique of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Art," Aesthetic Theory, p. 8.
404 "Magic Flute," Minima Moralia, p. 224.
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express something human and awaken our interest: For Hegel society 
constitutes natural beauty.405
The ideology and irrationality of those that insist on "rationalization" 
in artworks accuse irrational art of irrationalism for playing a trick on the 
praxis-orientated rules of reason and for failing to serve the needs of 
apparatchiks of every persuasion.406 And yet art-forms as the representation 
of Ideas depend on an audience not apparatchiks. Art's highest claim to 
spirituality, today as from earliest times, brings chaos into order. As 
paintings, sculpture, etc, it translates the mute language of things into 
something higher. Similarly '[...] music rescues name as pure sound - but at 
the cost of severing it from things.' 407
For Adorno, artworks participate in enlightenment because they do not 
lie. As they make no claims to the truth they have no need to feign the 
literalness of what speaks out of them.408 Artworks are magic-fetishes 
delivered from the lie of being truth.
Something of art's magical heritage persists throughout art's 
transformation. For Adorno the claim that art produces something magical, a 
sense of wonder, has a ring of truth about it. The rational aspects of art are 
strained to the utmost tension and threatened by the magical in art which
405 Cf. "The Range of Aesthetic Defined, and Some Objections against the Philosophy of 
Art Refuted," Hegel: Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, trans. Bernard Bosanquet (, 
England: Penguin, 1993) p. 4. 'But the mind [spirit] and its artistic beauty, in being "higher" 
as compared with nature, have a distinction which is not simply relative. Mind [spirit], and 
mind [spirit] only, is capable of truth, and comprehends in itself all that is, so that whatever 
is beautiful can only be really and truly beautiful as partaking in this higher element and as 
created thereby. In this sense the beauty of nature reveals itself as but a reflection of the 
beauty that belongs to the mind [spirit], as an imperfect, incomplete mode of being, as a 
mode whose really substantial element is contained in the mind [spirit] itself.'
406 Cf. "Mimesis and Rationality," Aesthetic Theory, p. 55.
40? cf «In nuce " Minima Moralia, p. 222.
408 ££ »Qn me Relation of Art and Society," Aesthetic Theory, p. 5.
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refuses to speak in one voice and which secularized as the new is a 
qualification as old as art's concept and is just as unfilled.
'The survival of mimesis, the non-conceptual affinity of the 
subjectively produced with its unposited other, defines art as a form of 
knowledge and to that extent as "rational." For that to which the 
mimetic comportment responds is the telos of knowledge, which art 
simultaneously blocks with its own categories. Art completes 
knowledge with what is excluded from knowledge and thereby once 
again impairs its character as knowledge, its univocity. Art threatens 
to be pulled apart because magic, which art secularizes, actually 
refuses this process, whilst in the midst of secularization the essence 
of magic sinks to the level of mythological vestige, to superstition.' 409
Alienated from the known the unknown is made manifest in consciousness 
as anxiety in face of the enigma. The subjective reaction is secularized as 
discrimination: the process whereby mimetic elements in turn blend with 
rational ones. This provides a haven for the mimetic elements of knowledge, 
the elective affinity between knower and known.
The sentimental and traditional suppress the dialectic of mimesis and 
rationality immanent to art. The astonishment and chance like fatalism of the 
new is likened to a fire from heaven. Magical delusion places beyond doubt 
the striving after concordance. On the other hand the unreflected logic of the 
Enlightenment, after the manner of prosaic pragmatism, would have to 
discard the dialectic: 'Art must first prove its utility.' 410 Which in effect 
means duration artworks are meant to endure. Aesthetic structures create a 
continuum that is totally spirit. However objectivation frees art from 
spiritual coercion, the goals of domination.
409 "Mimesis and Rationality," Aesthetic Theory, p. 54. Cf. "The Concept of 
Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 19. 'The work of art still has something in 
common with enchantment: it posits its own, self-enclosed area, which is withdrawn from 
the context of profane existence, and in which special laws apply.'
410 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 18. Cf. Plato. Republic. 
Book X.
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'The word for this process is discrimination. It contains the faculty of 
mimetic reaction as well as the logical organ for the relation of genus, 
species, and differentia specified. In the process, the differentiating 
faculty keeps an accidental a character as does any undiminished 
individuality compared with the universal of its reason.' 411
All artworks are enigmas to which immanent understanding remains a 
problematic category. According to Adorno, one does not understand art one 
understands something of it, something that does not extinguish the 
enigmaticahiess of art.412
It is against the background of an unleashed rationality that Adorno 
posits the dialectic of mimesis and rationality. Mimetic comportment, a 
distinct attitude towards reality, is seized in art by semblance which becomes 
its bearer: the complement to the autonomy of form. As the image of 
reconciliation mimetic comportment resists the reification of the antithesis 
of subject and object. Art works against itself. A coherence of meaning, 
unity, is contrived because it doesn't exist. Its semblance character negates 
the being-in-itself for the sake of which the organized meaning was 
undertaken: artifice. Those artworks that are a tour de force, speak to the 
equilibrium of the whole. In truth they achieve the impossible. 'In 
uncovering the tour de force of an art work, the performance must find the 
point of in difference where the possibility of the impossibility is hidden.'413 
Within the non-coercive relation it is art's accidental and unintended object 
that predominates. The unfolding of art is a quid pro quo which not only 
neutralizes mimesis, but also derives from it.
Where reification is the artworks essential determination then
411 "Quality and individual," Negative Dialectics, p. 45.
412 cf "Enigmaticalness, Truth Content, Metaphysics," Aesthetic Theory, pp. 120-122.
413 "Semblance, Meaning, and "tour de force,"" Aesthetic Theory, p. 106.
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expression ceases to be something immediate: alive. Expression is the 
archetypal and permeable juncture through which copies of non-aesthetic, 
fictive, and cultural experiences, refracted and transformed, reach most 
deeply into the artwork. Expression in artworks is a rebellious and dissonant 
dissatisfaction with the self and with semblance, which bound as it is to the 
consonant, harmonious and affirmative powers of society, excises the 
expression of suffering expression.
'Expression and semblance are fundamentally antithetical. [...] Yet in 
that artworks as such remain semblance, the conflict between 
semblance form in the broadest sense and expression remains 
unresolved and fluctuates historically.'5414
The fruition of an artwork, the realization of all labour expended, arises from 
how it deals with these antinomies in the lineaments of its own possibility 
and quality.
Tending towards nonidentity the reconciled condition of a changed 
consciousness resists the subjugating impulse, the act of aggression of a 
dominating subject which would violently reduce uniqueness to essential 
principles by way of deification of exemplars.
The mimesis of artworks is their resemblance to themselves. Whether 
univocally or ambiguously, this law is posited by the initial act of each 
artwork; by virtue of its constitution each work is bound to it. It 
divides aesthetic from cultic images.' 415
Therefore radical modern art is ideally progressive, not only in the
techniques it has developed but in its truth content. And this remains the
case in spite of the critique and summary verdict of the politically interested.
Existing artworks are more than mere existence through the eloquence
414 "Expression and Dissonance," Aesthetic Theory, p. 110.
415 "Crisis of Semblance," Aesthetic Theory, p. 104.
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of their language.416 Authentic artworks remain so even where they refuse 
any form of semblance, be it phantasmagorical illusion or auratic breath. 
The attempt to purge them of whatever contingent subjectivity might want to 
confer on them has the involuntary effect of more clearly delineating their 
own language. In artworks the term expression refers to this language.417 
Where this term has been technically employed longest and most 
emphatically i.e. in the "Classical" genre as against the "Romantic", it 
demands no particular emotional content and nothing is specifically 
expressed.
'The expressive music of the West, since the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, assumed an expressiveness which the composer 
allotted to his musical structures in much the same way as the 
dramatist did to his theatrical figures, without the expressed emotions 
claiming to have immediate presence and reality within the work.' 418
As we cannot eliminate from dialectics what is experienced in consciousness 
as alien, we should recognize not only the unbroken and all too human 
slogans and forms that interject between the subject and the negatively 
coercive and heteronomous thing but also the congealed fragments of the 
subjugated.
Existing artworks draw their authority from reflections they compel 
towards their own non-existence. The non-existing that emerges suddenly in 
artworks is mediated to them through fragments of the existing assembled 
into an apparition. Artworks, being non-conceptual and non-judgemental, 
do not decide whether by existing the non-existing that appears is an exalted
416 Cf. "Intuitability and Conceptuality," Aesthetic Theory, p. 98. 'Precisely in its great and 
emphatic forms, music embodies complexes that can only be understood through what is 
sensuously not present, through memory or expectation, complexes that hold such 
categorical determinations embedded in their own structure.'
417 cf «Crisis of Semblance," Aesthetic Theory, p. 104.
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expression, an appearance that enters history, or mere semblance. 'On the 
behalf of what cannot be exchanged, art must through its form bring the 
exchangeable to critical self consciousness.' 419 The artworks formal structure 
through which the content [inhalt] becomes eloquent is socially decisive.
The new as such must be interpreted and not just made to cohere in 
the false clarity of given.420 The new, not to be identified with reason has 
become the critique of omnipotent reason and thereafter for that reason, 
absurd. 'The darkness of the absurd is the old darkness of the new.' 421 This 
creates a zone of conflict between the new and ineluctable as it is 
problematic duration. The new creates gaps in what would otherwise be 
seen as the authentic movement of the present which, legitimated by a 
congruent and convergent past, prescribes futures. The new is longing for 
the new. It must be something willed as other, however, it could not be what 
was willed. The new wants nonidentity and yet intention reduces it to 
identity. 'Only in the new does mimesis unite with rationality without 
regression.' 422 The musician who follows the minute impulses of a new score 
understands it and yet in a certain sense does not know what she plays. The 
situation is the same for the actor:
'[...] and precisely in this is the mimetic capacity made manifest most 
drastically in the praxis of artistic performance as the imitation of the 
dynamic curves of what is performed; it is the quintessence of 
understanding this side of the enigma.' 423
418 "Schoenberg's Criticism of Illusion and Play," Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 38.
419 "The Nonexistent," Aesthetic Theory, p. 83.
420 Cf. "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, p. 134. 'What is new about the phase of mass culture compared with the late 
liberal stage is the exclusion of the new. The machine rotates on the same spot. While 
determining consumption it excludes the untried as a risk.'
421 "Second Reflection," Aesthetic Theory, p. 27.
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"The New: Its Philosophy of History," Aesthetic Theory, p. 20. 
"Enigma, Script, Interpretation," Aesthetic Theory, p. 125.
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As soon as the performance regresses to the stage of mimicry, of just going 
through the motions, there is a hardening and coarsening that presents the 
enigma of the works as a grimace.
Where impulse can no longer find security in established forms or 
content, experimentation is the means to release the unforeseen.424 Through 
the loss of its expressive quality the artwork opens itself up to being for 
another and becomes eloquent in itself. This is the antithesis of art's mimetic 
consummation.425 Where what is consumed is the abstract being-for-other of 
cultural commodities then arts mimetic element is betrayed, bartered off as 
something which it is itself incompatible.426 With the withering of the 
sensuous moment, nothing remains but the reified social relations of the 
administered world.
The immediate and implicit object of inquiry, set in the language of 
Hegel's Philosophical Anthropology, is the Spirit in Nature or the soul. 
The restless Spirit is set to awaken phenomenally and teleological to a 
consciousness that sets itself up as Reason. Exemplified as the unified self, 
Reason thereafter sallies forth as a judging rationality, put on the path to an 
objectivity made real through social relation and social establishments. 
Through his command of language Hegel highlights a process, a movement 
of consciousness which, in accordance with his own philosophical ideals, 
comes down heavily in favour of what is rational and reasonable in the 
particular and universal. This rationalist tendency is reflected again in
424 cf <Tne New. Its philosophy of History," Aesthetic Theory, p. 23.
425 Cf. "Subject-Object," Aesthetic Theory, p. 112.
426 Cf. "Deaestheticization of Art, Critique of the Culture Industry," Aesthetic Theory, p. 17
427 Cf. Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, Part 3 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, 
trans. W. Wallace and A.V. Millar (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1971) p. 25. § 387.
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Hegel's aesthetic theory, which finds its content, in what are considered 
worthy subject matters: Subject matters that are to act like stepping stones 
on the path to the Hegelian Absolute.428 The union or rather lack of union 
with one unique individual is the primary concern. The aim is wholeness a 
sense of completion, an ideal set and reflected in cultural institutions.
'Since the beginning of the bourgeois era, all great music has founded 
its sufficiency in the illusion that it has achieved an unbroken unity 
and justified through its own individuation the conventional universal 
legality to which it is subject.' 429
The body socially and historically framed in unruly passions has been 
posited as standing outside the strictures of the mind. This is the root of an 
unsatisfactory separation rather than union. The spirit consoles itself against 
the separation through the endorsement not of heroic ideals but rules and 
regulations; stoic virtue and logistics; the numbing of all particular feeling 
and expression in favour of immediate intentions and universal forms. 
Dramatic music, drawn towards the ideal of immediate intentions and 
universal forms, is presented as stylised communication, as the 
representation of passions. Where claims for the music extend beyond this 
stylised representation it is usually done so in the name of substantial but 
non-specific emotions or relations of the soul: something logically inferred 
as immediate and direct. The claim to validation and ultimately its 
semblance rests on the totality of form, the control exercised over the
428 Cf. Hegel: Introductory lectures on Aesthetics, p. 76. 'It has already been said that the 
content of art is the [Absolute] idea, and that its form lies in the plastic use of images 
accessible to sense. These two sides art has to reconcile into a full and united totality. The 
first attribution which this involves is the requirement that the content, which is to be 
offered to artistic representation, shall show itself to be in its nature worthy of such 
representation.'
429 T.W. Adorno, "Schoenberg's Criticism of Illusion and Play," Philosophy of Modern 
Music, Trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Bloster (United States of America: 
Continuum, 2003) p. 39.
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musical characters and their correlation. For the sake of social 
comprehension and the objective spirit the heteronomous individual is 
ordained to invoke a mimetic taboo in its name.430
The composer Arnold Schoenberg in a tour de force crashed through 
the taboo, revolutionizing musical expression with a change of function.
'Passions are no longer simulated, but rather genuine emotions of the 
unconscious of shock, of trauma are registered without disguise through 
the medium of music. These emotions attack the taboos of form because 
these taboos subject such emotions to their own censure, rationalizing them 
and transforming them into images.' 431
The dissolution of one area of obscurity, art's foundation as the immediate 
self-certainty of unquestioningly accepted materials and forms, had the 
effect of relieving that suffering whereby the substance of intellectual 
conception is brought to consciousness. Conversely the all-powerful culture 
industry appropriating both the enlightening principle and the configurations 
of the deposed obscurity trumpets the triumph and the trophy, now the 
deposed opposition, to the furtherance of the prevailing style of the times. 
Despite the fact that the demise of a region of obscurity gives on to another, 
art vehemently opposes this tendency by opposing the false clarity of the 
world with its own methexis in darkness.432
According to Adorno, even great artists, such as Bach, who more or
430 Cf. "Elements of Anti-Semitism," Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 181-182. 'In the 
bourgeois mode of production, the indelible mimetic heritage of all practical experience is 
consigned to oblivion. The pitiless prohibition of regression becomes mere fate; the denial 
is now so complete that it is no longer conscious. Those blinded by civilization experience 
their own tabooed mimetic features only in certain gestures and behaviour patterns which 
they encounter in others and which strike them as isolated remnants, as embarrassing 
rudimentary elements that survive in the rationalized environment.'
431 "Schoenberg's Criticism of Illusion and Play," Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 39.
432 Cf. "Intellectualism," Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 15. Cf. "Methexis in Darkness," 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 134. 'Aesthetic experience is that of something that spirit may find 
neither in the world nor in itself; it is possibility promised by its impossibility. Art is the 
ever broken promise of happiness.'
165
less agree with the objectively valid Zeitgeist find themselves as cultured 
individuals in permanent conflict with their administrations. In more recent 
times an artist as great as Pierre Boulez, one time director of the 
internationally renown Institut de Recherche et de Coordination 
Acoustique/Musique (IRCAM) a man in step with the Zeitgeist still finds 
himself in conflict not only with administration but also the totality of 
fragmented subjectivities that abound under the rubric of contemporary art.
'The creator's intuition alone is powerless to provide a comprehensive 
translation of musical invention. It is thus necessary for him to 
collaborate with the scientific research worker in order to envision the 
distant future, to imagine a less personal, and thus broader solutions. 
[...]Technology and the composer: collaboration between scientists 
and musicians [...]. Our grand design today [...] is to prepare the way 
for their integration and, through an increasingly pertinent dialogue, to 
reach a common language. [.. .JWhat is absolutely necessary is that we 
should move towards global, generalizable solutions.' 433
As aesthetics fell out of fashion Boulez sensed the need for it all the more 
strongly. The critical self awareness of the artist, in order to move beyond 
the naive, requires reflection on the convergence of the historical situation 
and contemporary artistic production. With his historicophilosophical theory 
of art Boulez is far from envisaging a normative aesthetics of the traditional 
sort.434 In all of this there appears to be an underlying presumption that the 
nature of music is sonic and therein supposedly lies its significance. The 
scientific attitude is a reflexive belief that maintains that the domain of 
scientific rationality is in principle universal in scope. This totalising claim 
equates knowledge with causal analysis. Its quantifiable law like processes,
433 Pierre Boulez, from IRC AM publicity 1976 and from Boulez (1977) quoted in publicity 
ca. 1981). As cited in, Georgina Born, "Introduction," Rationalization and the 
Institutionalization of the musical Adv ant-Garde, (United States of America: University of 
California Press, 1995) p. 1.
434 Cf. "The Need for Aesthetics," Aesthetic Theory, p. 342.
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subject to experimental manipulation, have become paradigmatic for all 
claims to rationality and theoretical knowledge. From this viewpoint all rival 
claimants to knowledge have been de-legitimated, vanquished.
'In the fully administered world, the mimetic taboo a keystone of 
bourgeois ontology encroached on the zone that had been tolerantly 
reserved for mimesis, whereby it beneficially revealed human 
immediacy to be a lie.' 435
Beyond the abstract negation of the subject the allergy to expression 
support's a hatred of the now powerless subject. Music as the fetishism of 
material and process, on the one hand, and music as unfettered chance, on 
the other, both in a sense belong in the category of relief for the weakened 
ego. In their effect the extremes of absolute determinism and absolute 
chance coincide.
'Hardly any harmonic tensions are created; hardly any complementary 
harmonies; hardly any monodic, much less polyphonic lines. This 
shrinkage is out of all proportion to the compositional expenditure of 
means and construction. It may have something to do with what one 
calls the preponderance of extras, of the extra musical [.. .].' 436
The diminished and functional subject in compensation inflates itself by 
feigning a relevance which was withdrawn from it. Without this false- 
consciousness there would be no critique of the commodity world and no 
attempt to emancipate society from the dominance of its relations of 
production. But the attempt to establish the subject as real miscarried. In the 
somewhat profoundly legitimate allergy to expression the subject is 
abstractly negated. However expression is not simply the hubris or 
mendacity of the subject. By being spoken, distance is won from the trapped 
immediacy of suffering. Expression transforms suffering just as screaming
435 "Dialectic of Inwardness; Aporias of Expression," Aesthetic Theory, p. 117.
436 "Difficulties," Essays on Music, p. 659.
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diminishes unbearable pain.437
According to Adorno, with the departure of any serious opposition 
scientific rationality felt free to rationalize social practices. In the process it 
became obsessed with calculation, standardization, impersonal rules and self 
discipline. The asceticism of cold calculating efficiency became the order of 
the day. As practices became more rational and orderly, the lives of 
individuals, and life itself, came to be seen as more and more meaningless: 
superfluous. As people became disconnected from the conceptual structures 
that had made them unique in each case, identical with themselves, so 
individuality became a way of affirming things in their isolation, 
collectivity, and fungibility.438 'The unity of the manipulated collective 
consists in the negation of each individual: for individuality makes a 
mockery of the kind of society which would turn all individuals to the one 
collectivity.' 439
The destruction of non-legislative narrative authority severed the 
affective links with individual experience in favour of an elitist and 
vocational rationality whose highest values, scientific truth and reason, 
being educationally unobtainable thereafter become vacuous and devalued. 
'Stupidity is a scar.' 440 A child's ceaseless questions are symptomatic of a 
hidden pain. Preliminary groping is easily thwarted when questions find no 
answers not even how the first question is to be appropriately framed. 
According to Adorno, the scar, a calloused area of insensitivity, forms where 
the urge to know, or play, or cry, was stifled: thwarted instead of being
437 Cf. Ibid.
438 Cf. "How Sickly Seem all Growing Things," Minima Moralia, p. 71.
439 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 13.
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encouraged. Good will gives way not through any lack of good will but 
because of flagging energy. Blind spots in the individual without even the 
indexical gesture of "look here" are stages devoid of hope. Such scars lead 
to deformities of fanaticism, spite, malice; the quiescence of blindness and 
impotence. However, scars can also build hard and able characters. 441
'Direct expressions of hurt or damage are all too familiar: 
disillusionment, alienation, disaffection, boredom, despair, anger. The 
indirect expression of hurt in forms of flight from rationalization are 
more common, since they are precisely strategies for coping with and 
escaping hurt, and diverse in character: cynical adaptation to the 
demands of rationalized society; the redivinization of the world 
through the making of one fragment of modern life (a political creed, 
the practice of science) be the one, all-embracing meaning of the 
whole; a retreat into almost mystical "experientialism" as what, at the 
psychological level, rationalized society has eschewed (pursued most 
concretely in a dedication to eroticism or aestheticism); religious 
fundamentalism and the return of religion generally; obsessive 
consumerism and a commitment to lifestyle.' 442
Dialectic of Enlightenment read in conjunction with Minima Moralia reveals 
that the norms of instrumental rationality compromise the institutions of 
society making them unavailable or unattractive as spheres of ethical 
practice. As a result, ' [w]hat the philosophers once knew as life has become 
the sphere of private existence [...]. 5443
The fear of departing from the immanent myths of society and cliche-
440 "Notes and Drafts," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 257.
441 Cf. Ibid. Cf. "The New: Its Philosophy of History," Aesthetic Theory, p. 21. 'Art is 
modern art through mimesis of the hardened and alienated; only thereby, and not by refusal 
of a mute reality, does art become eloquent; this is why art no longer tolerates the 
innocuous.' Cf. "Canon of Prohibitions," Aesthetic Theory, p. 35. 'Each and every 
important work of art leaves traces behind in its material and technique, and following them 
defines the modern as what needs to be done, which is contrary to having a nose for what is 
in the air. Critique makes this definition concrete. The traces to be found in the material and 
the technical procedures, from which every qualitatively new work takes it lead, are scars: 
They are the loci at which the proceeding works misfired. By labouring on them, the new 
work turns against those that left these traces behind; this, not shifts in subjective feelings 
for life or in established styles, is the actual object of what historicism treated as the 
generational problem in art.'
442 J.M. Bernstein. "Introduction," Adorno, Disenchantment and Ethics, (The United States 
of America, Cambridge University Press: 2001) pp. 19-20.
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ridden facts of the immediately given paralyses enlightenment thought. 
Thought's guilty conscience accrues through its acquiescence to and reliance 
on the everyday conceptual language of affirmation and opposition. 
Philosophy is cautioned to speak the truth by the same materialized 
consciousness that lament this very precision in the expressed meaning.
'A usage of current opinion makes such complaints comprehensible. 
We like to present alternatives to choose from to be marked True and 
False. The decisions of a bureaucracy are frequently reduced to Yes or 
No answers to drafts submitted to it [...].'4
Without the labour of conceptualization the technical apparatus and the 
social groups that administer it devalue individual economies. 'It is by way 
of concepts that art sets free its mimetic, non-conceptual layer.' 445 Necessity 
compels philosophy to work with concepts but this should not be turned into 
the virtue of their priority. With that the individual disappears into the 
cultural nexus of judging rationality and social-actuality and in pursuit of 
particularized judgments as exemplars of the universal it becomes beholden 
to the dazzling truth of a false but necessary immediacy: necessary in the 
sense that all judgments, even negative ones, assert and assume something. 
The positivity of thought restricted to the acquisition of singular facts 
that ultimately define an area of dissimulation, discerns in conceptual 
relationships something uncomfortable and useless and so, for the sake of 
self-preservation, positive thought holds fast to immediacy.
'Reflection, which in a healthy person breaks the power of 
immediacy, is never so compelling as the illusion which it dispels. As 
a negative, considered movement which is not directed in a straight 
line, it lacks the brutality inherent in positive movement.' 446
443 "Dedication," Minima Moralia, p. 15
444 "Vertiginousness," Negative Dialectics, p. 32.
445 "Art Beauty," Aesthetic Theory, p. 96.
446 "Elements of Anti-Semitism," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 195.
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The tangents of the empirical world converge in the insight that the concrete, 
by being in some way distinct, can be identified, possessed, sold. This point 
of departure is markedly an inability to participate in the negativity of 
thought where in contradistinction to the formal legality of fixed judgements 
thought comes into its own taking steps beyond individual judgment.
To want substance in cognition is a Utopian ideal that is blocked not 
by immediate reality but by the consciousness of possibility which even 
prior to figuration is rooted in the concrete. 'The utmost distance alone 
would be proximity; philosophy is the prism in which its colour is caught. 
"Utopia"  for Adorno an abstract and inextinguishable colour in the midst 
of extant things comes from the Greek and means "not-place" or "that 
which is not", to which its servant, existent thought, extends. Closed in on 
itself the self-preserving principle is the neurosis that thwarts the implicit 
better potentiality of men. That Utopia might be obtained is a spatiality that 
spurs men beyond the false condition. The impulse to do right, non-identical 
although associated with a mythical mystical name i.e. "pure will" or 
"intelligible character", is the concrete intermittent anticipation of the 
possibility that flares point like and briefly in consciousness. As something 
neither alien with regards to mankind nor identical with it, the impulse is not 
possessed and therefore not falsified.
According to Adorno, the separation of the moral, intelligible 
character from the empirical one is eons-old. 'Negatively, it breaks through 
the subject's painful perception that in their reality, in what became of them, 
all men are mutilated. What would be different, the unperverted essence, is
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withheld from a language that bears the stigmata of existence [...]. 9448 The 
elevation of interiority to the status of an immediate and implicit ideal 
sharply separates subject and object in the experience of remembering. 
Memory from the viewpoint of present subjectivity grasps the discrepancy 
between the subject's ideal image and the existent object.449 The identifying 
subject thereafter endeavours to block out external considerations and shut 
down the moment categorized as irrational, the manifold subaltern concerns 
of a false society. This moment, the addendum, would move beyond the 
reflexive beyond the block. The nonidentity which determines critique from 
within, after the criterion of identity, is at the same time that which it claims 
to be controlling the moment of spontaneity. No critique can serve itself, 
be its own purpose wholly without outside knowledge '[...] without a 
moment of immediacy, if you will, a bonus from the subjective thought that 
looks beyond the dialectical structure/
Inwardly the block is made manifest in tendencies of stubborn or 
persistent egotism and thereafter neurosis, the projection of particular private 
interests as the prescription, often on pain of death, for the whole of society. 
'Neuroses are pillars of society; they thwart the better potential of men, and 
thus the objectively better condition which men might bring about.' 451 
Neuroses are a priori. They sally forth to interfere with the interests of
447 "Rhetoric," Negative Dialectics, pp. 56-57.
448 "Truth Content of the Doctrine of Intelligibility," Negative Dialectics, p. 297.
449 Cf. Georg Lukacs, "The Romanticism of Disillusionment," The Theory of the Novel, 
Trans. Anna Bostock, (Great Britain: The Merlin Press, Ltd, 1978), p. 114. "The elevation 
of interiority to the status of a completely independent world is not only a psychological 
fact but also a decisive value judgement on reality; this self-sufficiency of the subjective 
self is its most desperate self-defence; it is the abandonment of any struggle to realise the 
soul in the outside world, a struggle which is seen as hopeless and merely humiliating,'
450 "Transcendental Illusion," Negative Dialectics, p. 182.
451 "Truth Content of the Doctrine of Intelligibility," Negative Dialectics, p. 298.
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others. With all the cunning of the unconscious at their disposal neuroses 
dam up and redirect the instincts of right action towards narcissistic self- 
gratification and hidebound self-preservation. Once they are transcribed, 
stamped on the world, neuroses relative to their origin appear as something 
estranged and thereafter are in some measure objective. The transcendental 
agreement is now coupled with the deadly seriousness of a comprehended 
truth. Polemical self-revelation is a thing that comes to be, not a thing that is. 
Within it denial is stylized as an end. Unmarred by meanness the part that is 
considered higher or more sublime is essentially a sense of inadequacy. 
Unable to change the causes of its humiliation the paralysed rational will is 
in the end the intelligible character. 'And yet, among men there is nothing 
better than that character the possibility to be another than one is, even 
though all are locked up in their selves and thus locked away even from 
themselves.' 452
Marked by neurosis the artist, anarchic, free floating and on a collision 
course with the reality principle, displays violent instincts. The enactment of 
antagonisms in the work, the antagonistic elements, the nonidentical, 
heterogeneous, and unformed that the artwork seeks to unify, although unity 
itself is only a partial element in an artworks, is the processual element that 
is enciphered in its objectivation. Objectivation is not sublimation. 
According to Adorno, artists do not sublimate: The most legitimate art is 
socially undesired. Artists neither satisfy nor repress their desires and 
[despite the psycho-analytic illusion] neither do they transform them into
452 Ibid. Cf. "Truth Content of the Doctrine of Intelligibility," Negative Dialectics, p. 298. 
'Weakness that will mistake itself for strength, if possible, is a hinge in the machinery of 
evil.'
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socially desirable achievements. This outrages psychological normalcy 
which unbidden is established as the criterion of aesthetic quality.
'According to the tone of psychoanalytic monographs, art should deal 
affirmatively with the negativity of experience. The negative element 
is held to be nothing more than the mark of that process of repression 
that obviously goes into the artwork.' 453
This positivistic tone neglects the artworks own objectivity, its inner 
consistency, level of form, idea of truth, critical impulse, etc. In a theory 
more productive psychologically than aesthetically psychoanalysis considers 
artworks as essentially unconscious projections analogous to the dream. This 
is a positivistic overestimation. Projection is but one element one sort of 
impulse in the artwork and almost certainly not the definitive: idiom, 
material, the product itself, all play a part. The artist's lot is to be 
hysterically excessive, uninhibited. To sublimation and diminished reactions 
they oppose idiosyncrasies: the coarse, inane, indecent, and the like.
Despite insights into the workings of symbolism and the dream 
psychoanalysis, according to Adomo, lacks an adequate concept of 
expression. Expression is appearance measured by the reality principle it 
wishes to circumvent. Expression negates reality, not by substituting itself 
delusively and symptomatically for reality, but by holding up to it what is 
unlike it. The whole complex experience and movement is blocked by 
reality which denies direct communication with its object. Expression 
achieves an unfalsified manifestation of itself and the concomitant resistance 
to it in sensuous imitation. The strength of expression is that it survives 
modification into a mere image on its outward path.
According to Adorno, by interpolating images between itself and that
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which it thinks consciousness, unwittingly or not, would be in the process of 
reproducing idealism. Within the praxis of representational thinking a body 
of ideas, authoritative, subjective and arbitrary would be substituted for the 
object of cognition. Representation [Vorstellung] is not a knowing, rather it 
is a limitation. Conforming to its "vision of things" it is the positing of an 
object before and for a subject of knowledge.454 Materialism concurs with 
the theological and endorses a secular ban on images: it is only with the 
absence of images that the full object could be conceived. 'Materialism 
brought that ban into secular form by not permitting Utopia to be positively 
pictured; this is the substance of its negativity.' 455 The materialist longing to 
grasp the thing aims at the opposite of subjective arbitrariness. In the 
transverse of the concept materialism's great desire would be the 
resurrection of the flesh, something foreign to the idealism of the absolute 
spirit.
'The perspective vanishing point of historical materialism would be its 
self-sublimation, the spirit's liberation from the primacy of material 
needs in their state of fulfilment. Only if the physical urge were 
quenched would spirit be reconciled and would become that which it 
only promises while the spell of material conditions will not let it 
satisfy material needs.'
Reality that is not given visually but functionally is an abstraction in itself.
Artworks are not being but a process of becoming. Their continuity is 
demanded teleologically by particular elements in need of it; enabled either 
by their incompleteness, or even insignificance. Art desires what has not yet 
been: a presence, presentation (Darstellung) an upsurge in the being-subject
453 "Critique of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Art," Aesthetic Theory, p. 8.
454 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Becoming," The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. Jason Smith, 
Steven Miller (United States of America: University of Minneapolis) p. 11.
455 "Materialism Imageless," Negative Dialectics, p. 207
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as such and consequently the negation of every and all given presence, be 
that of an "object" or of a "subject." It is as a result of their own constitution 
that artworks pass over into their other and find continuance in it. By 
pursuing its own identity with itself art assimilates itself with the 
nonidentical.
The self-preserving principle and acts are easier to rationalize than the 
addendum of the pure will: the instincts that spur men and women beyond 
the false condition. The addendum is the embodied will, the negative or 
sublimation of the will.457 The redirection of impulses to act into lines of 
thought is what makes the will substantial and unanimous. Rational insight 
in order to be in practice just that, "rational insight" must abstract itself from 
the demands of practice. In order to think through a new mode of conduct, a 
new orientation, theory requires a withdrawal from action. It is through just 
such a contemplative immersion that the processual quality of artworks is set 
free: moves in itself.458 Institutionalizing that withdrawal from action as 
itself a new mode of conduct codifies it as the rules for what is now a 
separate reflective activity.
Once the mode of conduct is established,
'[e]ach act of the will breaks through the mechanical autarky of logic; 
this is what makes theory and practice antithetical [...] if the motor 
form of reaction were liquidated altogether, if the hand no longer 
twitched, there would be no will/M59
Willing is the elaboration of motor reactions. Without a will there is no
456 Cf. Ibid.
457 cf «The Addendum," Negative Dialectics, p. 230. 'In the most profound concept of 
transcendental epistemology, the concept of productive imagination, the trace of the will 
invades the pure intellective function. Once that has happened, spontaneity is curiously 
skipped in the will.'
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consciousness but it is not as if the will were nothing else but consciousness. 
The genesis of pure consciousness [logic] is obscured by the machinations 
of idealistic identity. Reason that has genetically evolved from the force of 
human drives, as their differentiation, could hardly have done so without the 
kind of willing whose arbitrary nature is manifest in every thought act 'the 
kind that furnishes our only reason to distinguish such an act from the 
subject's passive, "receptive" moments [...]. J46° Pure consciousness has 
come to be in the moment of the negation of the will. Logic sits in isolation 
and its subjective correlate, contemplation, is a conduct that wills nothing. 
The addendum is the name for that which was eliminated in the process of 
abstraction, the otherness of pure practical reason. In reality the elimination 
was incomplete.
'The addendum is an impulse, the rudiment of a phase in which the 
dualism of extramental and intramental was not thoroughly 
consolidated yet, neither volitively bridgeable nor an ontological 
ultimate. This also affects the concept of the will that contains so- 
called "facts of consciousness" (which at the same time, purely 
descriptively, are more than such facts this lies hidden in the will's 
transition to practice). The impulse, intramental and somatic in one, 
drives beyond the conscious sphere to which it belongs just the same. 
With that impulse freedom extends to the realm of experience; this 
animates the concept of freedom as a state that would no more be 
blind nature than it would be oppressed nature. Its phantasm  
which reason will not allow to be withered by any proof of causal 
interdependence is the phantasm of reconciling nature and the 
mind.' 461
The division of mind and nature as expressed in folk psychology the social 
actuality of self-understanding is an abstraction that cannot be undone. The 
anxiety and difficulties that this produces cannot be overcome by immediate
458 cf "Aesthetic Experience is Processual," Aesthetic Theory, p. 176.
459 Ibid.
460 Ibid.
461 "The Addendum," Negative dialectics, pp. 228-229.
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theoretical fiat. For Adorno, the addendum figures as an ancient impulse, the 
promise of a reconciliation between mind and nature. 'It is a flash of light 
between the poles of something long past, something grown all but 
unrecognizable, and that which some day might come to be.' 462 This aspect 
of the addendum refers back to a point where the duality of mind and body 
had yet to be conceptualised, a point now uninhabited. The addendum is an 
X, a notion introduced to make intelligible the relation of will to 
consciousness. As Adorno's term for what is not strictly somatic nor purely 
mental the addendum is 'something physical which consciousness does not 
exhaust.' 463 Working in both directions the addendum is a somatic addition 
to conscious understanding and a cognitive addition to physical reaction. As 
such it is a new imperative, a moral addendum, our practical abhorrence at 
physical agony.464 According to Adomo:
'Dealing discursively with it would be an outrage, for the new 
imperative gives us a bodily sensation of the moral addendum  
bodily, because it is now the practical abhorrence of the 
unbearable physical agony to which individuals are exposed even with 
individuality about to vanish as a form of mental reflection. It is in the 
unvarnished materialistic motive only that morality survives.' 465
According to Adorno, ' [t]he unconscious innervations which, beyond 
thought processes, attune individual existence to historical rhythms, sense 
the approaching collectivising of the world.' 466 The process of integration 
and absorption, which each individual must dread, is also felt to be
462 "The Addendum," Negative Dialectics, p. 229.
463 Ibid.
464 Cf. J. M. Bernstein, "After Auschwitz," Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, p. 386. 
13n. 'Abhorrence includes the sense of horror and disgust, where the notion of disgust has 
the sense of what cannot be taken in or incorporated. Thus a feeling of abhorrence has a 
sense of a response to something that sketches out a limit to our capacity for response; thus 
abhorrence is, precisely, the feeling attendant to a limiting condition; in this case the human 
as inhuman.'
465 »]y[etaphysic and Culture," Negative Dialectics, p. 365.
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inevitable. The way by which integral society takes up the individual is less 
something positive more a process of crushing them into an amorphous 
malleable mass. As a kind of counter-irritant to the threatening 
collectivization the sensorium attempts to get in training for it, to try to 
outdo the danger by coaching oneself as a member of the mass. According to 
Adorno, this can be observed in the nervousness and restlessness that settles 
on everyone like a plague, in the reckless haste to join up, be in the swim of 
things in order not to miss the boat, the party, the warning bells, etc. The 
demand that everybody must have projects on the go all the time including 
one to extract the maximum from leisure makes the whole of life resemble a 
job, something relative to pecuniary gain or loss. However this resemblance 
only conceals a deeper fear. Production processes that are transferred to 
private life take with them not only a false-consciousness but also 
preparatory pseudo-activities.
'Pseudo-activity is an insurance, the expression of a readiness for self- 
surrender, in which one senses the only guarantee of self-preservation. 
Security is glimpsed in adaptation to the utmost insecurity. It is seen 
as a license for flight that will take one somewhere else with the 
utmost speed.' 467
Art's participation in and self-examination of collective and self- 
posited forms of thought combats the pathological and paranoiac 
consciousness. The language of artworks is not imprisoned in the spectrum 
or telos of a pre-established universality. The non-existing that emerges 
suddenly from the artworks is mediated to them by fragments of the 
existing. The assemblage is the fragmentary as appearance not as copy.
466 "Vandals," Minima Moralia, p. 139.
467 Ibid. Cf. "Suffering Physical," Negative Dialectics, p. 203. 'Even the steps which 
society takes to exterminate itself are at the same time absurd acts of unleashed self-
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Artworks are images as apparition. As something incommensurable to 
experience the image is permeated with the historical antagonism of subject 
and object, the ancient shudder which the world seeks to free itself through 
its demythologizing. The authority of the artwork is the reflection it compels 
through its apparition.46*
'Aesthetic images are no more translatable into concepts than they are 
"real"; there is no imago without the imaginary; their reality is their 
historical content, and the images themselves, including the historical 
images, are not to be hypostatised Aesthetic images are not fixed, 
archaic invariants: Artworks become images in that the processes that 
have congealed in them as objectivity becomes eloquent.' 469
The disintegrating materials and categories having lost their a priori self- 
evidence is a triumph of their being-for-other.470 In concordance with its own 
concept the broken and fragmented has no systematic argument straining 
towards the crescendo of the conclusion, there is to be no consoling fixed 
traditional linguistic and conceptual structures. Each fragment dances to its 
own intrinsic rhythm, follows its own hidden contours. 'Philosophy 
condenses into experience so that it may have hope. But hope appears only 
in fragmented form.' 471 The fragment acts as its own centre of power and 
possibility. The fragmentation process is productive where it prohibits its 
own completion. To the law of form the fragment remains unrealised. 
Unexhausted in its partiality and possibility the fragment makes a 
reconcilable claim to an order beyond the present totality of fixed and formal 
structures. In the process the fragment, as the emancipation of form, defines 
and incorporates the alienated without the acquiescence demanded by a
preservation.'
468 cf «The Nonexistent," Aesthetic Theory, p. 83.
469 "Art Beauty," Aesthetic Theory, p. 85.
470 cf "Disintegration of the Material," Aesthetic Theory, p. 16.
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rationalized reason. Fragments that are recombined into a new dynamic 
generate their own sense of signification and disillusionment.472 In this the 
fragment or series of fragments is concomitant with the impulse.473 As a 
newly prescribed textual or cultural reproduction of reason and power the 
fragment in its semblance and image character requires its own separate 
critical analysis.
In order to exist as a social reality a particular truth has to enter the 
ledger on the side of the universal.474 It is incumbent on artworks to grasp the 
universal, the ruling universality that dictates the nexus of the existing, in the 
particular. The particular becomes a conceptual power by being expressed. 
In concordance with the rationality of subjective means the universal in the 
particular is virtually pre-established. Language mediates the particular 
through universality, through the social and ethical. Its assimilation of the 
unutterable converges with a properly objectified and functional style of 
administering events.
The plain contradictoriness of answering to the challenge of uttering 
the unutterable, qualifies philosophy as dialectics even before it gets down to
471 "A Portrait of Walter Benjamin," Prisms, pp. 240-241.
472 Cf. "On the Concept of Philosophy," Eclipse of Reason, p. 167. 'Each concept must be 
seen as a fragment of an inclusive truth in which it finds its meaning. It is precisely the 
building of truth out of such fragments that is philosophy's prime concern. There is no royal 
road to definition.'
473 Cf. Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, Part 3 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, 
Trans. W. Wallace and A.V. Millar (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) § 473 A. 'Impulse must 
be distinguished from mere appetite. The latter belongs to self-consciousness [...] it is 
something single and seeks only what is single for a single, momentary satisfaction. 
Impulse, on the other hand, since it is a form of volitional intelligence [...] embraces a 
series of satisfactions, hence is a whole, a universal.'
474 cf "Particularity and the Particular," Negative Dialectics, p. 173. 'The unity of that 
which general concepts cover differs fundamentally from the conceptually defined 
particular. The concept of the particular is always its negation at the same time; it cuts short 
what the particular is and what nonetheless cannot be directly named, and it replaces this 
with identity. This negative, wrong, and yet simultaneously necessary moment is the stage 
of dialectics.'
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the task at hand, which inevitably entails being entangled in individual 
contradictions: rendering the impossible possible. The work and goal of 
philosophical self-reflection is the insistent unravelling of the paradox.
'Though doubtful as ever, a confidence that philosophy can make it 
after all that the concept can transcend the concept, the preparatory 
and concluding element, and can thus reach the nonconceptual is 
one of philosophy's inalienable features and part of the naivete that 
ails it.' 475
Concept formation on the model of the subjective philosophy of immanence 
assumes a monadological structure: free will as the lawful unity of impulses, 
both spontaneous and rationally determined, within a causal framework of 
volitive acts. And yet the decision making power of this structure is 
contradicted by the invasion of countless moments of external reality: 
notably social reality. 4
Art too exhibits this double character of immanence and social reality. 
Art's character of pure immanence is the burden it must bear if it is to seek 
autarky, which at the same time threatens it with sterility. In-itself and for 
the sake of its own preservation art seeks to escape its own sphere. 'For art is 
not only social by virtue of its own movement, as a priori opposition to 
heteronomous society.' 477 Society itself, in its concrete form, is the 
immediate situation of art. The question of what is possible, of productive 
formal approaches is immediately determined by society. According to 
Adorno, the other, the in-itself of the work, easily turns demagogical and 
ideological. The distance by which art transcends mere existence collapses 
to the absolute nearness of absolute integration. Art's escape from its own
475 "The Concern of Philosophy," Negative Dialectics, p. 8.
476 cf "Pseudoproblems," Negative Dialectics, pp. 212-213.
477 "Paralipomena," Aesthetic Theory, p. 310.
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domain of immanence carries anti-intellectual overtones. In the name of the 
people what mocks "artistic artists" or "art for art's sake" ogles the barbaric. 
Art is bewitched by the semblance that is the ruling criterion of its being-for- 
other the exchange relation that has been established as the measure of all 
things.
'Insofar as art is constituted by subjective experience, social content 
penetrates to its core, though not literally, but rather in a modified, 
fragmentary and shadowy fashion. This, not psychology, is the true 
affinity of artworks to dreams.' 478
In spite of its autarky and by means of it art seeks its other. What is external 
to its spell drives artwork beyond the fundamental determination of its 
identity with itself. The truth of artworks is not what they mean but what it 
is, what idea it is, that decides whether in itself the artwork is true or false. 
This truth of the work in-itself, the progressive self-unfolding sui generis, is 
commensurable and coincides, with regard to the idea, with the idea of 
philosophical truth. Philosophy and art converge in their truth content. The 
possibility for the convergence is to be sought in art's element of 
universality, its specification as language. This universality is collective; 
philosophical universality points back to the collective subject. 'However,' 
according to Adorno:
'In aesthetic images precisely that is collective that withdraws from 
the I: Society inheres in the truth content. The appearing, whereby the 
artwork far surpasses the mere subject, is the eruption of the subject's 
collective essence.' 479
The anticipation of a condition beyond the diremption of individual 
and collective, which every artwork seeks, is simultaneously the trace of 
memory in mimesis. The collective rememberance in artworks takes place
478 Ibid.
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by way of the subject: it is not identical with the subject nor separated from 
it. It is in the subject's idiosyncratic impulses that the collective form of 
reaction becomes manifest.
'For this reason, too, the philosophical interpretation of the truth 
content must unswervingly construe the truth content in the 
particular. By virtue of this content's subjectively mimetic expressive 
element, artworks gain their objectivity; they are neither pure impulse 
nor its form, but rather the congealed process that transpires between 
them, and this process is social/M80
The autarky of the I is an abstraction which like the mythological 
Being has no ontological priority. I myself as subject, freely determine 
myself. On the subjective side dialectics subjectively thinks hi a way that 
will no longer turn the thought form itself and its objects into immutable 
ones. Experience shows us that objects do not remain the same. The 
traditional guarantor of solidity and of the pre-designed unity underlying 
every identity, individual human consciousness, is unstable. Resignation that 
affirms self-abnegation as an instance of the self is spoilt by an obstinacy 
that turns the dissolution of the self into an inflexible stoic positing of the 
self. The attitude and semblance of total self-sufficiency becomes an Ur- 
image of defiance in self-abnegation. According to Adorno, the extreme 
confirmation of the self, abstract selmess, 'is that grinding of the teeth which 
says nothing but I, I, I,' 481 the counterpart of the nothingness that the self 
becomes in death. If identity no longer goes forth and becomes other to itself 
then it is no longer an identity of something it is nothing at all. This also 
applies to wholeness, as that which is constitutively preestablished over its
479 "Art and Philosophy; Collective Content of Art" Aesthetic Theory, p. 131.
480 Ibid.
481 The Jargon of Authenticiy, p. 125. Cf. The Jargon of Authenticity, p. 131. 'The subject 
is never so authentic for Heidegger as in that holding out in which it endures an extreme of
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parts.
In remembrance of the past a person does create a kind of unity 
however unreal or elusive it might be. 'Yet the "I" which he remembers in 
this unreality, the I which he was at one time and potentially becomes 
again this I turns simultaneously into another, into a stranger to be 
detachedly observed.' 482 The ambivalence of this identity and nonidentity 
extends into the logical problem of identity. The formula of "identity in 
nonidentity" would first have to be contrasted with the nonidentity in 
identity. According to Adorno, the test of the turn to nonidentity would be in 
its performance, if it remained declarative, it would be revoking, 
withdrawing itself.483
'In the unreconciled condition, nonidentity is experienced as 
negativity. From the negative, the subject withdraws into itself, and to 
the abundance of ways to react. Critical self-reflection alone will keep 
it from a constriction of this abundance, from building walls between 
itself and the object, from the supposition that its being-for-itself is an 
in-and-for-itself. The less identity can be assumed between subject 
and object, the more contradictory are the demands made upon the 
cognitive subject, upon its unfettered strength and candid self- 
reflection.' 484
Anything that resembles a structure is flattened by the universal barter 
relation and the bigger institutional forms. Gestures become chaotic, 
hemmed in and deformed in their image.485 The problem remains that 
orientated towards the primary, the ur-text or the systematically fixed and 
closed in itself, the notional subject becomes ideological, a screen for the 
objective and functional identity of society which in its blindness to the
pain, following the example of the ego.'
482 "Starting out from the Concept," Negative Dialectics, p. 154.
483 Cf. "Starting out from the Concept," Negative Dialectics, p. 155.
484 "Argument and Experience," Negative Dialectics, p. 31.
485 Cf. "Ontology Prescribed," Negative Dialectics, p. 88.
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prismatic is diminished, transfixed in a single glance.
According to Habermas, if Adorno and Horkheimer,'[...] do not want 
to renounce the effect of a final unmasking [of reason and power] and still 
want to continue with critique, they will have to leave at least one rational 
criterion intact for their explanation of the corruption of all rational 
criteria.' 486 If Adorno and Horkheimer are to abide in the paradoxical ground 
then there must be a minimum plausibility in the claim that there is no way 
out there is no overcoming the theoretical and performative contradiction 
of a determinate negation that resists the fusion of reason and power.
' Adorno's Negative Dialectic reads like a continuing explanation of 
why we have to circle about within this performative contradiction 
and indeed even remain; of why only the insistent relentless unfolding 
of this paradox opens up the prospect of that magically invoked 
"mindfulness of nature in the subject in whose fulfillment the 
unacknowledged truth of all culture lies hidden".487 Twenty-five years 
after the conclusion of Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno remained 
faithful to its philosophical impulse and never deviated from the 
paradoxical structure of thinking as totalising critique.'5488
For Kant, Enlightenment is, '"[...] man's emergence from his self- 
incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding 
without the guidance of another person.'"489 Kant puts his faith in reason, 
reason is to be our guide out of immaturity. Freud was much more 
pessimistic. Beneath the adult struggle to be reasonable are archaic images
486 « The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno," The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 126-127.
487 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 40.
488 uThe Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno," The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 119-120. Cf. "The Concept of 
Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 24. 'The self-satisfaction of knowing in 
advance and the transfiguration of negativity into redemption are untrue forms of resistance 
against deception. The justness of the image is preserved in the faithful pursuit of its 
prohibition. This pursuit, "determinate negativity" does not receive from the sovereignty of 
the abstract concept any immunity against corrupting intuition, as does skepticism, to which 
both true and false are equally vain.'
489 I. Kant. "Beantwortung der Frage: Was istAufkldrung?" Kants Werke (Akademie- 
Ausgabe) Vol VIII, p. 35. As cited in, "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality." Dialectic
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of what strength and power should be. Unable to forgo the narcissistic 
perfection of childhood the adult projects an ego ideal, the voice of the 
conscience, as a substitute for the childish narcissistic ideal. This narcissistic 
ideal is the product of repressions which in turn are the product of countless 
contingencies that never enter experience. The consequence of this is that 
experiences, thoughts and emotions, are channelled in very specific ways. 
This explains why the same person can be excessively kind in one scenario 
and blindingly cruel in another. People are always in danger of regressing to 
and mimicking these earlier stages in their development.490 In the 
constitution of the ego formed in resistance to mimicry, adaptation to nature 
becomes obdurate objectivizing behaviour.
The organized compulsion reproduced in individuals as rational self- 
preservation rebounds onto and threatens nature as social domination. The 
hierarchy of number and mathematical formulae are the most sublimated 
manifestation of mimicry. The power of instinctual, generational, and 
unconscious forces are sublimated as the ratio which science maintains as a 
archetype. Science endorses and preserves regularity by way of refined 
observations. Technology converts these mental processes, which like 
magical rites were once performed for survival purposes, into automation, 
blind examples of expediency and rote. 'With its triumph human statements 
become both controllable and inevitable.' 491
Individual spontaneity and development is marshalled by external
of Enlightenment, p. 81.
490 Cf. S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, Trans. David McLintock (England: 
Penguin Books, 2002) p. 24. 'It is contended that much blame for our misery lies with what 
we call our civilization, and we should be far happier if we were to abandon it and revert to 
primitive conditions.'
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forces which first embodied in the father later assumes different forms: 
schoolteacher, employer, government agent, etc. The societal forms of 
resistance coupled with the pressure of circumstance produce unbearable 
tensions in the nominally mature and experienced authorities who are called 
upon to set in motion a course of action that will alleviate the tension in 
themselves and others.
'The process of civilization, whose agents are the teachers, aims not 
least of all at levelling everything. It tries to eradicate from the pupils 
that uncultivated nature that returns in suppressed form in the 
idiosyncrasies, speech mannerisms, symptoms of rigidity, tenseness, 
and awkwardness of the teachers. Those pupils rejoice who perceive 
in the teacher that against which they instinctively feel the entire 
painful process of education is waged. This indeed comprises a 
critique of the educational process itself which in our culture to this 
day has generally failed. This failure is attested in the double 
hierarchy that can be observed within the school: the official hierarchy 
founded on intellect, achievement, and grades, and a latent hierarchy, 
in which physical strength, "being a guy," and certain practical 
abilities that are not honoured by the official hierarchy play their 
role.' 492
All authoritarian figures manipulate and capitalize upon this state of 
ambivalence arresting thought at a point determined, in theory at least, by 
the needs of society as a whole. Where common interest still complies with 
the kingdom of ends, the determination and classification of societal 
processes, 'Being is apprehended under the aspect of manufacture and 
administration.' 493 The apprehension of images is pre-censored and governed 
according to the norm of the understanding. People are displayed as types. 
Their success or failure belongs to a logic or sense of Being which is nothing 
if not democratic.
491 "Elements of Anti-Semitism." Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 181.
492 "Taboos on the Teaching Vocation," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p.
177.
493 "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 84.
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According to Nietzsche, it hardly seems to matter how rational or how 
stupid, the whole as moral custom takes precedence over the individual and 
whether willingly or grudgingly to do good means to do what is 
customary.494 Bataille makes the observation that to transgress the 
customary is taboo and even though the taboo is maintained by acts of 
violence, it ostensibly serves to eliminate violence from society. Bataille 
also recognized that the taboo intensifies the desire for the transgression that 
keeps the taboo in place. 495 The shift in the Christian commandment from 
"thou shall no kill" to "thou shall not murder" is an expression of how 
violence is integrated into the social milieu as a norm.
'The conception of unfettered activity, of uninterrupted procreation, of 
chubby insatiability, of freedom as frantic bustle, feeds on the 
bourgeois concept of nature that has always served solely to proclaim 
social violence as unchangeable, as apiece of healthy eternity.' 49
Hostility to qualitative difference coupled with the demands for an 
integrated totality dominated by quantification lends itself to the nai've 
supposition of an unambiguous development in one direction only: towards 
increased production. 'It is not man's lapse into luxurious indolence that is 
to be feared, but the savage spread of the social under the mask of universal 
nature, the collective as a blind fury of activity.' 497
In art it is not the savage dynamism of commodity production that is
494 Cf. F. Nietzsche, "On the History of Moral Sensation," Human, all too Human, trans. 
RJ Hollingdale, (The United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 51. 'He is 
called "good" who does what is customary as if by nature, as a result of long inheritance, 
that is to say easily and gladly, and this is so whatever what is customary may be (exacts 
revenge, for example, when exacting revenge is part of good custom, as it was with the 
ancient Greeks).'
495 Cf. G. Bataille, Eroticism, trans. Mary Dalwood, (Great Britain: Marion Boyars, 1994) 
p. 69. 'Man must combat his natural impulse to violence. This signifies an acceptance of 
violence at the deepest level, not an abrupt break with it; the feeling responsible for the 
rejection of violence is kept going in the background by this acceptance.'
496 "Sur L 'Eau, " Minima Moralia, p. 156.
189
the most human it is the artist's own idiosyncrasies. By being prohibited 
idiosyncrasies become objectively binding and so the particular is literally 
the universal. The necessity for reflection in art means being conscious of 
and articulating the particular idiosyncrasies of the artist. Art that preserves 
its distance from the immediacy of life retains its autonomy but pays for this 
in its renunciation of communication.
'Thinking men and artists have not infrequently described a sense of 
being not quite there, of not playing along, a feeling as if they were 
not themselves at all, but a kind of spectator. [...] The inhuman part of 
it, the ability to keep ones distance as a spectator and to rise above 
things, is in the final analysis the human part, the very part resisted by 
ideologists.' 498
By its absolute liberation from the universal the particular is rendered 
universal through the obtaining principle and polemical relation existing 
between universal and particular. A relation the mind will in its surety and 
objective immediacy raise above the particular, cleansing it of all that resists 
its own concept. The concept of the particular is always its negation, its cuts 
short what the particular is and what cannot be directly named replacing this 
with identity. 'Today immediacy of aesthetic comportment is exclusively an 
immediate relationship to the universally mediated.' 499 The dialectic of 
universal and particular does not eliminate their difference. The particular is 
inhabited by that sense of abhorrence, sense of disgust, at what cannot be 
incorporated.
In order to reach out to touch what both fascinates and disgusts its 
sense of taste the fine aesthetic sensibility would have to overcome its own 
hostility and taboos on expression. The repugnance for all artistic
497 ibid.
498 "After Auschwitz," Negative Dialectics, p. 363.
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subjectivism, expressions of exaltation, because of their historical lack of 
taste and tact is an immediate impulse, historically determined by the same 
delicacy of late bourgeois organization as that against which the cultivated 
taste rebels.
'Taste is the most accurate seismograph of historical experience. 
Unlike almost all other faculties, it is even able to register its own 
behaviour. Reacting against itself, it recognizes its own lack of taste. 
Artists who repel or shock, spokesman of unbridled cruelty, are 
governed, in their idiosyncrasy, by taste; the cultivation of a fine 
sensibility, the domain of nervous neo-romantics, is as patently coarse 
and unfeeling, even to its protagonists, as in Rilke's line: 'For 
poverty's a great glow from within [...]' 50°
Erotic pathos is just as intolerable for the fine aesthetic sensibility as any 
self-righteous aesthetic and therefore it too joins the list of prohibitions.
'In art since Expressionism the prostitute has become a key figure, 
though in reality she is dying out, since it is only by portrayal of 
figures devoid of shame that sex can now be handled without aesthetic 
embarrassment.' 501
The purely inhuman is alone in being the worthy subject for art's 
transgression.
Dialectically what now seems alien are those mimetic features, 
gestures and behaviours tabooed by the experience of civilization. The 
infectious gestures of direct contact, touch, soothing, coaxing, etc, have an 
old fashioned feel, as does the other side of the same social condition, the 
howling voice, the yell 'as cold as business' that seeks to influence by 
flattery, threat and entreaty. 502 When we do encounter these gestures in 
others there is a tendency to mistake them for unconscious power relations, 
undisciplined mimicry, or passed down generational remnants. And yet
499 "Art in the Industrial Age," Aesthetic Theory, p. 219.
500 "Damper and Drum," Minima Moralia, p. 145
501 Ibid.
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coldness is the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity. 503 The tabooed 
impulses are therefore seen as embarrassing, rudimentary and isolated 
remnants. Along with regression the pitiless prohibition of the mimetic 
heritage and of all practical experience is first denied and then, along with 
the denial, consigned to oblivion.504
For those hardened souls that conform in their reactions to social 
reality, the power relations of the external world, the immediacy and 
formless familiarity of the intimate sphere violates their imponderable 
auratic individuality. Undiminished nearness as a denial of strangeness and 
humanity virtually negates the particular individual. Slackness and lack of 
tact in the intimate sphere, the "being cruel to be kind", becomes a pretext 
for violence, coldness, and incorporation of the other into the inventory of 
property. Despite claims to the contrary intimacies estrange and this 
becomes the subject of critical scrutiny. 505
502
503
"Elements of Anti-Semitism," Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 181-182.
Cf. "After Auschwitz," Negative Dialectics, p. 363. 'His mere survival calls for the 
coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have been 
no Auschwitz; this is the drastic guilt of him who was spared.'
504 Cf. Ibid.
505 "Just hear, how bad he was," Minima Moralia, p. 182. 'Only by recognition of distance 
in our neighbour is strangeness alleviated: accepted into consciousness. [...] Wherever 
immediateness posits and entrenches itself, the bad mediateness of society is insidiously 
asserted. The cause of immediacy is now espoused only by the most circumspect reflection. 
This is tested on the smallest scale.'
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Chapter Five: 
"What is, is more than it is. This "more" is not imposed 
upon it but remain immanent to it, as that -which has been 
pushed out if. In that sense, the nonidentical would be the 
thing's own identity against its identifying, stabilizing 
procedures. The innermost core of the object proves to be 
simultaneously extraneous to it, the phenomenon of its 
exclusion, the reflex of an identifying, stabilizing 
procedure. This is where insistent thinking leads us in 
regard to the individual: to his essence rather than to the 
universal he is said represent. Communication with 
others crystallizes in the individual for whose existence 
they serve as media. " 506
Theodor WAdorno
The perennial paradox of art comes to fruition in the idea that spontaneous 
reactions are genuine, equated with the true. However, undeviating self- 
reflection shows us that, even in childhood, the impulses reflected upon are 
not quite "genuine" and always contain an element of wilful imitation, play, 
or of wanting to be different. Art's own comportment and formal language 
reacts spontaneously to the objective situation thereby making itself equal to 
high industrialism the extant force and relations of production. Modern art 
is critical where the most progressive and differentiated technical procedures 
are saturated with concomitant social experiences.507
According to Adorno, the here and now of spontaneous experience has 
long since been stripped of its power by corporate interests and for that 
reason spontaneity as the development of an ever diminishing number of 
technical faculties is to be mistrusted. The conception of an ultimate and 
absolute substantiality of the individual spontaneous self fell victim to an 
illusion of authenticity: one which protects the established order.508 An 
example of this can be seen in Kant's deteriorating declamations on morality
506 "Individuality not the Ultimate Either," Negative Dialectics, pp. 161-162.
507 Cf. "Modern Art and Industrial Production," Aesthetic Theory, p. 33.
508 cf "Coy Assay," Minima Moralia, pp. 152-153
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and the freedom of the will. Kant contrasted the idea of freedom with the 
object of research of the individual sciences, particularly psychology. By 
banishing the latter's object of research to the realm of unfreedom Kant 
manages to assigns the positive sciences a place below speculation.509
This antithesis has been exacerbated to the extreme. 'The sciences 
paid the price in narrow mindedness, and philosophy in noncommittal 
vacuity.' 510 Protocol statements, data collection, the solidified reactive 
modes and individual reactions of the behaviourist's canon are an ideology 
that relieves consciousness of what runs counter to its outward situation. 'No 
note is taken of the fact that what has been solidified brings forth new 
qualities, qualities distinct from the reflexes from which it may have 
arisen.' 511 The quantifying method, whose primacy acquiesces in so-called 
preliminary questions and reflections on instrumentation and what might be 
cognoscible, secures itself as a basic science and retains the conception that 
whatever is can be reduced to the general constitution of knowledge. This 
reflection leaves knowledge indifferent, its substance untouched.512 'The 
equality of their quantifying method leaves no room for the evolving 
otherness than does the spell of fate.' 513 In such a climate, talk of free will or 
freedom would be concept fetishism.
According to Adorno, the integration of society is the cause of the 
indifference to talk of freedom as well as the thing itself. To speak of
509 "A Split in the Concern with Freedom," Negative Dialectics, p. 214.
510 Ibid.
511 "Freedom, Determinism, Identity," Negative Dialectics, p. 216.
512 Cf. "The Disappointed Need," Negative Theory, p. 72. 'The first formula to express this 
was Kant's famous line that the "transcendental Idealist" is an "empirical realist.' Cf. 
"Paralogisms of Pure Reason (A)," Critique of Pure Reason, p. 347. 'The transcendental 
idealist is, therefore, an empirical realist, and allows to matter, as appearance, a reality 
which does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately perceived.'
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freedom, especially where it lends itself a bombastic tone causes alarm in 
the subject. It raises the fear that freedom would leave the subject 
unprotected and paralyse the interests already provided for, interests to 
which they have become accustomed.514
Obj edification of the dialectic of human reflexes with regards to 
character and will, a process which entails being for reflex or against reflex 
according to context, embodies the principle of dominion: the identity of self 
and its alienation.
'Identity, the condition of freedom, is immediately and simultaneously 
the principle of determinism. There is a will insofar as a man 
objectified himself into a character. Towards himself whatever that 
may be he thus becomes something external, after the model of the 
outward world of things that is subjected to causality.' 515
The positivistic concept of "reaction" presupposes a passive dependence on 
each situation. Descriptive in intent the ideology of adjustment denies the 
interaction of subject and object thereby excluding by its method what fails 
to follow the world's course. The dogma of rationalism requires an external 
authority such as the authority of an impersonal objective reason. To qualify 
as a rational being one is thereafter supposed to dutifully acquiesce with its 
laws or rules. The doctrine of equivalence of action and reaction asserts the 
principle of immanence: the explanation of every event as repetition.
According to Adorno, the concepts of subject and object, or rather 
what they refer to, by resisting all definitions have a certain priority if not a 
little vagueness. The separation of subject and object is both real and 
semblance. It is real in the sense that in the realm of cognition the separation
513 "Freedom, Determinism, Identity," Negative Dialectics, p. 216.
514 Cf. Ibid.
515 "Freedom, Determinism, Identity," Negative Dialectics, p. 217.
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gives expression to the rivenness of the human condition semblance where 
the separation, the result of coercive historical processes, is hypostatized into 
an invariant.
Separation without mediation becomes ideology. 'Semblance is the 
magical transformation of the subject into the ground of its own 
determination, its positing as true being.' 516 Where the subject claims 
independence it forgets how much it is object itself. Under the levelling 
domination of abstraction subject and object posit the principal of 
immanence. 'Representation is exchanged for the fungible universal 
interchangeability.' 517 Subjectively, by way of rigidly applied categories, 
description captures something objective, truncating what the thing might be 
in itself for the sake of conceptual manageability.
The separation of subject and object, the alienation that is imparted to 
epistemology is also divulged in the dialectic of forces and reciprocal 
relations of will and consciousness. Where will takes a consciousness and 
correlatively consciousness takes a will there is an eventuality that 
transcends and calls for more than conditioned reflexes. Self-preservation in 
preparing for what it will eventually transcend emulates the biological 
individual's prescription of the form of the reflex. 'The strengthening 
moment is the self of self-preservation; it is to this that freedom opens as the 
difference that has evolved between the self and the reflexes.' 518
As participation in the social bustle, spontaneous expression infers an
516 "On Subject and Object," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 251.
517 "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 10.
518 "On Subject and Object," Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, p. 251.
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ability to yield to the superior power of the existent.519 It is the tacit 
acceptance of the given or preformed: the power that happens to be 
recognized at the moment.
'How lovely!' becomes an excuse for an existence outrageously 
unlovely, and there is to be no beauty or consolation except the gaze 
falling on horror, withstanding it, and in unalleviated consciousness of 
negativity holding fast to the possibility of what is better.''520
Unreflective thought, the pre-determined non-thought of the received idea 
travels the line of least resistance. Spontaneity is reduced to replaceable, 
exchangeable dispositions which precisely annul thought of its necessity. 
The cultural bustle which endangers concentration with its myriad claims on 
our attention, coupled with categorical demands and the pressures of 
conformity, diminish the demands that individuals make on themselves. 
Relevance is now determined by organizational considerations, topicality by 
the prevailing objective tendency. The effort required to produce something 
worthwhile is now so great it is hardly worth the bother. 521 Much easier to 
"be in the swim", "to go with the flow."
'Thinking subjectivity, however, is precisely what cannot be fitted into 
a set of tasks imposed heteronomously from above: it is adequate to 
them only in the sense that it is no part of them, so that its existence is 
a pre-condition of any objectively binding truth/'522
The dominant are both adaptive and compliant and affirm in their 
coarseness, insensitivity and violence the pre-condition of all power:
519 Cf. "Aldous Huxley and Utopia," Prisms, p. 102. 'Mind, the spontaneous and 
autonomous synthesis achieved by consciousness, is possible only to the extent to which it 
is confronted by a sphere outside its grasp, something not categorically predetermined 
'nature'.
520 "How nice of you, Doctor," Minima Moralia, p. 25. Cf. The Jargon of Authenticity, p. 
20 'A landscape becomes uglier when an admirer disrupts it with the words "how 
beautiful." The same happens to customs, habits, institutions which barter themselves away 
by stressing their own naivete instead of by changing it.'
521 "If knaves should tempt you," Minima Moralia, p. 29.
522 "Great and Small," Minima Moralia, p. 126.
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Oppression. Domination finds its root in the oppressed. Oppression is the 
recognition of an existent power to which the domineering adapts. 523 This is 
a fatality which resistance has to clarify.
The principle of dominion which antagonistically rends human society 
is as coercion the general element of un-freedom whereby society prolongs 
its existence. Coercion is inherent in all philosophy, even that which intends 
freedom. It is manifest in the difference between philosophical conception 
and performance, the accounting of its method and its execution.
Immanent to our thinking the coercive character is the medium of 
deliverance of critical knowledge. As freedom to the object has yet to be 
achieved the divergence between dialectic as a method and substantial 
dialectics continues. As the method can only be legitimised in execution this 
situation would end in the performance rather than in the accounting of the 
philosophical ideal: substantive dialectics. But in reality the execution the 
act, would deny the method, by showing the insufficiency of that method. 
This cannot be rectified by a surplus of method.
The remnant left after the divergence of conception and execution 
denotes some excess or nonidentity that allows for the fact that the method 
fails to quite absorb the contents. This necessarily gives precedence to the 
matter. To be in or part of the matter and not always beyond it means to 
penetrate the immanent content of the matter.
The reason why to talk of freedom seems obsolete and unrealisable is 
that it is conceived in just such an abstract and subjective manner. In such a 
form it is easily overcome by objective and integrative social trends.
523 Cf. "How nice of you, Doctor," Minima Moralia, p. 26.
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Where interests are being provided for, subjects find what happens to 
them to be irresistible. 524
'Pleasure always means not to think about anything, to forget 
suffering even where it is shown. Basically it is helpless. It is flight; 
not, as is asserted, flight from a wretched reality, but from the last 
remaining thought of resistance. The liberation which amusement 
promises is freedom from thought and from negation.' 525
The little pleasures of life, those seemingly innocuous expressions that 
exempt themselves from thought have a callous silliness about them, a 
defiant disregard that serves their diametrical opposite. Every spontaneous 
expression, every casual and amiable remark contributes to the silencing of 
the negativity of life. Rubbing along in the spirit of a warmed up 
egalitarianism is condescending, an insulation from the totality of social 
processes. An unalleviated consciousness of negativity means holding fast to 
the possibility of what is better. 'It is the sufferings of men that should be 
shared: the smallest step towards their pleasures is one towards the 
hardening of their pains.' 526
The various elements or factors that make up society gather around 
themselves a plurality of theories, with concomitant theorists, each with their 
own particular take on the complex relations that exist between the 
universalistic society and particular individuals. However, at the back of the 
relation there remains an ever present dark foreboding, an event horizon in 
memory, where the restless spirit progresses around a point of pain. 
According to Nietzsche,
'When man decided he had to make a memory for himself, it never
524 cf "Freedom, Determinism, Identity," Negative Dialectics, p. 216.
525 «jke cuiture Industry: Enlightenment and Mass Deception," Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, p. 144.
526 «jjow nice of you, Doctor," Minima Moralia, p. 26.
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happened without blood, torments and sacrifices: the most horrifying 
sacrifices and forfeits (the sacrifice of the first born belongs here), the 
most disgusting mutilations (for example, castration), the cruellest 
rituals of all religious cults (and all religions are, at their most 
fundamental, systems of cruelty) - all this has its origin in that 
particular instinct which discovered that pain was the most powerful 
aid to mnemonics.' 527
hi order to aid the survival of the good and impose discipline terror is 
installed as a threat, which as a pledge and the promise of a specific 
undertaking is the dark basis of all dominion.
Rationality as a means of domination does not mean that reason is 
dominating what people do. Rationality that compels obedience fulfils and 
preserves the interests of those authorities controlling the media of 
domination, the enabling tools and means of expression.528 Authorities have 
the capacity to inspire fear because they have the power to annul 
consciousness. In English the root of the word, authority, is, Author, the 
connotation is that authority involves something productive. Assurance, 
superior judgement, the ability to impose discipline, inspire fear, awe, 
embarrassment, etc,; these are characteristics of authority which, generally, 
is an attempt to control the frames of reference that give meaning to life.529 
Experiences are meaningful where they are grasped reflectively. Meaning
527 F. Nietzsche, "Second Essay: 'Guilt', 'Bad Conscience' and Related Matters," On the 
Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe, Ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, (The United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 41.
528 Cf. K. Marx & F. Engels. The German Ideology, Ed. C.J. Arthur (London: Lawrence & 
Wisehart, 1985) p. 64. 'The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. 
the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has 
control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally 
speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.'
529 Cf. R. Sennett, Authority, (London: Martin Seeker and Warburg Limited, 1980) pp. 16- 
27. Cf. "Novissimum organum. " Minima Moralia. pp. 228-229. 'As a general principle the 
individual is not merely the biological basis, but the reflection of the social process; his 
consciousness of himself as in-itself is the illusion needed to raise his level of performance, 
whereas in fact the individuated function in the modern economy as mere agents of the law 
of value.'
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emerges from the way the subject regards its experience. What is valued in 
experience is determined by authority, by production, authorship, a relation 
and a process from which dialectics is not excluded.
According to Adorno, dialectics interprets every image as text. In this 
process, of determinate negation, the image is deprived of its power and 
appropriated for truth.530 Subjective experience contributes images that are 
collective and therefore are not images of something they are rather the 
experiential content [Erfahrungsgehalt] that constitutes every language. The 
eloquence of language, its collective substance, originates in this image 
character. It is by virtue of this experiential content, not in the objective 
forming and fixation that artworks diverge from empirical reality. Artworks 
are empiria through empirical deformation531
Images are material, we work with them, ensnare them. They are 
something that confronts us and the memories of that which we were 
previously confronted with. Images that have come to belong to the 
motivational set of a rationalized reason are thoroughly mediated a 
complex process involving education, training, experience, imagination, 
reflection. Collective identification characterized as false-consciousness 
belongs to those individuals who, immersed or immured in the images they 
equate with their own self-image, believe them to be at one with the whole 
as a result of direct cognition. Within false consciousness the actual social 
situation the level and degree of conscious mediation is hidden from the
individual.
'The more the whole divest itself of all spontaneous elements, is
530 Cf. "The Concept of Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 24.
531 Cf. "Image Content is Collective," Aesthetic Theory, p. 86.
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socially mediated and filtered, is 'consciousness', the more it becomes 
'culture'. In addition to being the means of subsistence, the material 
process of production finally unveils itself as that which it always was, 
from its origins in the exchange-relationship as the false consciousness 
which the two contracting parties have of each other: ideology. 
Inversely, however, consciousness becomes at the same time 
increasingly a mere transitional moment in the functioning of the 
whole. Today, ideology means society as appearance. Although 
mediated by the totality behind which stands the rule of partiality, 
ideology is not simply reducible to a partial interest. It is, as it were, 
equally near the centre in all its pieces.' 532
'Conflict concentrates past and future in the present' real 
desperation expresses itself in silence, mute witness to the fact that there is 
nothing more to be recounted, that all we can do is recognize the horror for 
what it is. 5 For mass culture conflict is paradoxical. On the one hand it 
cannot tolerate conflict, it disrupts the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
system, on the other, a degree of conflict because of the various ways it 
collapses time into the present can facilitate the smooth running of the 
system's control mechanisms. Condemned but immovable the invariant 
frames of reference 'are made in the image of an omnipresent terror, of the 
dizziness that overcomes a society threatened by total destruction.' 534 The 
more a-historical and preordained its procedures are the less temporal 
relations become a problem, they are simply excluded.
A degree of conflict helps bind more of the external temporal relation 
into a dialectical unity of temporal moments. In order to stop conflict from 
exploding the temporal continuum its relevance as an item of reality is 
determined by its relation to the latest imago to be distributed. Events are 
mediated through fragments of the existing into an apparition which
532 "Cultural Criticism and Society," Prisms, pp. 31-32.
533 Cf. "The Schema of Mass Culture," The Culture Industry, p. 74.
534 "The Wrong Need," Negative Dialectics, p. 93.
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illuminates and touches.
'In art something momentary transcends; objectivation makes the 
artwork into an instant. [...] If, as images, artworks are the persistence 
of the transient, they are concentrated in appearance as something 
momentary. To experience art means to become conscious of its 
immanent process at a standstill [.. .].' 535
The aesthetic image is both the paradoxical the attempt to transfix this most 
fleeting instant and a protest against natures fear that it will dissipate into the 
chaotic. 536
The decisive aspects of reality elude representation through the 
aesthetic imago. This is because the way it maintains its monopolistic hold
CO'7
on culture forbids anything that cannot be grasped immediately. This is 
the source of the glaring contradiction between the culture industries 
elegant, technical and modish presentation on the one hand, and the 
culturally derived and decayed content on the other. The reality of the 
appearing historical content renews the sense antagonism at the aesthetic 
levels for the fixed and unreal imago.
The aesthetic image escapes the mythical by subordinating itself to its 
own unreality. This is the meaning of its law of form. Artworks distance 
themselves from the empirical by becoming appearance and by becoming 
more than they are. This more is the sense of spirit pertaining to artworks538 
and objects in general.
'What is, is more than it is. This "more" is not imposed upon it but 
remains immanent to it, as that which has been pushed out of it. In this 
sense, the non-identical would be the thing's own identity against its 
identifications. The innermost core of the object proves to be 
simultaneously extraneous to it, the phenomena of its seclusion, the
535 "Image Character," Aesthetic Theory, p. 84.
536 "Mimesis of the Fatal and Reconciliation," Aesthetic Theory, p. 134.
537 Cf. "The Schema of Mass Culture," The Culture Industry, pp. 61-97.
538 Cf. "Art as Spiritual," Aesthetic Theory, p. 86.
203
Mark Walker: 
reflex of an identifying stabilizing procedure.' 539
In the artwork the individual is linked to otherness and linked to others 
through the identifying principle of the subject which, according to Adorno, 
is itself the internalized principle of society. 540
Through aspects of its idea incarnate in individuals the concept of 
Enlightenment is an expression of movement within society as a whole. The 
technical apparatus and social groups which administer its dominant 
conventions brook no negative treatment from the spirit which is therefore 
increasingly made taboo. In modern life the fallen spirit and social progress 
go hand in hand. This is reflected in the way the individual is devalued in 
relation to the economic powers. For Adorno, the important issue is 
prescience not that of culture as value. 'The point is rather that the 
Enlightenment must examine itself, if men are not to be wholly betrayed. 
The task to be accomplished is not the conservation of the past, but the 
redemption of the hopes of the past.' 541 The true concern of the spirit is the 
negation of reification something it fails to engage in where it is fixed as 
cultural commodity.
From the standpoint of the developed exchange society the 
individual has the one choice, deceit or failure deception is the mark of the 
ratio which betrays its particularity and the possibility of failure allows for 
the postulate of a moral excuse for profit. Deception is a mode of exchange 
where everything proceeds as it should, contracts are fulfilled and yet the 
other party is deceived, hi this sense, radical socialization means radical
539 "Individuality not the Ultimate Either," Negative Dialectics, p. 161.
540 ££ "objectivity in the Antinomy," Negative Dialectics p. 241.
541 "Introduction," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. xv.
alienation.542
For the sake of universal equivalence and comparability, the formal 
techniques and procedural structures of economics and culture are the import 
that ties the subject to the principle of being-for-something-else, of being 
merchandise. 543 For Adorno it is art that suggests that not everything in the 
world is exchangeable. Playing over into the ideological art is the image of 
what is beyond exchange. Art speaks for what cannot be exchanged through 
its form: it brings the exchangeable to critical consciousness. The telos of 
artworks is a language not imprisoned in a pre-established universality.
Formal and abstract, the synthesis of equivalence and the unification 
of the multiplicitous damage's both what is synthesized and the synthesis 
itself. Articulation, identification, always coincides with a certain defeat of 
form which extends to the needs, both spiritual and material, that the 
articulated is designated to express.
No less subject to criticism than the ontological and material drafts 
which enunciate them, needs are subject to social processes and the vagaries 
of supply and demand. On the one hand, needs being real and not invariable 
do not guarantee satisfaction, on the other, their ideological form, limited 
and heteronomous, advances the illusion that they should be met even in 
their semblance. However, this does not allow us to criticize them out of
existence.
'For in the needs of even the people who are covered, who are 
administered, there reacts something in regard to which they are not 
fully covered a surplus of their subjective share, which the system 
has not wholly mastered. Material needs should be respected even in
542 Cf. "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment," Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 60-62.
543 cf "Weaves,; ancj Support" Negative Dialectics, p. 94.
544 cf ^g N0nexistent," Aesthetic Theory, p. 83.
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their wrong form, the form caused by overproduction. The ontological 
need too has its real moment in a state in which men can neither 
recognize nor admit the rationality, the sense of necessity that rules 
their conduct.' 545
The faulty consciousness whose inverted needs aim at things not needed by 
the subject believes in the attainability of the unobtainable. The faulty 
consciousness is misdirected in its aims and needs. Blocked by extant 
society consciousness falls back on hopeless and impossible longing which 
thwarts fulfilment, making the subject believe it should pursue in the name 
of desperate self-preservation the unattainable and unnecessary, a trend 
irresistible to philosophies that are both desperate and self-preserving.
A thought without a need that wished for nothing would be nothing. 
However needs in their subjective form present us with a confusing mix of 
truth and falsehood. Needs as primitive wish fulfilment, substitute 
satisfaction, and cultural delusion, the result of treating the mind as a 
dumping ground, rub up against what is true the thought that wants the
right thing.
'If there is any truth to the doctrine that human needs cannot be told 
by a state of nature, only by the so-called cultural standard, the 
condition of social production along with their bad irrationality are 
also part of the standard. Its irrationality must be ruthlessly criticized 
against the needs of the mind, the substitute for all that has been 
withheld.' 546
Despite the fact that institutions are more powerful than ever forming the 
world after the style of the culture industry, in the lament that the world has 
become formless and in the call for a binding order, there is a more specific 
need for a structure of invariants. 5
545 "The Wrong Need," Negative Dialectics, p. 92.
546 Ibid.
547 cf "Weakness and Support" Negative Dialectics, p. 94.
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Prior to judgement and understanding there is in a sense a choice 
between heteronymous objectifying elements, the intelligibility of the matter 
which the subjective judgement discovers there and makes manifest. The 
objective emphasis is a reflexive response, a specification. Critical argument 
is specifically the exchange of alternative specifications. At its most serious 
level the argument is an analysis of how the really basic conditions of life, 
those pertaining to physical existence and survival, are perceived, selected, 
interpreted. 548 
Although blocked by the present form of society and so no more than 
a helpless longing, the cultural conservative and self-preserving stylists are 
desperate not to be buried by historical dynamics they feel helpless against. 
"Everybody must behave (as if spontaneously) in accordance with his 
previously determined and indexed level, and choose the categories of mass 
product turned out for his type. ,549 The need for something solid inspires the 
ontology's-it is what they adjust to. According to Adorno: 
"The subjective consciousness of men is socially too enfeebled to 
burst the invariants it is imprisoned in. Instead, it adapts itself to them 
while mourning their absence. The reified consciousness is a moment 
in the totality of the reified world. The ontological need is the 
metaphysics of that consciousness even when its doctrinal content 
leads it to exploit the critique of reification that has nowadays become 
so cheap. The form of invariance as such is the projection of what has 
congealed in the reified consciousness. Incapable of experiencing 
things not already contained in the repertory of eversameness, that 
consciousness recoins immutability into the idea of something 
eternal--()f transcendence. ' 550 
548 Cf. Raymond Williams, "Problems of Materialism," Culture and Materialism. (United 
Kingdom: Verso, 2005), pp. 108-\09. 'To re-emphasize, as a fundamental materialism, the 
inherent physical conditions-a specific universe, a specific planet, a specific evolution, 
specific physical lives-from which all labour and all consciousness must take as their 
origins, is right and necessary.' 
549 Cf "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. p. 123. 
550 "Weakness and Support," Negative Dialectics. p. 95. 
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The consciousness that feels impotent, that has no confidence in its ability to 
change institutions or stop obeying formal categories will reverse the 
conflict and identify with the aggressor. The identification with an external 
and heteronomous ideal is a failure of emancipation, a retreat into the 
familiae a loss of philosophical nerve. Modem art by merely existing and by 
reminding us of lost chances reveals the dubiousness of the heteronomous 
structural ideal.551 
For Hegel society is constituted out of the innumerable spontaneous 
acts made by individuals who count and depend on each other for self-
preservation. According to Hegel: 
. In civil society each member is his own end, everything else is 
nothing to him. But except in contact with others he cannot attain the 
whole compass of his ends, and therefore these others are means to the 
end of the particular member. A particular end, however, assumes the 
form of universality through this relation to other people, and it IS 
attained in the simultaneous attainment of the welfare of others.'552 
As objects of political power people surrender their spontaneity to events. 
Events do not show in any context other than the conceptual. They are the 
historical trend that shatters the continuity---events are things that happen to 
people, things that they did not bring about themselves. 'Events are the 
private affair of the oligarchs and their assassins; they do not arise from the 
dynamic of society but rather subordinate society to an administration 
551 Cf. Ibid. Cf. "Spirit as Social Totality," Negative Dialectics, p. 315. 'The universal by 
which every individual is detennined at all, as one of his particular kind, that universal is 
borrowed from what is extraneous [its application] and therefore as heteronomous to the 
individual as anything once said to have been ordained for him by demons.' cr. Robert 
Hullot-Kentor, ""I still hear ... " and the Question of Music Appreciation," Things Beyond 
Resemblance, (United States of America: Columbia University Press), p. 49. 'For musical 
memory, as among the mind's pre-eminent powers of sensory reproduction, is involuntary 
in the highest degree. Its obliging dictum, fluently engaging rhythmically nodding head and 
gesturing limb, is the simplest: the more any music is heard, the more there is a need to hear 
it again whether from a loud speaker or left hemisphere.' 
552 "Additions," Philosophy of Right, p. 267. 
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intensified to the point of annihilation. ,553 
For whatever reason or pretext, i.e. self-preservation; irrational states 
of dominion, more and more individuals are caught up in the tightly woven 
web of integration. The differentiation that accompanies integration is lost as 
individuals are, on pain of destruction and against their own better 
judgement, absorbed into its legality. Coercion acquires an exalted meaning 
through ideologies that claim for the idea its being-in-itself. The principle of 
unreflected self-preservation, the bad universal hypostatised in the 
individuaL is taken over by society as a social mechanism.554 The individual 
returns as a microcosmic copy of that mechanism. This sanctioning of an 
internalised and hardened super-ego has as its reflex response the call for 
freedom and with that its counterpart in repression. 'How much aggression 
is so far inherent in freedom can be seen whenever, in the midst of general 
unfreedom men act as if they were free.'555 For theory to rise above the 
antagonisms of the existent, the society that exists and the individual that 
exists, the subject as the I would have to be reconciled with the non_I.. 556 
Subjective reason is expected to see reason against itself.557 
The failure to make good on the claim that the non-I is finally the I is 
owed to ideology-its complicity with identifying thought that presents the 
thing, and what has happened to it as its "in-itself." Identity becomes the 
553 "Spengler after the Decline," Prisms, p. 59. 
554 Cf. "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality:' Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 87. 
'Individuals, who have to look after themselves, develop the ego as the instance of the 
reflective preliminary and general view; it is extended and contracted as the prospects of 
economic self-sufficiency and productive ownership extend and contract from generation to 
generation. Finally it passes from the dispossessed bourgeois to the totalitarian cartel-lords, 
whose science has become the inclusive concept of the methods of reproduction of the 
subjugated mass society.' 
555 "Universal and Individual in the Philosophy of Morals," Negative Dialectics. p. 283. 
556 Cf. Ibid. 
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doctrine for a doctrine of adjustment whereby the more the I thinks, the 
more it becomes debased into an object that repays the subject for what the 
subject has done to it.
The non-identical element in any identifying judgement is clearly 
intelligible in that individuality is "not yet". The un-established is the 
contradiction between particular and universal. 'The potential for freedom 
calls for criticizing what an inevitable formalization has made of the 
potential.' 558
According to Adorno, difficulties within the social situation requires 
the means for explicating social phenomena to be inherent to the technical 
apparatus of an economy previously determined or indexed. Without 
theoretical ambiguity, a trace in the living, literally this is ideology, socially 
a necessary illusion. 'To preserve itself, to remain the same, to "be," that 
society too must constantly expand, progress, advance its frontiers, not 
respect any limit, not remain the same.' 559 Identity needs the non-identical 
as much as the universal requires its particular difference.
Installing the particular as simply extant would hide how much the 
particular has come to be a function of the universal: a complementary 
ideology. The universal appears in differing aspects according to partiality 
and context. The traditional idea of the universal is arrived at by abstracting 
from particular properties in order to align the more common and general 
instances of a given type or thing. In such a process we can still see the 
universal as being-in-itself. That's to say the universal exists as an idea
557 Cf. "On the Dialectics of Identity," Negative Dialectics, p. 148.
558 "Cogitative Self-reflection," Negative Dialectics, p. 151.
559 "The Antinomical Character of Systems," Negative Dialectics, p. 26.
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without the necessity of any inner relation to the particular features of the its 
instances. Conversely, we can view the universal as instantiated by its 
particulars in the same way as particular thoughts become the embodiment 
of the concrete universal by being expressed, or the way individuals through 
spontaneous acts become universal society. The I therefore can be seen as an 
abstract universal relative to the changing content of the mind or as the 
concrete universal the experiential embodiment of the concept which 
reaches out to touch all of reality. 560
Society tolerates the particular only as a category, as a form of the 
supremacy of the universal. 'A true preponderance of the particular would 
not be attainable except by changing the universal.' 561 Universality is a 
criterion of correctness in the handling of objects it is not a criteria of their 
truth. Without the pluralism of individual spontaneities, without 
conceptualization as the consciousness of an act of combining and grasping, 
universality would not have come into being.
The self-preserving interest of individuals is transferred to the species. 
The logic behind this reproduces a historical concern: without the transfer of 
the self-preserving interest to the species, and everything that entails, 
individuals could not preserve themselves in more complex or strained 
social realities.
'There are innumerable times when unavoidable motives of self 
preservation force people, even conscious people capable of criticizing 
the whole, to do things and to take attitudes which blindly help 
maintain the universal even though their consciousness is opposed to 
it. It is only because, to survive, they have to make an alien cause their 
own that there arises that appearance of reconcilement/ ""?562
560 Cf. C. Taylor. Hegel, "Self-positing Spirit," p. 112.
561 "Dynamics of Universal and Particular," Negative Dialectics, p. 313.
562 "Law and Equity," Negative Dialectics, p. 311.
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What seems paradoxical because of its universal mediation but nevertheless 
demands to be paired with the above reflection is Hegel's doctrine of a 
universally self-restored immediacy. 'Compared with epistemological 
reflection on the universal in individual consciousness, that consciousness is 
right in its refusal to be consoled about evil, sin, and death by references to 
the universal.' 563
The concept of society resists definition because what it refers to 
cannot be wholly known in advance. At one level society is non-identical, 
compulsive, and incomprehensible. On the other hand society, its institutions 
and processes, are made comprehensible through the self-understanding of 
the individuals who partake in them. The commitment to a linguistic 
community as the source for a reinvigoration of communal life is the 
overarching disposition of modern social formations orientated towards 
technologically rationalized categorical frameworks. From this viewpoint 
what is significant and worthy is the intelligible exemplified by the way 
language resonates within us.
'Nowadays this sort of fetishism takes the most drastic forms. 
Thoughts have to be answered for as though they were deeds. Not just 
the word as authority's target but the tentative, experimenting word, 
testing the possibility of error, is for this reason regarded as 
intolerable.' 565
The intolerance to ambiguity in authoritarian thinking makes the un-
563 "Dynamics of Universal and Particular," Negative Dialectics, p. 313.
564 Cf. "Authors Note," The Jargon of Authenticity, p. xix. 'Ideology has shifted into 
language. Social and anthropological changes have brought about this shift, though without 
breaking the veil. The fact that language is actually ideology, i.e., societal necessary Schein, 
"appearance," can be shown from within it. [...] Language gives itself over either to the 
market, to balderdash, or to the predominating vulgarity. On the other hand language shoves 
its way towards the judge's bench, envelops itself in judicial garb, and in this way asserts its
privilege.'
565 "Notes and Drafts," Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 244.
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regimented thought an anathema, something dirty, defiled, and impure. 
According to Adorno, the psychologically insular, inhibited, conventional, 
and in response to threatened narcissism, aggressive reactionary individuals, 
exhibit defence mechanisms through which a weakly developed ego, 
repudiates that which disturbs its restricted functional capacity. In the 
rebellion against semblance and expression lie the roots of the resentment 
against modernism.
'This psychological posture is that of an 
an impatience with what is ambivalent and not strictly definable; 
ultimately, it is the refusal of what is open, of what has not been 
predetermined by any jurisdiction, ultimately of experience itself. 
Immediately back of the mimetic taboo stands a sexual one: Nothing 
should be moist; art becomes hygienic.' 566
Objectivity has come to mean consensus; the non-controversial aspect 
of things; the unquestioned impression; majority thinking. The objective 
fa9ade is made up of reified subjective impressions. Breaking through the 
objective shield the subjective favours relatedness rather than consensus. 
The claim that that something is too subjective flares only briefly as an 
objective criterion. For the subjective engages with the specific experiences 
of the matter. The formal objection to subjective relativity is vacuous when 
one considers that the particular area of concern for subjective relativity is 
that of aesthetic judgement.567 Subjecting oneself to the artworks immanent 
law of form, the compulsion of the structure has an incomparably greater 
force than any objective analysis. 5568
566
567
"Dialectic of Inwardness; Aporias of Expression," pp. 115-116. 
-"' Cf. "Unfair Intimidation," pp. 69-70. 
ses cf "choice of Thematic Material; Artistic Subject; Relation to Science," 
p. 230. 'On the thematic level, in the language of indictment, no boundary can be 
drawn between aggressiveness and conformism. [...] Real denunciation is probably only 
capacity of form, which is overlooked by a social element that believes hi themes. What i 
socially decisive in artworks is the content that becomes eloquent through the
a 
is
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For Adorno 'History is the content of artworks. To analyse an artwork 
means to become conscious of the history immanently sedimented within 
it.' 569 The artworks own development, its inner tune and monadological 
nucleus mediated problematically to real history and historicism as 
appearance, explodes the continuity of its own inner temporality. This 
discharge is the result of the artworks inwardly antagonistic forces and the 
impossibility of bringing these forces, like those of knowledge, to any 
equilibrium in the unreconciled world. '[T]he conflict between semblance  
form in the broadest sense and expression remain unresolved and 
fluctuates historically.
The artwork's thematic content and substantive subject matter, the 
material, technique, situation, etc, is embodied, infused with an import 
which although nonconceptual is, as a play of forces, the semblance of 
meaning in the artwork. This being syntactically articulated and organised 
becomes the artwork's intention. '[A]esthetic form is the objective 
organization within each artwork of what appears as bindingly eloquent. 
The instant in which these forces become image, the instant in which what is 
interior becomes exterior, the which makes them an image makes 
them shine at the same time destroy them as image. The path to 
objectivation destroys the auratic image.
'As a result of its determination as appearance, art bears its own 
negation embedded in itself as its own telos; the sudden unfolding of 
appearance disclaims aesthetic semblance. Appearance, however and 
its explosion is essentially historical."""
'571
'572
work's formal structures.'
569 "Explosion," p. 85.
570 "Expression and Dissonance," p. 110.
571 "Form and Content," p. 143.
572 "Explosion," p. 85.
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Both static and dynamic, the is as much the trajectory the artwork 
traverses as it is the goal. The specific artistic achievement takes place 
through immersion in experiences that are fundamental to this overarching 
binding of the artwork.
It is not through the use of thematic material or the manipulation of 
effects that takes the artwork beyond the monad. To arrive at aesthetic 
realism from the premise of philosophical materialism is false, unreal. Art as 
a form of knowledge implies knowledge of reality and reality is always 
social. In truth art transcends the knowledge of reality as what exists. But 
this mediated truth content and social content becomes social knowledge 
where art is grasped in its essence, in the immediacy and ferment of 
experience, the point where mimetic impulses are driven to the point of self- 
consciousness, not in theories or endless reflection. The figuration of art 
brings its essence into appearance in opposition to its semblance.
In art primacy is given to the object in a way that makes it entirely 
distinct from empirical reality. As a characteristic of art, aesthetics can only 
affirm the primacy of the object through the unconscious writing of history, 
through the way it forgets the vanquished, repressed, a forgetting that goes 
as far as to exclude possibility: the forgetting of what is possible. In art the 
principle that gives primacy to the object has a potential that enables the 
artwork to free itself from objects and the domination of what is.
The discipline and lawfulness exerted by an artwork enables it to 
forfeit the crude authoritarian character of human relations.
'Immersion in the individual work, which is contrary to genres, leads 
to an awareness of that work's immanent lawfulness. The works
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become monads and are thus withdrawn from any disciplinary effect 
they could exercise externally/
Through the immanent and primary play of forces the artwork converges 
with external reality. Where secondary sensuous pleasing gives access to the 
alluring sensuousness of pain by transfiguring into its antithesis, the 
importance of dissonance, the seal of everything modern, is revealed as an 
archetype of ambivalence.
Dissonance elicits from within the work social alienation. 'Its power 
over the subject intensifies in parallel with the increasing autonomy of the 
work.' 574 Dissonance congeals into indifferent material, a new form of 
immediacy. Without the memory trace of its own development and what it 
developed out of it becomes anonymous. Without its place in society the 
artwork fragments into on the one hand a reified cultural possession and on 
the other a subjective source of pleasure that has little to do with the 
object. 575 'Subjective pleasure in the artwork would approximate a state of
release from the empirical as from the totality of the heteronomous.' The 
happiness gained through art's escapism is accidental and less essential than 
the happiness in its knowledge. '[T]he concept of aesthetic pleasure as
^77
constitutive of art is to be superseded.' The accidental and psychological 
projection of feeling related to the aesthetic object makes way before the
573 "On Antiquity's Genre-Aesthetics," p. 202.
574 "Aesthetic Hedonism and the Happiness of Knowledge," p. 15.
575 Cf. Theodor Adorno, "New and Old," trans. Willis 
Domingo, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), pp. 38-39. 'Dialectics is the quest to see the new in 
the old instead of just the old in the new. As it mediates the new, so it preserves the old as 
the mediated. If it were to proceed according to the schema of sheer flow and indiscriminate 
vitality then it would degrade itself to a replica of the amorphous structure 
of nature, which it should not sanction through mimicry, but surpass through cognition. 
Dialectic gives its own to the old as reified and consolidated, which dialectic can move only 
by releasing the force of its own weight. Dialectic itself reaches the insight that the closed 
process also includes the non-included. It thus reaches a boundary to knowledge itself.'
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artworks demand that knowledge does it justice. 'The work wants its truth 
and untruth to be grasped. [...] Happiness in artworks would be the feeling 
they instil of standing firm. This holds true for the aesthetic sphere as a 
whole more than for any particular work.' 578
The primacy of the object in art is aesthetically confirmed in the 
character of art as the unconscious writing of history, in the displacing, 
dissolving, and reconstructing according to the works own law.579 Where art 
must grasp its thematic content in its other it does so from within it 
own immanent nexus. An event or situation is able to retroactively shape a 
preceding development by awesomely spiritualising its mimetic impulses 
whose elements are not juxtaposed but grind away at each other in the praxis 
of their form.580
The historicophilosophical significance of the emancipation of form is 
crucial in that the critical stance defines the alienated as such. By hardening 
themselves to alienation in the image, hermetic works refuse the conciliatory 
interests and intelligible criticisms of the culture industry. In the dialectics of 
form and content, content can all too easily degenerate to a positive given, a 
mould for reification. Axiomatic to the conception of art history and cultural 
history are transformations in the comportment of the aesthetic subject that 
are specific to aesthetic forms.
'Thus the more deeply the content is experienced and 
transformed unrecognizably into formal categories, the less the 
unsublimated materials are commensurable with the content 
of artworks. Everything appearing in the artwork is virtually content
576 "Aesthetic Hedonism and the Happiness of Knowledge," p. 15.
577 Ibid.
578 Ibid.
579 cf "primacy of the Object and Art," p. 258.
580 cf "primacy of the Object and Art," p. 259.
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as much as it is form, whereas form remains that by which the 
appearing determines itself and content remains what is self- determining.' 581
It is through the eloquence of the collective substance, the expression 
or gesture that arises out of the fissures and fragments that 
originate in the image, that art becomes its own character of eloquence 
Fundamentally distinct from language, the language of 
artworks, like every language, is constituted by the collective undercurrent 
of collective experiences and their objectivation: something that happens 
through the instantiation of their inner historicity and sedimented external 
history.583 The spirit of transcendence is manifest in artworks through their 
becoming appearance, something that cannot be fixated as to its immediate 
identity, and is akin to their determination as phenomena. That "which is" 
also the name of "that which is not."
Epistemology compels philosophy towards substantiveness, towards 
dealing with historical entities as it object. However, the concept of 
nonconceptuality cannot stay with its epistemological self or substance. 
'Nonconceptuality, inalienable from the concept, disavows the concept's 
being-in-itself. It changes the concept.' 584 Something immutable, identical 
with itself, would be blind to "matter" as well as to its own blindness. Art is 
the corrective for conceptual knowledge. It carries through what conceptual 
knowledge, because of its non-pictorial subject-object relation, cannot 
achieve and so longs for in vain.
According to Adorno, art in complete isolation and through a
CO 1
"Form and Content," p. 145. 
582 See footnote 7.
583 Cf. "Image Content is Collective," p. 86.
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subjective act unveils what is objective. Spirit does not simply animate the 
work as phenomena; it is as much the force or interior of the work, the force 
of their objectivation.
The impulses that are transposed into artworks by virtue of their 
integration remain the plenipotentiary in the aesthetic continuum of extra- 
aesthetic nature. The impulses are those of the subject, at the same time they 
are impersonal, nonidentical to the ego, simple participants in its integrative 
power. The subject is the instrument of expression. The expression of 
artworks is the nonsubjective in the subject; not so much the subjective 
expression as its copy.
'The spirit of artworks is their immanent mediation, which 
transforms their sensual moments and their objective 
arrangements; this is mediation in the strict sense that each and 
every element in the artwork becomes manifestly its own other. 
[...] The spirit of artworks is objective, regardless of any 
philosophy of objective or subjective spirit; this spirit is their own 
content and it passes judgement over them: It is the spirit of the 
thing itself that appears through the appearance. Its objectivity 
has its measure in the power with which it infiltrates the
. coc
appearance.
The modification of mimesis is the constitutive act of spiritualization in all 
artworks. It is only later that art develops this act, although it is already 
posited in the modification of mimesis through the work. The development 
does not occur through mimesis itself, the physiological from of spirit, but 
through imagination whose modification shares the guilt of the affirmative 
character of art. Shared guilt because imagination mollifies the pain, '[...] 
just as the spiritual totality in which this pain disappears makes it
584 "Compulsory Substantiveness," p. 137.
585 "Art as Spiritual," p. 87.
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c Qfi
controllable and leaves it untransformed.'
Despite superficial similarities what comports itself in art and what 
comports itself in the world are not reduced to the same. In the world what is 
seen as unidentical nature, or not literally nature, such as expression, is 
reduced to being material of the domination of nature, to a vehicle of social
domination. In the world unidentical nature is truly alienated. However,
' [expression, by which nature seeps most deeply into art, is at the 
same time what is not literally nature, a memento of what expression 
itself is not, of what could not have become concrete except through
c oo
the of that expression.'
The subject, the epitome of mediation, is the How demanded by any 
comprehensible idea of its concept. If the subject is not to be nothing, and 
according to Adorno no matter how we define the subject it contains an 
entity, then it needs to refer to something active. The "something" indicates 
an irreducible objective moment on which the subject depends.
Form is that in the artworks by which they become artworks. Form, by 
repudiating the view that artworks are immediately given, endeavours to 
banish from the artwork mere existence, whose heterogeneous shadow is 
melancholy. Comparable if not equivalent to mediation and objective 
reflection, form in artworks is the relation of parts to each other and to the 
whole, as well as the elaboration of details. Form seeks to bring the 
particular to speech through the whole and this is its melancholia. Form 
limits what is formed thus creating its specific difference. The artistic labour
586 "Expression as Eloquence," p. 113
587 Cf. "Subject and Object," p. 143. 'For society is immanent in 
experience [...]. Nothing but the social self-reflection of knowledge obtains for knowledge 
the objectivity that escapes it as long as it obeys the social coercion that holds sway in it, and 
does not become aware of them.'
588 "Domination and Conceptual Knowledge," p. 113.
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of forming, a process of selecting, trimming and renouncing, confirms this. 
If the artwork is so formed that it resembles language then after the manner 
of the dialectical image it is thus transform into the antithesis of form, the 
mimetic impulse.589 The rejection process is the way art becomes entangled 
in the guilt context of living. Art's Utopian moment, unlike its possibility, is 
disfigured through incision. As the reverse image of longing, melancholy 
anticipates the negation of meaning in the undermined.
'What radiates wordlessly from artworks is that thrown into relief 
by the unlocatable grammatical subject it cannot be 
referred demonstratively to anything in the world that previously
exists.' 590
In the Utopia of its form, art is disfigured by the weight of pluralism it 
engenders as soon as it enters the empirical domain and from which as art, it 
steps away. The antithesis to mere existence in the artworks is semblance in 
which meaning predominates. Yet this does not exhaust meaning in the 
artwork which also summons into appearance what appearance would 
otherwise obstruct: the essence that conceals itself in the factual. Art 
summons and indicts this appearance, negates it, even as it posits as its own 
measure an essence that is not present: possibility. In artworks even the 
disavowal of meaning is endowed with meaning. Yet because what is 
manifest in the artworks is bound up with semblance, even the most 
successful, complete artworks radiate sadness, the feeling of, '" Oh, were it 
only so.'" 591 Hence artworks demand of themselves an integration through 
which their content appears immediately present. In art unity, a coherence of 
meaning is contrived because it does not exist. As artificial meaning it
589 cf «porm and p. 144.
590 "Semblance, Meaning, and "tour de force"," p. 105.
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negates the being-in-itself, the potential for which the organization of 
meaning was undertaken. Every artefact works against itself. It is and it is 
not. Artworks are thus a balancing act that demonstrates something about art 
as a whole: They achieve the impossible. They contrive a unity that doesn't 
exist. The impossibility of every artwork in truth defines even the simplest 
as a stunning success.592
The philosophical investigation of music is concerned with the 
specific configurations in compositional procedures, the unprogrammatic 
concept inherent in the object. The reason for this is that the true nature of 
aesthetic form is revealed in the concrete crystallization of structure, in the 
music itself, not in discussions of style or generic categories, but in the 
extremes of form. In such extremes the essence of music can be defined. 
This alone permits the perception of it's concept of truth. 593 For Adorno, the 
composers Igor Stravinsky and Arnold Schoenberg are two innovators 
whose uncompromising consistency has driven forward to the point where 
the impulses present in their works have become legible as concepts: the 
object of investigation itself.594
'Precisely in its great and emphatic forms, music embodies complexes 
that can only be understood through what is sensuously not present, 
through memory or expectation, complexes that hold such categorical 
determinations embedded in their own structure.' 595
Music in this sense is autonomous rather than functional. As autonomous art 
it forms a separate world of its own an essence beyond appearance where 
the listener, immersed in the immanent logic and dynamic of the sound
591
592
593
594
"Semblance, Meaning, and "tour de force,"" p. 105. 
Cf. "Semblance, Meaning, and "tour de force,"" p. 106. 
Cf. "Introduction: Choice of Subject," p. 3. 
Cf. "Introduction: Choice of Subject Matter," p. 4.
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forgets the individual self. The power of music manifest in the force of will 
generates a visionary world beyond individuation.
Art has a double character: language is both a constituent and mortal 
enemy. Artworks are eloquent in the highest degree and incommensurable 
with all communicative language. Art's character of eloquence is 
fundamentally distinct from language as its medium. The true language of 
art is mute and its muteness takes priority over poetry's significant element, 
which in music too is altogether lacking. That aspect of the artwork that 
most resembles speech depends most likely on their or 
a selfhood not at first excised by indentificatory thought from 
the interdependence of entities. Thus it is that the rhinoceros that mute 
animal, seems to say: "I am a rhinoceros.'" Art says and this, 
art's expression, does not communicate the subject or how something is 
mediated, rather it reverberates with the proto-history of subjectivity that 
survives in the subject.596
Philosophical reflection allows us to see through the assimilation of 
the spirit to the reigning principle of pure aggression which lies at the back 
of every worry about where to take hold of philosophy. Common sense and 
traditional thinking demand a frame of reference whose intelligibility is not 
so important as long as unframed thoughts are kept out. 597 The shock of 
inconclusiveness the lack of a unequivocal position threatens those whose 
happiness consists in being able to hold onto something be it the existent, a 
bit of ontology, or the perpetuation of unfreedom.
595 "Intuitability and Conceptuality," p. 98.
596 ££ "Expression as Eloquence," pp. 112-113.
597 £f "Vertiginous," pp. 32-33.
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The tendency in epistemological reflection to turn towards the subject, 
the process of abstraction whereby the subject first comes to be subject, 
means a reduction in objectivity. 'Abstraction is the subject's essence. This 
is why going back to what it is not must impress the subject as external and 
violent.' 598 In empirical reality appropriation and return, the negation of the 
negative, is hardly ever an affirmation. The facts included under sensation 
and feeling that the empirical school distils and elevates into the form of 
general propositions and laws have no other import or validity beyond the 
fact that they can be shown to exist in phenomena. The empirical attitude to 
objectivity tells us in a judgment what something is. On how something 
ought to be and what thus can be said not to exist, it says very little. In the 
aesthetic sphere things are different. The dialectical maxim negation of the 
negation bears some truth because the subjective artistic production is not 
shackled as it is externally. Released from the world by its formal 
constituent's art is paradoxically less illusory, less deluded by the 
subjectively dictated lawfulness that is empirical knowledge.
The prohibitions of art and the idiosyncrasies of artists are the 
sedimentations of a collective form of reaction and so the particular is made 
universal. 'The dialectical postulate that the particular is the universal has its 
model in art.' 599 Popular music's institutional and stereotypical pattern divests 
the listener of their spontaneity and promotes conditional reflexes, contiguous 
recognition. Complicated rhythmic and harmonic formulations are replaced 
by schemas of abstract embellishments. Following not so much the course of 
the music as its substitution by individual elements the illusionary force is the
598 "Transcendental Delusion," p. 181.
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simple. This falls within the sphere of the natural.600 'Aesthetic objectivity, 
the reflection of the being-in-itself of nature, realises the subjective 
teleological element of unity; exclusively thereby do artworks become 
comparable to nature.' 601 The refusal to establish the universal as 
metaphysical truth means concentrating on the particular. That the particular 
owes its existence to the universal is a societal relation. By virtue of its 
tendency towards radical particularization the artwork says nothing but what 
is said by its own elaboration, through its own immanent process. By 
speaking, something goes beyond the here and now and yet art's 
transcendence only becomes universally eloquent through its specific 
impulse, its opposition to the universal. 602 Language is hostile to the particular 
nevertheless it seeks to rescue it through transmission, through the 
constellation of the universal. Language does justice to its own universals not 
when they accord to the semblance of their own rigid autonomy but rather 
when they are concentrated on what is specifically to be expressed. 'The 
universals of language receive their truth content by way of a process that 
countervails them.' 603 The closer art approaches language the stronger the 
universals. The element in art that mostly resembles language is its mimetic 
element. 'The paradox that art says it and at the same time does not say it, is 
because the mimetic element by which it says it, the opaque and particular, at 
the same time resists speaking.' 604 With regards to its substance and universal 
it is the inextinguishably idiosyncratic particular subject that reaches out to
599 "Nominalism and the Decline of Genres," p. 202.
600 «Qn pOpUiar Music," p. 446.
601 "Transition from Natural to Art Beauty," p. 77
602 Cf. "Philosophical History of Conventions," p. 205.
603 Ibid.
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grasp art's indispensable mimetic element.
'That reflection is a requisite of art today means that it must become 
conscious of its idiosyncrasies and articulate them. As a consequence, 
art threatens to become allergic to itself; the quintessence of the 
determinate negation that art exercises is its own negation.' 605
Art in essence is a comportment that through the subject is necessarily 
linked to expression. Proclamations of the demise of art because everything 
is to become art and the insistence on culturing uncultivation are gestures of 
resentment and conformism reciprocal with the faltering of aesthetic powers. 
As a reprise of futurist and dadaist actions they furnish barbarism and the 
profit interests of the culture industry with a subterfuge: immediate and 
momentary pleasures that fail to live up to what is expected of them.606 The 
pleasure resembles the appetitive, culinary, and remains ultimately 
unfulfilling. The unmistakable symptom of deaestheticization is the passion 
for not allowing the artwork to be what it is by touching it, narrowing its 
distance from the viewer, dressing it up, in short possession for the sake of 
extra-aesthetic reasons, status, commerce, vested interests.607 Through 
immersion in meaningful experience one's identity as an artist becomes the 
organon of the work of art.
As something spiritual art is compelled by its situation to undergo 
subjective mediation in its objective constitution. The impulse will not be 
fulfilled at once but only in further articulation. The mediate role benefits 
philosophy no less than art. The collective impulse, of philosophy, and 
idiosyncratic compulsion, of the artist, is itself a piece of objectivity that
604 Ibid.
605 "Canon of Prohibitions," p. 36.
eoe cf "Paralipomena," p. 319.
607 Cf. p. 16.
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stands watch over regressive unconscious tendencies. The objectivity that 
weighs upon the subject is the cause of its suffering. The expression of that 
suffering, the subject's most subjective experience, is objectively conveyed. 
The resistance needs to unfold. Where the particular and the social universal 
converge, there is freedom. 'Where the thought transcends the bonds it tied 
in resistance there is its freedom. Freedom follows the subjects urge to 
express itself.' 608 The overwhelming unconscious and collective forces 
embedded in technological and productive processes are obliged to correct 
themselves by way of the subject.
The individual consciousness becomes in the unity of the self and its 
experience an objectified subject. Objectivity presses the individual to look 
or turn towards itself through the principle of self-preservation, to the 
impairment of that objectivity. Even though concepts give continuity to 
experience, which by definition is always more than the purely individual, 
the fact that logical universality tends to predominate in individual 
experience works against any such expansion and halts or postpones the 
point of departure: being-in-the-world.609
'When thought in the process of cognition identifies as conceptual the 
conceptual elements which are directly posited in perception and 
hence so compelling, it progressively draws them back into the subject 
and rids them of perceptive power. In this process each previous stage, 
including that of science, appears as perception by comparison with 
philosophy, as an alienated phenomenon which is marked by 
unrecognised intellectual elements; it is part of the pathology character 
of cognition to stop there, without negation. The naive devotee of 
absolutes, however universally active he may be, is a victim of the
eos u-j^e speculative Moment," p. 16. 
609 cf "individualistic Veil," p. 312. 'A candid look at the 
predominance of the universal does all but unbearable psychological harm to the narcissism 
of all individuals and to that of a democratically organized society. To see through selfhood 
as non-existent, as an illusion, would easily turn all men's objective despair into a 
subjective one. It would rob them of the faith implanted in them by individualistic society: 
that they, the individuals, are the substance.'
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dazzling power of false immediacy. But this dazzle is a constitutive 
element of all judgement, a necessary illusion. Every judgement, even 
a negative one, asserts and assumes.' 610
In its generality the individual experience goes as far as the universal, not 
only on the subjective formal side of individual consciousness but also in the 
fact that every content is carried for the sake of self-preservation and 
reproduced along with that self-preservation. Self-reflection where it is able 
to overcome the principle of self-preservation may raise and expand 
individual consciousness. Surviving in the individual speculative moment is 
resistance to the prescribed. 'What awaits the qualitative subject in the 
matter is the potential of its qualities, not the transcendental residue of this 
potential.' 611
The quantifying tendency on the subjective side that makes a taboo of 
subjective reactions reflects a desire for concordance, a place beyond doubt. 
Where social conditions would make cognition accord with a law of 
perpetual sameness 'Ideology conceals itself in the calculation of 
probabilities.' 612 Hidden within the calculation of probabilities is the 
ideology of the unbroken entirety. Proselytizing against the transient, 
invariance is produced by peeling the invariables out of the variables in the 
confident hope that from immediacy, from the fixed and solid, an unbroken 
entity will spring.
Unlike the systems intent [the exclusive conclusion of knowing that 
cognitive definitions by dissecting and profligacy will inevitably miss the 
mark: the idea of being] conclusiveness is heteronomous and beyond
610 Cf. "Elements of Anti-Semitism," p. 194.
611 "Quality and Individual," p. 44.
612 "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass deception," 
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achievement either by rational will or social totality. 'To dialectics, 
immediacy does not maintain its immediate pose. Instead of becoming a 
ground it becomes a moment. At the opposite pole the same thing happens to 
the invariants of pure thought.' 613
With the concept of duration "Being" takes refuge in isolated and 
absolute derivatives. Being claims precedence to each abstraction, yet no 
immediacy is the whole of cognition. 'Each immediacy is a moment. No 
ontological draft can do without absolutizing single culled out moments.' 
Inherent to a extensional concept formation is the detemporalization of what 
it refers to. Detemporalization is not an attribute of the concept in-itself, it is 
something that has become, that has arisen. Timelessness in the concept is 
mediated through abstraction and by simple omission. Pure becoming, the 
pure act, eliminating all heterogeneous being recoils into timelessness.615 So 
formed and maintained the concept is attributed constancy as its in-itself 
quality and superior status.
'In order to create some kind of order in successive circumstances, 
nomenclatures or systems of thought were created which would 
survive with a certain constancy in relation to temporal elements 
which they encompassed. Now it seems to me to be the case at this 
point - and, indeed, in the whole tendency to see ontology as a 
doctrine of invariants, of tunelessly abiding - that this timelessness of 
the concept represents [...] an impoverishment, a deficiency of the 
concept.'
Lost to the totality, duration is modelled on fixed inheritable
p.145.
613 "Dialectics and Solidity," p. 40.
614 "Being," p. 83.
eis cf "xra(jition and Knowledge," p. 54. 'A knowledge wholly
conforming to the idol of that purity, of total timelessness a knowledge coincident with
formal logic would become a tautology; there would be no more room in it even for
transcendental logic. Timelessness, the goal which the bourgeois mind might be pursuing in
order to compensate for its own mortality, is the acme of its delusion.'
616 "Lecture Ten: The Problem of Mediation," p. 71.
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possession. The spiritual, like material, becomes property. Freed from the 
illusion of fixed inheritable possession duration, in accordance with its own 
concept, would internalise transience and approximates an idea of truth, not 
as the abstractly enduring, but in consciousness of its temporal essence. 'The 
concept of existence as the essentiality of transience, the temporality of 
temporal things, keeps existence away by naming it. Once treated as the title
of a phenomenological problem, existence is integrated.'
Resignation and delusion reference and evocation are ideological 
complements of the name. What dissolves the fetish of the name is the 
insight that things have come to be under certain conditions but could well 
be otherwise. The becoming that fades and dwells within things is a 
temporal experience that cannot be stabilized in concepts. The precision in 
the concept substitutes for the thing itself, opening a gap between word and 
thing.
'The determinable flaw in every concept makes it necessary to cite 
others; this is the font of the only constellation which inherited some 
of the hope of the name. The language of philosophy approaches that 
name by denying it. The claim of immediate truth for which it chides 
the words is almost always the ideology of a positive, existent identity 
of word and thing.'618
Philosophy admits its linguistic nature, its dependency on the texts it 
criticizes. It comes together in the traditions it would seek to deny. The 
question of how thinking might preserve and transform tradition by 
relinquishing tradition has its archetype in the secularisation of sacred texts. 
Voluntarily submitting thought to a subjectively chosen tradition forswears 
the ideal of autonomy, the authoritative autarkic thought of being. However,
6 ' "Historicality," pp. 13 0-131.
618 "Thing, Language, History," p. 52.
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as a properly constitutive factor the traditional moment in thinking is not a 
point-like subjectivity but a quasi-transcendental mechanism hidden in the 
depths of the soul.
'What accedes to language [and therefore a tradition] enters the 
movement of a humanness that does not yet exist; it is compelled 
towards language and alive only by virtue of its helplessness. 
Stumbling along behind its reification, the subject limits that 
reification by means of the mimetic vestige, the plenipotentiary of an 
undamaged life in the midst of a mutilated life, which subverts the 
subject to ideology.' 619
According to Adorno, the Kantian claim that the subject's totality and 
its determination predominates over the moments it lives by was 
progressive, an assist to freedom: the subject becomes moral for itself and is
690protected from the violence done to it by the reflexive ordering of society. 
One of the foremost achievements of Kantian deduction was perceived 
rememberance, the trace of historicity at the stage of imaginative 
reproduction in the unity of the "I think."621 For Kant, however, formation is 
essentially deformation. The exertion of cognition is by and large the 
destruction of its usual exertion. What grounds selfhood is Man's dominion 
over the self. This almost certainly involves the destruction of the subject in 
whose name the dominion serves. The functions and achievements of self- 
preservation, the definitions and determinations of its substance, is the very 
life that is dissolves, dominated, and suppressed by virtue of self- 
preservation.622 The unfolding of life is a paradox, a contradiction. '[...] by
619 "Dialectic of Inwardness; Aporias of Expression," p. 117.
620 Cf. "The Will as Thing," p. 238-239.
621 cf "Tradition and Knowledge," p. 54. Cf. "Incapacitation of the 
Subject," p. 68. 'Restricting the mind to thoughts open and attainable 
at the historical stage of its experience is an element of freedom; non-conceptual vagary 
represents the opposite of freedom.'
622 Cf. "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment," p. 54-55.
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adaptation to death life pays the toll for its continued existence.' 623 What is a 
contradiction to the logical theorists is familiar to artists as their sense of 
form.
The sense of form is the reflection of the work in itself. It is that on 
which that reflection must depend. As spontaneity amid the involuntary it is 
both blind and binding at once, the blindness corresponding to the necessity 
in the object. As objectivity closed to itself it devolves upon the subjective 
mimetic capacity, a fatal capacity, which gains it force through its antithesis, 
rational construction: hence the contradiction. What unfolds in the artist's 
work, the controlled mimetic element; the procedures that summon up in 
order to redeem and destroy spontaneity; mimesis as the fulfilment of 
objectivity, these are elements that traverse the extremes. Expression, not 
restrained by any preordained irrationality or superficiality, converges with 
the bluntness of rational objectivity, the immanent understanding of the 
material. 'Aesthetic rationality must plunge blindfolded into the making of 
the work rather than directing it externally as an act of reflection over the 
work.' 624 Semblance, form in its broadest sense, seeks to salvage what the 
active spirit eliminated from what it reduced to its material, to what is for 
another. Semblance seeks that fatal capacity, the trace of the damage 
artworks want to revoke. In the process what is to be salvaged becomes 
dominated, produced. The redemption through semblance is itself illusory. 625
The developmental process that Hegel describes; the sublation of one 
nature by another nature qualified by its fit to the functional context of
623 "Elements of Anti-Semitism," p. 180.
624 "Expression and Mimesis," pp. 114-115.
625 cf «xowards the Redemption of Semblance," p. 107.
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society; the movement from awakening consciousness to social and 
institutional constructs family, church, state, that kind of thing, but also 
friendship, shared interests, civility, etc, echoes the more anthropological, 
speculative, and productive history of mimesis and rationality found within 
the pages Adorno and Horkheimer posit three 
phases in the development of mimesis and rationality: The pre-historical, the 
magical, and the historical.
'Civilization has replaced the organic adaptation to others and mimetic 
behaviour proper, by organized control of mimesis, in the magical 
phase; and, finally, by rational practice, by work in the historical
/r
phase. Uncontrolled mimesis is outlawed.'
At the earliest phase there is an adaptation to environment a self-conscious 
following of the course of nature, carried out in order to avoid the 
contingency and excesses of the world. Confrontations with what is ordered 
as amorphous and immediate nature, bolster a mimetic taboo against the 
immediate, the sensual. In the later so called civilized phase of the mimetic 
the taboo is maintained and developed by a dictatorial minority that projects
A07Stoic virtues as virtuous nature. Since the mimetic taboo art became the 
organ of mimesis.628 Art now defines an area tolerantly reserved for mimesis. 
Adaptation to nature, to the seasons, migration of animals, etc, is an 
aspect of archaic mimesis, adaptation to the inanimate, inorganic another.
'[A]s the animate approaches the inanimate, and the more highly 
developed form of life comes close to nature, it is alienated from it, 
since inanimate nature, which life in its most vigorous form aspires to 
become, is capable only of wholly external, spatial, relationships. 
Space is absolute alienation.' 29
626 «]niements of Anti-Semitism," p. 180.
627 Cf. Ibid.
628 C£ "Expression and Dissonance," p. 110.
629 "Elements of Anti-Semitism," p. 180.
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Mimesis of inanimate, inorganic nature as a way to escape the terrors 
of nature, a nature from which the animate self, with no little effort, had 
recently estranged itself, is an adaptation to death. Playing dead, hiding out, 
incorporating death into life, are ways of avoiding external confrontation. 
This becomes much more important in the mythical/magical mimetic phase 
where the notion of sacrifice is advanced. Whether fear of nature is causally 
predicated of nature or through social relations [and there is reason enough 
to think of both, an individual shaman/magician providing an instance] the 
important thing to note is that fear or one of its relations, from Aristotle to 
Heidegger and beyond, have provided the template and orientation for 
thinking about the passions in particular and philosophy in general.6 °
'What some like to call and to ennoble as an existential is 
claustrophobia in the world: in the closed system. It perpetuates the 
spell as coldness between men, without which the calamity could not 
recur. Anyone who is not cold, who does not chill himself as in the 
vulgar figure of speech the murderer "chills" his victims, must feel 
condemned. Along with and the cause of it, this coldness too 
might pass. is the necessary form of the curse laid in the 
universal coldness upon those who suffer it.' 631
Mimesis of the hardened and estranged is reproduction of an earlier 
state: adaptation is repeated adaptation, repetition of the same. Once the 
doubling of nature becomes intentional then self-empowerment is optimized 
through a mode of rational interaction. In the magical phase there is 
developed an organized control of mimesis. This contains a form of 
rationality whereby prescriptive scenarios, myths, rites, sacrifices etc, are
630 Cf. C. Levi-Strauss. trans. Rodney Needham. (Penguin, Great Britain: 1969) 
p 142. 'Actually, impulses and emotions explain nothing: they are always either of 
the power of the body or of the impotence of the mind. In both cases they are consequences, 
never causes. The latter can be sought only in the organism, which is the exclusive concern 
of biology, or in the intellect, which is the sole way offered to psychology, and to
anthropology as well.'
631 "The Spell," pp. 246-347.
234
performed in the belief that nature will look favourably on human goals. The 
Shaman/Magician copies something in the future. What we have come to 
know as art has its roots here in the magical and, to a greater or lesser extent, 
intentionally or not, they retain their powers of prescription. Many works of 
art that reach out from the past radiate a humanity that seem strangely at 
odds with, and thereby alienate themselves from, the growing inhumanity of 
the world. It is here, in their divergence from the empirical world that 
artworks, Ancient and Modern, old and new, converge. Both are less 
deluded by the subjectively dictated lawfulness of immediacy than empirical 
knowledge.
The criterion and unifying principle of "good will" is the internalised 
and identifying principle of society as a whole. In its spontaneity the will is 
defined as the subject, and yet, '[...] solid and identical like reason, it is 
objectified into a hypothetical but factual power [...] from which all
/ro")impulses that refuse to be objectified are banned as heteronomous.' The 
positivity and infallibility of this moral aspect is the of closed 
societies where the individual is virtually powerless to effect changes over 
the conditions of those crying out for change. In those situations where the 
individual harnessed to the social order accrues guilt through decay of the 
moral aspect, individual and isolated acts, being not absolutely good or 
absolutely evil, become venial where the will achieves some measure of 
independence. The criterion and unifying principle remains "good will."633 
However, '[w]hatever an individual or a group may undertake against the 
totality they are part of is infected by the evil of that totality; and no less
632 "Unfreedom of Thought," p. 235.
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affected is he who does nothing at all' 634
Bourgeois evil is the post-existence of older things, things which are 
subdued, but not quite, things that do not comply: the pre-logical natural 
moment. Surviving in the will, weakened in imagination, are physical 
impulses without which there would not be a will. The will that tames and 
negates impulses is dialectically defined as, '[...] the force that enables 
consciousness to leave its own domain and so to change what merely exists; 
its recoil is resistance.' 635
Each time a conscious decision is made it more or less reflects the 
moment it consistently has access to. All productive thought that does not 
simply reconstruct or recapitulate to what has come before and wants to gain 
knowledge of something without covering categories has to surrender to it 
without reservation. This itself is not a recipe for success. To succeed the 
knowledge that is actualised through immersion in the object would have to 
potentiate theory, ready and waiting however concealed with sudden flashes 
of illumination. Philosophical knowledge begins where it opens up what 
traditional thought considers opaque, impenetrable and individual.636
'For the right practice and for the good itself, there is really no other 
authority than the most advanced state of theory. When an idea of 
goodness is supposed to guide the will without fully absorbing the 
concrete rational definitions, it will unwittingly take orders from 
reified consciousness, from that which society has approved. A will 
detached from reason and proclaimed as an end in itself [...] such a 
will, like all ideals that rebel against reason, stands ready for every 
misdeed. Good will may be self-understood but hi the mirage it grows 
obdurate, a historic sediment of the power which the will ought to 
resist. In contrast to its pharisaism, the irrational moment of the will
633 ^jjjg Yyjii as Thing," p. 239.
634 "Dialectical Definition of the Will," p. 243.
635 "Dialectical Definition of the Will," p. 241.
636 cf «The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," p. 81.
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condemns all moral aspects to fallibility as a matter of principle.' 637 
Theory prevents the mind from becoming an absolute. Critical self- 
reflection keeps the subject open, keeps it from building walls between itself 
and its object, from constricting the abundance of ways to react. The 
mobility of consciousness, one of its best features, points to a double mode 
of conduct: On the one hand an immanent dialectical process that criticizes 
the system and recalls what would be outside of it and, on the other, free, 
unbound, unregimented thought that allows us to step outside of the 
dialectic. Both aspects of consciousness are linked by the non-compromising 
and critical attitudes they take to each other. Their elective affinity lies in the 
fact that, 'the force that liberates the dialectical movement in cognition is the 
very same that rebels against the system.' 638
The motif of one reason [logos] which offers a refuge to the 
unelucidated remnant and to repression, culminates in the formula that the 
moral aspect is always self-understood. To be self-understood, self- 
impressed, is the mark of civilization i.e. neurotic, one, identical. By 
excluding rational reflection the mere assumption of moral certainty is 
immoral, nothing survives in it which we could grasp as the moral. We are 
left with non-thought of received ideas, reiteration of the same, myth. The 
objectiflcation and rationalization of the will, the subordination of acts to a 
unifying moment of reason, makes the will something other than its content,
/--5Q
its material, diffuse impulses.
637 "Dialectical Definition of the Will," p. 242.
ess "Argument and Experience," p. 31.
639 cf «The will as Thing," p. 238. 'The individual impulses'
objectification in the will that synthesizes and determines them is their sublimation, their
successful, delaying, permanence-involving diversion from the primary goal of drives. Kant
'All conceivable definitions of the moral aspect down to the most 
formal, the unity of self-consciousness reason, were squeezed out 
of that 'matter' with which moral philosophy did not want to dirty its 
hands. Today, morality has been restored to the heteronomy it loathes, 
and its tendency is to void itself. Without recourse to the material, no 
ought could issue from reason; yet once compelled to acknowledge its 
material in the abstract, as a condition of its own possibility, reason 
must not cut off its reflection on the specific material. Precisely this 
would make it heteronomous.' 640
Material is what you work with or what is available to work with. 
Presupposed by alternatives it is everything that requires a decision. 
Technique, how we approach the material, is no less dependent on its 
material than material is dependent on the transformation of technique. 641 
Because concretely only a tiny part of the abstract material is employable, 
the part that does not clash with the condition of the spirit, the part that joins 
the spirit in its agonic restlessness, material is thoroughly historical.
Whatever subjectively 'is' includes an objectivity, entity, that has yet 
to be established. The element of objective reason internal to subjective 
reason the that transcends its subjective place holders is called rational 
identity. Its moment of universality, linked to the realm of pure purpose, 
cannot be divorced from a plethora of drives, natures, mortalities, etc. The 
most subjective, naive immediacy eludes for a brief spell the interventionist 
intentions of the subject and presents us with an opportunity to see
faithfully circumscribed this by the rationality of the will. It is this rationality that makes the 
will something other than its "material," the diffuse impulses. To stress a man's will means 
to stress the unifying moment of his actions, and that is the subordination of those actions to 
his reason. A common adjective for a libertine is "dissolute," dissolved; the language opts 
for morality as the unity of the person in accordance with the abstract rational laws.'
640 "Dialectical Definition of the Will," p. 243
641 Cf. "On the Concept of Material," p. 148. 'It is obvious how much a 
composer who, for instance, works with tonal material receives this material from tradition. 
If, however, he turns critically against tradition through the use of autonomous material, one 
completely purged of concepts such as consonance, dissonance, triad, and diatonic, the 
negated is nevertheless retained in the negation. Such works speak by virtue of the taboos 
they radiate [...].
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something as it really is.
'To receive something as it is offered at a time, dispensing with 
reflection, is potentially always tantamount to recognizing it the way it 
is; virtually all thoughts, on the other hand, cause a negative 
motion.[...] The most subjective, the immediate datum, eludes the 
subject's interventions. Yet such immediate consciousness is neither 
consciously maintainable nor downright positive [.. .].' 642
According to Adorno, in terms of essence the permanent exercise of 
caution in both directions, the implicit and the explicit, points to the non- 
dimensional in Being. Being is compressed into a point. As a procedure this 
has its foundation in categorical vision, the growing awareness of a concept. 
This is a corresponding moment to but beyond sensory matter. Categorical 
vision has an immediacy that resembles visuality, this makes it a self- 
adjustment rather than an activity. Traditional epistemology knew this as a 
synthesis, as categorically constituted facts. The factual moment isolated and 
hypostatized, a protest against the split between concept and entity, ceases to 
be a moment and becomes a thing: the separation and reduction of 
phenomenal and spontaneous thought to a thought deemed both scientific 
and necessary. Being as the of fundamental ontology is nothing but 
this categorical fact.
That mental facts can be purely described, isolated, accepted as what 
they claim to be is both a dogma and a demand.
'[A]s if reflecting on things of the mind, re-thinking them, did not turn 
them into something else. The unhesitant supposition is that thinking, 
an inalienable activity, can really have an object that will not be made 
a product by the mere thought/5643
The view of sensory things in their not being absolute or irrefutable 
corresponds to a moment of direct vision. What is astir in this seemingly
642 "Dialectics and Solidity," pp. 38-40.
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directness of the given is the experience, the congealed transmission, of 
what has come to be. The sense of evolved objectivity in things that 
supposedly merely are, is an awareness of the break between a things 
identity and its concept. This allows for a binding physiognomy of the mind, 
a physiognomic flash, or essence perception that does not simply attribute 
mental objectivity to projections of a contemplating subject.
'[E]ssence perception is our word for the physiognomic view of 
mental facts legitimate view because things of the mind are not 
constituted by the cognitive intentionality of consciousness but are 
based objectively, far beyond the individual author, on the collective 
life of the mind, in accordance with its immanent laws.' 644
A thinking that claims to gather all definitions to its side, a doctrine 
categorical vision too naively relies upon, disqualifies the vis-a-vis. With 
regard to structures of the mind this turns a second immediacy into a first 
immediacy.
The stress on Being as something aloof from the merely conceptual, 
an exemplary consciousness, has a positional value that is inclined to inflate
historically.
'Giinther Anders remarked that the more socialized the world, and the 
more tightly the network of general definitions covers its objects, the 
greater will the tendency of individual facts to be direct transparencies 
of their universals, and the greater the yield a viewer obtains precisely 
from micrological immersion.' 645
However the immediacy of insight, the receptivity within synthesizing 
consciousness, is a phenomenon not to be denied. It gives rise to, in the 
judgement, a recognition and configuration of both example and 
comparison. Without the moment of insight the particular could not be the
643 "On Categorical Vision," p. 81.
644 "On Categorical Vision," p. 82.
645 "On Categorical Vision," p. 83.
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universal. It is only its hypostasis that is to be denied. Categorical vision, 
despite its fallibility, contributes to the understanding of the thing itself not 
its classification.
According to Adorno, the cult of Being reaching out for a positive 
relation to the world and life transposes the way things are, an empirical 
claim to superiority, into the realm of essence. 'That Being shows, and that 
the subject should accept it passively, is borrowed from the old 
epistemological data which was supposed to be factual, ontical in 
character.' 646
For Adorno, the objectivity of dialectical cognition requires more 
subjectivity not less if philosophical experience is to flourish. The positive 
Zeitgeist is allergic to this need. 'It holds that not all men are capable of such 
experience; that it is the prerogative of individuals destined for it by their 
disposition and life story; that calling for it as a premise of cognition is elitist 
and undemocratic.' 647 It would be fictitious to assume that philosophical 
experiences are equally accessible to everyone. Not many can withstand 
what the administered world makes of its compulsory members. Criticizing 
the world's course has become a privilege.
However the is not simply the same as the
646 "Immanent Critique of Ontology," p. 99. Cf. Martin Heidegger. 
p. 51. 'Nor does discourse about "Being" ever understand this name 
in the sense of a genus, an empty generality under which the historically represented 
doctrines of beings are subsumed as individual cases. "Being" ever and always speaks as 
destiny, and thus permeated by tradition.' For a alternative translation see, Martin 
Heidegger, 2nd ed., Pfullingen 1957, p. 47. 'Our talk of "Being" 
never understands this name in the sense of a species to whose empty generality the 
historically offered doctrines of entity belong as individual cases. "Being" speaks ever and 
ever as sent and hence pervaded by tradition.' As cited in, "Sense of Being," 
p. 87.
647 "The Privilege of Experience," p. 40
648 Cf. "Dialectics and Solidity," p. 41. 'The construction of truth in 
analogy to a which is the final consequence of the concept of subjective
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The is rational insofar as it preserves and 
fulfils the interests of those who dominate [rationalize] the social situation, 
e.g. a ruling class with fatal means. Reason on the other hand should 
transcend mere domination and travail beyond the limitations of the 
instrumental reason that is the historical priori of modern times. The 
historical may be priori but it is not thereby a fate that is fixed, inescapable 
and unchangeable.650 The substance of the changed philosophy sought by 
negative dialectics,
'[...] would lie in the diversity of the objects that impinge upon it and 
of the objects it seeks, a diversity not wrought by any schema; to those 
objects philosophy would truly give itself rather than use them as a 
mirror in which to reread itself, mistaking its own image for 
concretion.' 651
As the physiological primordial form of spirit mimesis and its 
modification is the process whereby reason sets itself up as the 
psychologically real self, the T of self-consciousness and self- 
preservation.652 'In the constitution of the ego reflective mimesis becomes 
controlled reflection. "Recognition in the concept," the absorption of the 
different by the same, takes the place of physical adaptation to nature.' 653
Through having to choose between their subjugation to nature and the 
subjection of nature to the self the essence of enlightenment is revealed to be
reason, would in all men's name defraud all men of what they need.'
649 Cf. Hauke Brunkhorst, "The Dialectic of the Medium," 
(Great Britain: University of Wales Press, 1999), p. 19. "The difference between 
and distinguishes between the mere of 
historical a prioris (Heidegger) and the of history that is .'
650 Ibid.
651 "Infinity," p. 13.
652 cf "Expression as Eloquence," p. 113. "The modification shares the 
guilt of the affirmative character of art because it mollifies the pain through imagination just 
as the spiritual totality in which the pain disappears makes it controllable and leaves it
untransformed.'
653 "Elements of Anti-Semitism," p. 181.
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that of domination. As the non-identical within the rational mimesis 
expresses, through the dialectic of eloquence a refusal to reflect the 
categorizing order. With a different mimetic a different notion of space and 
time is involved, this splits asunder the idea of a single unified 
rationalisation of reason calling everything to account from a single aspect 
viewpoint.
The objects that impinge on philosophy and which it seeks are diverse 
and not wrought by any schema. Philosophy does not use them as a mirror in 
which to reread itself: mistaking its own image and power of representation 
as guarantee for concretion. The capacity for representation is both 
progressive and regressive at the same time: the capacity of representation is 
the measure of domination and in performance domination is the most 
powerful thing that can be represented. Adaptation to the power of progress 
involves the progress of power in its capacity for representation. For the 
dominant to survive it must not be tempted by that which is unrepeatable.
The fixed order of time, the three fold schema of past, present and 
future, is intended to free the present from the clutches of the past. The 
power of the past is referred behind the absolute barrier of the unrepeatable. 
Nevertheless the past is placed at the disposal of the present as practicable 
knowledge. The practical by directly invoking the recent past with the 
irresistible promise of pleasure turns the temptation of self-abandonment 
into a mere object of contemplation becomes art. In practice impulses must 
be doggedly sublimated in an additional effort, an addendum, which must 
ignore the drive that impels to diversion. But all unification remains 
deception and so thought becomes illusionary wherever it seeks to deny its
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decisive function.
As a specific undertaking integration binds the centrifugal counter- 
forces, absorbs the manifold, and creates abstract unity by removing the 
antithetical element by virtue of which the unity came to be in the first 
place. Released from the empirical as from the totality of the heteronomous, 
subjective pleasure, the happiness in artworks would be the feeling of 
holding firm. Art appeases the compulsion to rescue the past as something 
living. Instead of using the past as the material of progress art appertains to a 
presentation of past life which is not cognition. This separates it from social 
practice which merely tolerates art as it tolerates pleasure.655
The spiritualized artwork expresses or reverberates with the proto- 
history of subjectivity. For example, the fact that music as a whole has its 
source in the collective practices of cult and dance is no mere point of 
departure. The historical source remains the unique sensory subjective 
impulse of music, something that continues to weave its spell on the 
collective practice.656 The subject as the only adequate instrument of 
expression is itself mediated. The impulses are those of the subject and yet 
participating in the integrative power of the ego they nevertheless remain 
nonidentical with respect to the ego formation.
'The subjective impulse that registers what is to be done is the 
appearance of something objective transpiring back of this impulse, 
the development of productive forces, which art in its innermost has in 
common with society and at the same time opposes through its own 
development. In art, development has multiple meanings' 657
The transposition of impulses, the plenipotentiary in the aesthetic continuum
654 Cf. "Art, Society, p. 15.
655 Cf. "The Concept of Enlightenment," p. 34.
656 cf «Tne Antimony of Modern Music." p. 18.
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of extra-aesthetic nature, is in effect a claim that by virtue of the artistic 
integration the impulses are no longer incarnate as the extra-aesthetic 
nature's afterimage.658 Aesthetic structures create a continuum that is totally 
spirit. In that way they become the semblance of a blocked being-in-itself in 
whose reality the intentions of the subject would be fulfilled and 
extinguished.659 Art develops this act through the work that, mollifying the 
pain, modifies mimesis through imagination. Development, the absorption 
of art alien techniques external to art but originating in society, is one of 
art's means, and part of its autarchy.
Even though it resembles the subject the expressed is the 
nonsubjective in the subject. Expression is a priori imitation that having 
been objectified endures. The expression of artworks is not so much the 
subject's expression as its copy.
'Expression, by which nature seeps most deeply into art, is at the same 
time what is not literally nature, a memento of what expression itself 
is not, of what could not have become concrete except through the 
of that expression.' 660
With regards to the question of [of expression] the key position for the 
subject in cognition is experience, and not the constituent form. Knowledge 
steps up and comes close where the subject as agent and entrusting itself to 
its own experiences acts, rendering the veil it weaves about the object 
without anxiety.
657
"Development of Productive Forces," p. 192.
658 Cf. Part 3 of the 
trans. W. Wallace and A.V. Millar (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1971) § 473A. 'Impulse must 
be distinguished from mere appetite. The latter belongs to self-consciousness [...] it is 
something single and seeks only what is single for a single, momentary satisfaction. 
Impulse, on the other hand, since it is a form of volitional intelligence [...] embraces a 
series of satisfactions, hence is a whole, a universal.' As cited in D. Knowles. 
(Routledge, London: 2002) p. 39.
659 Cf. "Domination and Conceptual Knowledge," pp. 113.
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The more art expels the pre-established the more it is thrown back on 
the dimensionless point of pure subjectivity. In the art's secularization of 
transcendence, the tendency of the subjective point to expel the pre- 
established leads to an absence of social resonance, a contraction of the 
accessible.661 The resulting impoverished powerless gesture, the scream of 
the destitute, is a confession concerning the impossibility of artistic 
objectivation: a postulate common to all artistic manifestations.
The aesthetic concept of anti-art anticipates this dialectic and 
constantly tries to abrogate its postulate. The implication being that art must 
go beyond its own concept in order to remain faithful to that concept. 662
'Artists with the integrity of Picasso and Schoenberg went beyond the 
subjective point. Their difficulties in this could be sensed and feared 
right from their efforts to achieve a so called new order. Since then 
these difficulties developed into the difficulties of art as such. To date, 
all requisite progress beyond the subjective point has been brought at 
the price of regression through assimilation to the past and by the 
arbitrariness of a self-posited order.' 663
Without conceptual labour the melodious discord of something's possibility
660 "Domination and Conceptual Knowledge," pp. 113-114.
661 At one level this would be existentialism. Cf. "Objectless Inwardness," 
pp. 29-30. 'In Kierkegaard there are so little of a 
subject/object in the Hegelian sense as there are given objects; there is only the isolated 
subjectivity, surrounded by a dark otherness. Indeed, only by crossing over this abyss would 
subjectivity be able to partake in "meaning" that otherwise denies itself to subjectivity's 
solitude. In the effort to achieve transcendental ontology, inwardness takes up the "struggle 
with itself," on which Kierkegaard the "psychologist" reports. Yet no psychology is 
required to explain this struggle [...]. Mourning can be shown, pragmatically, to be 
Kierkegaard's central affect in the foundational nexus of his philosophy. [...] From a 
historico-philosophical perspective, Kierkegaard, the psychological solitary, is least solitary. 
He himself vouches for a situation he never tires of asseverating that he has lost reality. [..] 
In the image of the concrete individual, subjectivity rescues only the rubble of the existent. 
Subjectivity, in the form of the objectless inwardness, mourns in its painful affects for the 
world of things as for "meaning."
662 cf ""Dialectic of Integration and the "Subjective p. 30. 
'[T]he program of their surrealist successors rejected art, yet without being able to shake 
free of it. Their truth was that it would be better not to have art than have a false one. But 
they fell to the mercy of the semblance of an absolute subjectivity existing purely for-itself 
and objectively mediated, yet without the ability to go beyond the position of being-for- 
itself. Surrealism expresses the foreignness of the alienated only by seeking recourse in 
itself.'
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and aspects remains unrealised.
The materialist dialectic of social meaning and intentions has as its 
antecedent the theological The dialectical movement becomes, in 
theory, one of regression and Utopian development. By contrast the 
dialectical image a homily to forgotten affects, challenges this 
image of development and regression there is on the one hand a use-value 
which persists and on the other a non-functioning alien survivor, something 
that outlives its own immediacy and the forfeiture of betrayal and despair.
According to Adorno, consciousness of the sordid hidden aspects of 
culture breaks through its husk of self-contentment. This is the source of the 
contemporary predilection with the disruptive, the sordid and shabby. 
There is a point where this particular predilection converges with the 
spiritualization of art.
'Art that forswears the happy brilliance that reality withholds from 
men and women and thus refuses every sensual trace of meaning, is 
spiritualized art; it is, in its unrelenting renunciation of childish 
happiness, the allegory of the illusionless actuality of happiness while 
bearing the fatal proviso of the chimerical: that this happiness does not
664
exist.' 665
If the idiosyncratic or alien survivor presents itself as an ambiguous cultural 
accumulation or with a living trace that points to the more seamier side of 
the compass, the flotsam and jetsam of debased life, then the mentality that 
cedes the decisions about essentiality and inessentiality to the disciplines 
which deal with an object at a particular time, will more than likely '[...] not 
bother with the dignity of the objects to be dealt with and will either parrot 
public opinion about this dignity or choose the criterion of whether, as they
663 Ibid.
664 Cf. "On the Truth Content of Artworks," p. 130.
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'"666say, a "thing has not been worked upon yet.'
In formal terms the greatness of the art object measured by what the 
transcendental subject has marked as "idea" is independent of what it, the 
artwork, has to say. A priori ideology posits something spiritual as being 
independent of its material production. And yet to travail beyond the 
classification of social effects and in the interest of the social decipherment 
art must become conversant with its material.
The spirit of artworks negates the spirit that dominates nature and so 
does not appear as spirit. 'The uncheckable movement of spirit towards what 
has eluded it becomes in art the voice that speaks for what was lost in the 
most distantly archaic.' 667 Contrary to spirit is the prespiritual [mimesis] 
which along with what is opposed to spirit [materiality] is that on which 
spirit ignites. Thereafter spirit becomes the principle of construction.
'In artworks, spirit has become their principle of construction, 
although it fulfils its telos only when it emerges from what is to 
constructed, from the mimetic impulses, by shaping itself to them 
rather than allowing itself to be imposed on them by sovereign rule. 
Form objectivates the particular impulses only when it follows them 
where they want to go of their own accord. This alone is the methexis 
of artworks in reconciliation. The rationality of artworks becomes 
spirit only when immersed in its polar opposite. The divergence of the 
constructive and the mimetic, which no artwork can resolve and which 
is virtually the original sin of aesthetic spirit, has as its correlative in 
that element of the ridiculous and clownish that even the most 
significant works bear and that, unconcealed, is inextricable from their 
significance. The inadequacy of classicism of any persuasion 
originates in its repression of this element; a repression art must 
mistrust.' 668
665 Ibid.
666 "Essence and Appearance," p. 169. Cf. "Theodor Adorno. Letters 
to Walter Benjamin," trans. Ed. Ronald Taylor (Verso, Great 
Britain: 1986) p. 110. '[...], your draft seems to me full of the most important ideas. Of 
these I should like to emphasize only the magnificent passage about living as a leaving of 
traces, the conclusive sentences about the collector, and the liberation of things from the 
curse of being useful.'
667 "Critique and Redemption of Myth," p. 118.
668 "Critique and Redemption of Myth," pp. 118-119.
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The aesthetic principle of construction where it exhorts the blunt primacy of 
a planned whole over the details tends towards stasis. With its complement 
in the over elaborate and dense, construction obscures what it means for one 
thing to merge wholly with another.
The assumption of a historical tendency in artistic material use 
contradicts how material is traditionally defined: The sum total of all 
material at the disposal of the artist. All material specifications are 
characteristics and indications of historical processes. The demands made 
upon the subject by the material are itself a crystallization of the creative 
impulse, an element socially predetermined. The artist's altercation with the 
material is at the same time an altercation with society. Into this image of 
creativity seeps the fetishism of commodities, monopolistic production, 
ontological Being, as well as a sense of puzzling bewilderment at the 
ridiculousness of artwork and concomitant feelings of impotence, 
frustration, rage, etc, and their contrary.
According to Adorno, society's own concept seeks to establish free 
relations. This remains unrealized as society remains as rigid as it is 
defective. Institutional forms hem in and deform an increasingly chaotic life. 
The production and reproduction of life is not transparencies of a reconciled 
realization of reason that would be one with a non-violent order. The course 
of society, its objectified legality, is not as anarchic as it appears to the 
irrational and accidental form of individual fate. 'But its objectified legality 
is the converse of a state of Dasein in which men could live without fear.' 669
669 "Ontology Prescribed," pp. 88-89.
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The premonitions of objective negativity are drowned out by the 
ontological drafting of an order-in-itself which runs to the most abstract 
order, the structure of Being. As ever the world is set to shift to the horrors 
of order. Where men cannot even think of rationally determining their lives 
or the life of the whole without adding to their torment then they tend to 
prefer the invidious form of the bad rather than the semblance of the better.
'When men are forbidden to think, their thinking sanctions what 
simply exists. The genuinely critical need of thought to awaken from 
the cultural phantasmagoria is trapped, channelled, steered into the 
wrong consciousness. The culture of its environment has broken 
thought of the habit to ask what all this may be, and to what end; it has 
enfeebled the question what it all means a question growing in 
urgency as fewer people find some such sense-evident, as it yields 
more and more to cultural bustle. Enthroned instead is the being-thus- 
and-not-otherwise of whatever may, as culture, claim to make sense. 
The weight of existing culture ends all insistence on the reality of its 
asserted meaning, or the legitimacy of that meaning.' 670
Into the vacuum steps fundamental ontology, self proclaimed spokesperson 
for the pilfered interest and all that has been "forgotten." Epistemology tends 
to list such interests as prejudice. This, according to Adorno, is not the least 
of reasons why ontology is adverse to epistemology.
The ontological positing of an order-in-itself is historically reflected in 
art in those works that tended to absorb materials that mocked all attempts at 
subjective inspiration [e.g. montage in early radical painting and cinema]. In 
music the tendency was set to eliminate the element of musical language in 
music. The subjectively mediated musical coherence was to end, replaced by 
tonal relations dominated by exclusively objective mathematical 
relationships. But this objectification turns into complete reification.
'The desire to be pure nature corresponds to the purely manufactured 
thing. The ontological region that lies beyond the subjective accident
670 "Sense of Being," pp. 85-86.
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is exposed as subjective mastery over nature that has been absolutized 
as a mere technique, in which the subject of absolute rule only divests 
itself of its own humanity and simultaneously fails to recognise 
itself.' 671
Mimetic comportment as the nonconceptual affinity of the 
subjectively produced with its unposited other claims rationality where it 
responds to the telos of knowledge. To that extent art is rational. To accuse 
art of irrationalism because it refuses to conform to a single aspect 
instrumental reason is simply ideological.672 'The telos of artworks is a 
language whose words cannot be located on the spectrum; a language whose 
words are not imprisoned by a prestabilized universality.' 673 Art is rationality 
that criticizes rationality. Rationality that applies extra-aesthetical logic and 
causal criteria, thereby pre-empting art through theories of the rational and 
irrational are despite good intentions, their having being provoked by the 
ideological misuse of art, nevertheless faulty. 'Rationality in the artwork is 
the unity-founding, organizing element, not unrelated to the rationality that 
governs externally, but does not reflect its categorizing order.' 674
The hegemonic conception of radical and modern time-consciousness 
places culture towards the centre of its analysis. Culture as lived or 
professionally produced tends to elicit a certain kind of response, naturalism 
in regards to the appropriation of psychic configurations and discourse. The 
hegemonic conception takes it as a given that the horizon open to the future
671 "Music, Language, and Composition, p. 121.
672 Cf. "Mimesis and Rationality," p. 55. 'Artworks do not repress; 
through expression they help to make present to consciousness the diffuse and elusive 
without, as psychoanalysis insists, "rationalization."  To accuse irrational art of 
irrationalism for playing a trick on praxis-orientated rules of reason is in its own way no less 
ideological than the irrationality of official faith in art; it serves the needs of apparatchiks of 
every persuasion.'
673 "The Nonexistent," p. 83.
674 Ibid.
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is determined by expectations in the present that guide our access to past 
experiences which orientated towards the future are said to preserve an 
authentic present as the locus of innovation and tradition. As this process 
accelerates, as more is drawn into the orbit, the distance that opens between 
the past experience and the horizon of expectation lends itself to a Utopian 
quality even as it closes off the future as a source of disruption. In practice 
what can be characterized as effective history or critical history grounds 
itself and circles around assumptions about certain kinds of cultural goods.
The hegemony of the object and the concomitant deformations of 
social and enlightenment thought, as an axiological orientation of 
modernism, are made manifest through its most estranged forms. In the 
world of contemporary music, high-modernism is one of these estranged 
forms. In this instance high-modernism means the progressive, 
technologically grounded, mathematized, computerized, and future 
orientated. The high-modernist avant-garde is so complex and uncongenial 
that it is unapproachable for everyone bar the specialist and curious. In order 
to secure the future for this cutting edge music, technology, and theory in the 
absence of validation by the markets or the public, high-modernism like 
other sciences retreats into institutions, universities, etc, subsidized arenas 
where subsidy becomes the mark of high-culture and legitimacy becomes a 
question after the accumulation of cultural authority. In this situation the 
institutionalised and bureaucratic way of thinking becomes the model for a
thought less free.
'But the responsibility of philosophical thought in its essential 
situations is not to play this game. A given alternative is already a 
piece of heteronomy. The legitimacy of alternative demands has yet to
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be judged by the very consciousness that is moralistically asked to 
make its decision beforehand. To insist on the profession of a 
standpoint is to extend the coercion of conscience to the realm of 
theory. With this coercion goes a coarsening process in which not 
even the great theorems retain their truth content after the adjuncts 
have been eliminated.' 675
For Adorno the disavowal of every existential posture, the sense of 
being not quite here, of not playing along, is an attitude towards immediacy 
common to artists and thinkers. The ability to keep ones distance to become 
a spectator and rise above every occasion is at once the most inhuman and in 
the final analysis the most human of stances. The experience has a moment 
of objective truth beyond the appearance of the self-preserving motive. 
"What does it really matter?" without its associations of callousness and 
dread, is the line most likely to make the individual aware of the 
insignificance of existence. Being both spellbound the aesthetic of the 
ephemeral and the bestiality of the involved are the wrong ways of living. 
Mediation of the extremes is required for an atmosphere of free and easy 
sympathy and spontaneity.676
The ephemeral is discredited where through its indifference to 
temporality it perpetuates the status quo. "A-historicity" is the necessary 
complement to the concept of dynamism. In line with the inevitability of 
change, with that which it cannot cope, the subject simulates 
individualization and promotes the dynamic of the subjecting form, 
reinforcing its primacy over the external processes of life. Under the spell of 
identity what is different, incompatible with the spell, will turn to poison. On 
the other hand, under the compulsion to identity the non-identical grows
675 "Vertiginousness," p. 32.
676 Cf. "After Auschwitz," pp. 363-364.
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abstract and adopts a legally fateful, event like character. The nonidentical 
as an undigested scrap of subjugated nature, acquires an irrationalism that 
converges with the necessity posited in the subject. It is not through the 
defiance or extirpation of the unintended but reflection on the difference that 
helps reconciliation.
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In Adorno's theory of philosophical aesthetics aesthetic comportment is the 
capacity to perceive more in things than they are.678 As the given is 
transformed into an image aesthetic comportment is defined as the capacity 
to shudder. What later became "subjectivity" is at the same time the 
shudder's own development.
'Intensity is the mimesis achieved through unity and ceded by the 
multiplicity to the totality, although this totality is not immediately 
present in such a fashion that it could be perceived as an intensive 
force; the power accumulated in the totality is, so to speak, restored to 
the detail.' 679
The productivity and sheer explosive power of basic aesthetic experience is 
that of a subjectivity released from the imperative of purposive activity. To 
the dominant rationality and the status quo aesthetic comportment is 
irrational and inadequate. The rational injunction which urges that all steps 
to a conclusion are to be made explicit and exposition should exactly 
reproduce the process of thought invokes the liberal fiction of universal 
communicability of each and every thought. But for Adorno the value of 
thought is measured by its distance from the continuity of the familiar.680
677 "The Problem of Solipsism and False Reconciliation," p. 259.
678 cf "jheories on the Origin of Art," p. 330.
679 "The Category of Intensity," p. 187.
680 For the distance between Nietzsche and Adorno, cf. "What is Romantic," 
p. 133. '[H]e [the suffering man, the man poorest in life] will likewise [as well as 
most need of kindness, peaceable, goodness in thought and action] have need of a logic, the 
conceptual comprehensibility o/existence - for logic tranquillizes, makes trusting - in 
short a certain warm, fear-averting confinement and enclosure within optimistic horizons.
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Where thought repudiates the nonidentity that makes it thought in the 
first place it also repudiates its inviolable distance. Every thought which is 
not idle carries with it the impossibility of its full legitimation. Distant 
thoughts are manifest in the delicacy, fragility, and intricacy of thinking. 
Distance is a field of tension not a comfort zone. 'Only at a remove from life 
can mental life exist, and truly engage the empirical.' 681 What aesthetic 
comportment and artworks do is distance thought from reality. As the 
precipitate of history in concepts the artwork reminds us of ends rather than 
the rationality of means and as such it is objectivity freed from categorical 
structure: free to reflect. This is art's rationality and knowledge character. 
The more it approximates the pre-existing standard, the further its 
antithetical function is diminished. Aesthetics, which shouldn't believe it 
achieves affinity to art by enunciating what art is, becomes normative 
through its power of articulation. Aesthetics begins with reflection on the 
demands of the concrete historical situation of art. As such it is not in 
isolated existence that aesthetic claims to knowledge are founded
'[...] knowledge comes to us through a network of prejudices, 
opinion, innervations, self-corrections, presuppositions and 
exaggerations, in short through the dense, firmly founded but by no 
means uniformly transparent medium of experience/5682
Religious symbolism in its appearance lays claim to the transcendence of the 
immediately present. Aesthetically obedient to the administered world 
mediaeval iconography, a kind of theology of art was in general governed by
[. .] and my eye became ever and ever sharper for that worst and most insidious form of 
in which most errors are committed - the retrograde conclusion from 
the work to the author, from the deed to the doer, from the ideal to him who has 
from every mode of thought and evaluation to the which commands behind it. 
-With regard to all aesthetic values I now avail myself of this principle distinction: I ask in 
each individual case 'is it hunger or is it superfluity which has here become creative?' 
681 "Keeping One's Distance," p. 126.
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fixed laws that could not easily and simply be broken by the dictates of 
individual imagination.683 With its withdrawal from theological dogma art 
became secularized. As the secularization of transcendence it participates in 
the dialectic of enlightenment: a dialectic that in order to stay true to its own 
concept of going beyond its own concept art confronts with the aesthetic 
conception of anti-art. Art has to step outside of its own concept in order to 
remain faithful to its concept. By being secularized art did not lose its claim 
to transcendence nor its being appropriated by a basic style defining power. 
According to Adorno, the stereotypical appropriation of everything, even 
anti-art and the inchoate, for the purposes of mechanical reproduction and 
exchange is the power that manages to surpass or suppress the rigor and 
currency of any "real style". 684 What maintains the power of convention is 
the immanent rule of production and exchange that sustain a constant 
pressure manifest as a need to produce new effects all the more whilst still 
conforming to the old pattern of checks and balances.
'No mediaeval theologian could have determined the degree of the 
torment to be suffered by the damned in accordance with the of 
divine love more meticulously than the producers of shoddy epics 
calculate the torture to be undergone by the hero or the exact point 
which the leading lady's hemline shall be raised.' 685
Everything is shaped down to the last detail according to the language of the 
anathema, the catalogue of explicit and implicit, exoteric and esoteric. 
Everything is to be stamped with sameness nothing can appear that does not 
meet with approval at first sight. What and how something is said must be
682 "Gaps " p. 80.
683 Cf. Emile Male, Trans. Dora Nussey, (Great Britain: The Fontana
684 cf "jug new and Duration," p. 29.
685 "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," 
257
measurable by the everyday language of reproduction and exchange. 
Imitation and repetition become absolute. An artwork has been essentially 
objectified and made viable before the established authorities began arguing 
about it.686 As a result of the critique of meaning categories such as unity and 
harmony have not vanished, they survive even in the most extreme and 
dissonant in which art revolts against its neutralization as an object of 
contemplation. In the throes of inspiration the principles of harmony, 
metamorphosed, and in the end unrecognizable, is at work organizing, 
making elements gel. Inspiration if it is to count tacitly presupposes an 
element of coherence even if just as a limit, a vanishing point.687 In harmony 
art senses acquiescence to the administered which it continues to oppose. 
But with steadily increasing autonomy comes the continuation of the 
domination of nature which in real terms is progressive something art finds
painful to admit much like the necessity of that progress within itself.
The secularization of the world and the secularization of art do not 
necessarily coincide. Notwithstanding the inevitable losses that follow in its 
wake art scholarship retains and adds to its historical understanding even 
though society as a whole has chosen to forget or shows little interest 
outside of an absolute scandal. Monad like and in-itself, artworks never 
forget. As a fragment artworks are that part of the totality that opposes 
totality. In this way art becomes a specific undertaking. Art's integration 
binds the centrifugal counterforces even though as the fragmentary it affects
p. 128.
686 cf .cj^g culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," 
pp. 128-129.
esv cf «The concept of Harmony and the Ideology of Closure," p. 157.
688 Cf. "The Concept of Harmony and the Ideology of Closure," p. 158.
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to transcend its own concept. The fragmentary contains both these elements. 
The secularization of art allowed it to develop and this is what distinguishes 
artworks from religious symbols. At the same time art was condemned to 
provide the existing world with a consolation for the loss of hope: the hope 
of a better world beyond.
Although they are more, there would be no valid artworks without the 
power of longing.689 According to Adorno, '[o]nly in memory and longing 
not as copy or as an immediate effect, is pleasure absorbed in art.' 690 That the 
artwork transcends longing in its immanence is explained by the neediness 
of the world, a soliciting force that is inscribed as a figure in the historically 
existing. Artworks by retracing the dialectical figure or image in its 
neediness are able to summon forth fulfilment and change. Artworks are the 
language of this wanting. The artworks content; import, and essence is as 
substantial as this wanting. What is wants the other, not as it is but as it 
might become. Immanent to the displacement of the elements within its 
constellation is the hope that they might thereafter find their rightful 
position. For the idealists this would be the of the absolute. By being 
more than what simply exists and by retracing the historical and worldly 
figure artwork's participate in objective truth. Artworks make a case for 
what is to come: reality should imitate the artwork, a reversal of the doctrine 
that artworks imitate reality. Artworks signal the possibility not the actuality 
of the nonexisting. By testifying to the possibility of the possible the object 
of art's longing, the reality of what is not is metamorphosed in art as 
remembrance. Remembrance remains bound to semblance. 'In remembrance
689 cf «Truth as Semblance of the Illusionless," p. 132.
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what is qua what was combines with the nonexisting because what was no 
longer is.' 691
For art, Utopia [literally "non-place" but here meaning "the yet-to- 
exist"] remains a recollection of the possible in opposition to the actual that 
suppresses it. 'Each artwork is Utopia insofar as through its form it 
anticipates what would finally be itself, and this converges with the demand 
for the abrogation of the spell of self-identity cast by the subject.' 692 In 
artworks the actual destructive power of myths, which in reporting and 
naming intend the repetition of the same, is mollified through the negative 
determination of difference, the particularization of the repetition that myth 
exercises in empirical reality.693 According to current logic the particular 
would not be identifiable without the identifying universal. The general 
concept of particularization is an instance where the particular is not 
particular anymore. Dialectically the particular is indissoluble in the cover 
concept. In the surety of logic this is treated as a universal state of facts. The 
indissolubility of the particular is taken as its own cover concept: reason in 
its rigidity can not make sure of the particular without the concept. In the 
process identity wins over nonidentity. 694 Art's rejection of the empirical 
world inheres in it's concept as a law immanent to it: It is thus no mere 
escapist fantasy. On the other hand this law sanctions the primacy of reality 
it strengthens the spell of that which the autonomy of art seeks to free itself. 
Against the somatic stimulation of the "popular arts" and in contrast to
690 "The Pleasure of Art," p. 14.
691 "Truth as Semblance of the Illusionless," p. 132.
692 "Methexis in Darkness," p. 135.
693 Cf. "Mimesis of the Fatal and Reconciliation," p. 134.
694 Cf. "Particularity and the Particular," p. 173.
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religious and ceremonial functions, the autonomy of art is its quality of 
being a law unto itself. By undertaking to posit totality out of itself, whole 
and self-encompassing, the principle of autonomy is suspected of giving 
consolation by transferring the image of autonomy to the world in which art 
exists and that engenders it. 695 Art exists in a historically changing 
constellation of elements and cannot be reduced to the single formula of 
providing consolation. By recognizing the difference that has been spirited 
away, by historicizing and negating its particular rationality, dialectics 
breaks the spell of total identification.
The idea of art is to gain control, determine and negate as unreal the 
semblance of the artefact: the fact that it says more.696 This more is other 
mediated through a nexus of elements and yet divided from it. Artworks 
become what they are in the production of this more. In it they posit what 
they are not permitted to posit: more as what appears. Art in an act of 
liberation re-enacts the spell of reality, sublimating it as image where 
sublimation and freedom mutually accord.
'That by virtue of their organization artworks are more not only as 
what is organized but also as the principle of organization for as 
what is organized they obtain the semblance of being nonartifactual  
determines them as spiritual. This determination, when recognized, 
becomes content. It is expressed by the artwork not only through its 
organization but equally through its disruption which organization 
implies.' 697
Artworks produce their own transcendence. As a pure process of becoming
695 Cf. "Art's Self-Evidence Lost," p. 2.
696 £f "Truth as Semblance of the Illusionless," p. 132. 'The definition 
of art is not fully encompassed by aesthetic semblance: Art has truth as the semblance of the 
illusionless. Cf. ""More" as Semblance," p. 78. 'Nature is beautiful in that 
it appears to say more than it is. To wrest this more from that more's contingency, to gain 
control of its semblance, to determine it as semblance as well as to negate it as unreal: This 
is the idea of art.'
697 "On the Truth Content of Artworks," p. 130.
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they go beyond the appearance that they are in the nexus of elements which 
is the arena of transcendence. It is only insofar as these elements 
asymptomatically approximate nothingness and are drawn into the 
amorphous do they meld into a whole. As differentiated partial elements 
they want to be something that previously existed: the remembrance of a 
motif or theme. In this way once again they become separated from 
transcendence.
It is not through meanings but through transcendence, which is akin to 
expression, that artworks are spiritual. Artworks fail when they seek to 
produce transcendence as an effect. For Adorno art is probably never more 
transcendent and expressive than in the moment it falls silent, falls mute, 
where by virtue of its own movement it converges with its natural element  
the desolation of an open infinity which grants no affirming finality and 
says adieu to life: farewell. The evanescent fleeting associations which 
confound any efforts to pin them down say more of the hope of return than 
any general reflection on the essence of the fleeting and enduring. To grasp 
such micro-logically constructed figures requires philosophical aesthetics 
namely internally developed, mediated thought/
What is essential to art is that which is not the case. That which 
doesn't measure up and is incommensurable with the empirical. Movement 
against and beyond the empirical requires a sense of proportion, an 
understanding of the limits and limitations of experience and empirical 
deduction relative to their prospective concrete relations and context. 'The 
compulsion to aesthetics is the need to think this empirical
698 £f "Methodology, "Second Reflection," History," p. 358.
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incommensurability. The objective difficulties in this are compounded 
subjectively by broad resistance.' 699 For most people aesthetics is 
superfluous, it disturbs their pleasures. The subjective resistance 
unintentionally helps give expression to the fact that art allies itself with the 
repressed and dominated in society. At the same time industry turns this 
resistance into an institution. Art is cultivated as a market, a natural reserve 
for the irrational. Art is to become a direct source of pleasure from which 
thought is to be excluded. This fundamentally confuses the ever problematic 
objectivation of art. 700 The aporia of art is not cured through any willing 
subordination to authority. 'It remains an open question just how, without 
coercion, it would be possible, given an unmitigated nominalism, to achieve 
anything on the order of an objectivity of form; this is impeded by instituted 
closure.' 701 The observer takes part in objectivity when, for example, the 
energy of subjective projections [even if misguided] penetrate or extinguish 
themselves in the artwork giving rise to an awareness of objectivity from
within.702
Originating in aesthetics and fed on art-historical theses the idea, 
drafted by conservative cultural critics, that art has lost its sense of form, has 
since spread to become a view of the world as a whole: the world has 
become formless. This opaque and despairing negativity is conflated with 
the positivity of redemption. The art-historical thesis that maintains that 
Bach, Beethoven, and Mozart are more metaphysically substantial than the 
later romantics [i.e. Wagner] is not diminished by pointing out that music's
699 "The Changing Function of Naivete, p. 335.
700 Cf. Ibid.
701 "Objectivity and Reification," p. 175.
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turn towards language created hitherto unimagined expressive values and a 
wealth of qualitative possibilities. The devalorization of metaphysical sense 
was appropriate to the state of social consciousness under developed 
capitalism. What makes this inauthentic, the despairing conflation of the 
negative with the positivity of redemption, at the same time honours the 
determining historical experience. 703 Although the basic assumption that the 
loss of form is in fact a loss is in no way established the reaction to the idea 
and popularised since is a specific need for a structure of invariants. For 
Adorno the dubiousness of this claim turns on the fact that the institutions of 
the culture industry are more powerful than ever: '[...] they have long since 
produced something like the neon-lit style of the culture industry, a style that 
covers the world as the turn to the baroque did once upon a time.' 704 
Consolidating the subject's enslavement to the merchandise character the 
rule of universal equivalence and comparability depreciates qualitative 
definitions reducing them to the form of invariance which as such is the 
projection of what has congealed in reified consciousness. According to 
Adorno, no theory, including aesthetic theory, can dispense with the element 
of universality. 'This tempts aesthetics to take the side of invariants of 
precisely the sort that emphatic modern art must attack.' 705 The situation of 
art means that the concepts aesthetics is compelled to drag helplessly behind 
and without which it could hardly be conceived are the concepts it art seeks 
to undermine. The lack of any sense of the historical situation of artistic
702 Cf. Ibid.
703 "Music, Language, and Composition," trans. Susan H. Gillespie, p.
123.
704 "Weakness and Support," p. 94.
705 "irreconcilability of Traditional Aesthetics and Contemporary Art," p.
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phenomena corresponds to the tendency of philosophical aesthetics towards 
abstract rules, for example reducing the new to the ever-same. However, 
according to Adorno, '[w]hat sets itself up as an eternal aesthetic norm is 
something that has developed and is transient; the claim to imperishability is 
obsolete.' 706 The universal in the midst of aesthetic particularization is driven 
beyond the semblance of a static being-in-itself. The critique of invariants 
which maintains even the excluded through their negation conceives 
invariants in their own variability. Art and probably life in general does not 
need the prescription of norms where and when it finds itself in difficulty. 
Rather it needs whatever will provide the capacity for reflection.
The conflict between subjectivity and form is undiminished. If form 
does not prove by itself by its transparent function that it is entitled to 
live, but instead is simply posited in order to be available for a mind 
persuaded that it is thus sheltered, then this form is coercive, untrue and 
inadequate. The obeyer of formal categories cannot wholly repress their 
inadequacy to a mind which opposes the visible heteronomy with another 
heteronomy. The dubiousness of this heteronomous structural ideal is 
reflected in radical modern art which reminds us of lost chances. The sense 
of frustration and loss of confidence in the ability to change institutions and 
their mental image reverses the conflict into identification with the 
aggressor. 'The subjective consciousness of men is socially too enfeebled to 
burst the invariants it is imprisoned in. Instead it adapts itself to them while 
mourning their absence.' 707 In a state of unfreedom no one has a liberated
339.
706
707 "Weakness and Support," p. 95.
265
consciousness: the doctrine of invariants perpetuates how little has changed.
The subject that abdicates and adapts was prompted to do so by more 
powerful subjects. Even in its fallibility and weakness the subject is not 
expected to retreat from the claim to objectivity. The subject as a 
would not be the most qualified to judge and understand. If the converse was 
true then the philistine devoid of any relation to art would be the most 
qualified to judge it: the unmusical would be the best music critics.
Objectivity begins to play its part where the energy of the misguided 
subjective projection has extinguished itself in the artwork. A cognitive 
posture more applicable or more just to the aesthetic runs counter to the 
observing subject whose feelings provoked by the artwork are real and to 
this extent extra-aesthetic. The distinction between the subordination of 
concepts and the coordination of sensations marks the difference in the form 
of thought between what holds for consciousness in general and individual 
consciousness which as empirical consciousness is different from all others.
The mediated forms are orientated to the necessity in the object.
'Like art itself, knowledge of it is consummated dialectically. The 
more the observer adds to the process, the greater the energy with 
which he penetrates the artwork, the more he then becomes aware of 
objectivity from within. [...] The subjective detour may totally miss 
the mark, but without the detour no objectivity becomes evident.' 708
The artworks immanent exigency and its growing integration is also its 
immanent contradiction. Carried through the immanent dialectic reflects 
itself as resolved: this is aesthetically a false principle. The totally 
objectivated artwork congeals into a thing which is no less essential than its 
negation. If the artwork evaded objectivation altogether it would regress to
708 "Objectivity and Reification," p. 175.
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709empirical realm and the impotently powerless subjective impulse.
Modern art can be understood as the perpetual intervention of the 
subject in the unreflected governance of the traditional play of forces. The 
permanent interventions of the ego are matched by a tendency to abdicate 
out of weakness. The abdication of the subject from what has become 
distant, foreign, and dangerous is mistaken for a guarantee of objectivity. 710 
The more the pre-established is expelled the more art is thrown back onto 
the dimensionless point of pure subjectivity.
In the contemporary stage of development of art's mimetic essence, 
art's comportment assimilates itself with the nonidentical countermanding 
the idea of reconciliation in artwork's whose form dictates intransigence. 711 
The belief that a work of art is to be reconciled as an object of immediate 
contemplation is unsound. Older art possesses a certain immediacy of effect. 
This is no longer present in new art which requires something more, 
mediation, a helping hand, in order to be understood. The difficulty in 
understanding the new art, namely the experience, the production, materials, 
task and demands of the artist, arise from the work having become divorced, 
in principle, from consumption: Divorced, that is, from immediate 
presumptions, claims and possibilities.712 All artworks are enigmas. That 
they say something and in the same breath conceal it expresses this 
enigmaticness from the perspective of language. The enigma of art makes 
understanding a problematic category. The demands of the artwork, to be
709 Cf. Ibid.
710 ^f "Dialectic of Integration and the "Subjective Point"," p. 29.
711 Cf "Mimesis of the Fatal and Reconciliation," p. 134.
712 Cf "Why is the New Art so Hard to Understand?" trans. Susan H. Gillespie, 
p. 128.
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grasped in it's content, less it's effect, is bound to their specific experience. 
'The solution of the enigma amounts to giving the reason for its insolubility, 
which is the gaze artworks direct at the viewer.' 713 The mediation of the 
enigma can only be fulfilled by way of the theory that reflects this 
experience.
Aesthetics, protesting against abstracting and classifying procedures, 
partakes in history and thereby, overcoming its own uniqueness, it becomes 
the nexus in a problem; aesthetics requires classificatory genres and 
abstractions as its object especially in relation to the art manifestos it 
becomes. 714 'Art desires what has not yet been, though everything that art is 
has already been. It cannot escape the shadow of the past. But what has not 
yet been is the concrete.' 715
Aesthetic theory, being wary of all a priori constructions and 
abstractions, is a derivative of discursive logic, and not identical with it. It is, 
therefore, able to suspend its own rigour, which as an idea made concrete 
gives rise to the many forms of discord and disruption that we find in 
modern art. 716 Conversely, artworks that disavow their own logical rigor, 
and have a tendency towards integral construction, suspend what is 
heterogeneous to their self-determination and with it the mimetic trace on 
which their construction depends.
713 "Enigmaticalness and Understanding," p. 122.
714 Cf. "Methodology, "Second Reflection," History," p. 358-359. Cf. 
Ibid 'The concrete historical situation of art registers concrete demands. Aesthetics begins 
with reflection on them; only through them does a perspective open on what art is. For art 
and artworks are exclusively what they are able to become.'
715 "Methexis in Darkness," p. 134.
716 £f »LOgic9 Causality, Time," p. 138. 'The autonomous law of form of 
artworks protests against logicality even though logicality itself defines form as a principle.'
717 Cf. "The Problem of Solipsism and False Reconciliation," p. 259. 
'But art mimesis driven to the point of self-consciousness, is nevertheless bound up with
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The double character of artworks provokes permanent conflict in our 
understanding of the affinity between identifiable and non-identifiable 
elements and relations.
'In that no artwork is capable of resolving its immanent tension fully, 
and in that history ultimately attacks even the idea of such a 
resolution, aesthetic theory cannot rest content with the interpretation 
of given artworks and their concept. By turning towards their truth 
content, aesthetics is compelled as philosophy beyond the 
works.' 718
In terms of discursive thought, art and the artwork, as semblance, are both 
irrational. And yet art and artworks are, indeed, logical. Aesthetics, the study 
of the conditions and mediations of the objectivity of arts, has need of a 
logical consistency to become self-alike. And yet this logic is without 
concept or judgement. Art's logic draws its consequences from phenomena 
that have already been spiritually mediated and so is analogous to the logic 
of experience rather than practical empirical reality. 'By way of their logical 
character, artworks are determined objectively in themselves without regard 
to their reception. Yet their logicality is not to be taken What 
needs to be comprehended in artworks is their incomprehensibility: 
semblance is indeed their logic.
There is a contradiction, an aesthetic inconsistency, between what an 
art work appears to be and what it is. When called to legitimise itself to the 
world every artwork is a priori helpless. The success and truth of the artwork 
depends on its nonidentity with the concept. The artwork succeeds when that 
which is accidental to its concept is absorbed into its own immanent
feeling, with the immediacy of experience; otherwise it would be indistinguishable from
science [...] '
718 "Methodology, "Second Reflection," History," p. 359.
719 "Logicality," p. 136.
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necessity. Without this immanent necessity, art's anti-mimetic impulse, 
there would be no objectivation, no integration, and no material 
consequence. Art finds it continuation in this objective need, the neediness 
of the world which as an individual and specific undertaking is ideological; 
an abstract unity created by the loss of art's antithetical element. 720 Art 
redeems itself where the spirit throws itself away and re-ignites on the pre- 
spiritual: the mimetic.
Aesthetic comportment, '[...] is neither immediately mimesis nor its 
repression but rather the process mimesis sets in motion and in which,
modified, mimesis is preserved.' This process allows the I, in its
individual relation, to comprehend something beyond itself. Where 
aesthetic comportment is repressed, rationality becomes powerless. Its 
narrow minded wisdom separates feeling from knowing.723
'Yet feeling and understanding are not absolutely different in the 
human disposition and remain dependent even in their dividedness. 
[...] The fatal separation of the two came about historically and is 
revocable. without mimesis is self-negating. Ends, the raison 
d'etre of are qualitative, and mimetic power is effectively the 
power of qualitative distinction. The self-negation of reason clearly 
has its historical necessity: The world, which is objectively losing its 
openness, no longer has need of a spirit that is defined by its openness; 
indeed, it can scarcely put up with the traces of that spirit. With regard 
to its subjective side, the contemporary loss of experience may largely 
coincide with the bitter repression of mimesis that takes the place of
720 Cf. "Situation," p. 29.
721 "Theories on the Origin of Art," p. 331.
722 cf j^ 'jhat shudder in which subjectivity stirs without yet being subjectivity is the 
act of being touched by the other. Aesthetic comportment assimilates itself to that other 
rather than subordinating it. Such a constitutive relation of the subject to objectivity in 
aesthetic comportment joins eros and knowledge.' p. 331.
723 cf «Quaiity and Individual," p. 46. 'Yet the isolated individual 
unhampered by any ukase may at times perceive objectivities more clearly than the 
collective which is no more than the ideology of its functionaries, anyway.' Cf. "Out of the 
Firing-Line " p. 55. '[T]he mish-mash of enlightened manipulation of 
oublic opinion and oblivious activity: all this is another expression for the withering of 
experience the vacuum between men and their fate, in which their real fate lies. It is as if 
the reified, hardened plaster-cast of events takes the place of events themselves.'
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i   i724its metamorphosis.
The unconformable situation is derived from the fact that the system is able 
to produce rage. What first appears as rage later, under the auspices of a 
superego, becomes identity: not literal identity, a point for point relation 
with the object, but still the subsumption under a concept. 725
Both rage and the need to identify point to an excess. Manifest in the 
sublimation of impulses, sublimation remains an ambiguous concept. 
Sublimation may shape the creative process but it is also ideological and 
reactionary, adapting the individual to the 'normal rationality' of an 
irrational society.
'There is a total lack of any adequate criteria for distinguishing 
'positive' from 'negative' ego-functions, above all, sublimation from 
repression. Instead, the concept of what is socially useful or 
productive is rather innocently dragged in. But in an irrational, 
society, the ego cannot perform at all adequately the function allotted 
to it by that society.' 726
As an element within fully comprehending experience 
aesthetic or lived experience is the psychologically real response 
to a particular and abstracted aspect in the interplay between constructive 
and mimetically expressive elements.727 As cultural surrogate it would be 
conventional experience, arrested attention, which means, explicit in the 
gesture of pointing, being open to persuasion: The spontaneous mimetic
724 "Theories on the Origin of Art," p. 331.
725 According to Adorno, this has its counterpart in a social process. Cf. "Idealism as 
Rage," p. 23. 'In the form of the barter principle, the bourgeois 
really approximated to the systems whatever it would make commensurable with itself  
and it did so with increasing, if potentially homicidal, success. Less and less was left
  ^
eodor Adorno. 'Sociology and Psychology' (1955), trans. I. N. Wohlfahrt, 
47 (January/February 1968) pp. 86-87. As cited in, Max Paddison., 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 131. 
727 Cf. "Notes," p. 375. '[...] "Erlebnis," or lived experience, and 
"Erfahrung " or comprehending experience is a distinction for which there is no comparable
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reaction to the immediacy of this gesture is the weakening of the I.
'Against this stands the individuation of knowledge. Not only the way 
the object is perceived depends upon that individuation and 
differentiation; the differentiation itself is demanded by the object, 
which demands therein its so to speak. Just the 
same, the modes of subjective reaction which the object needs require 
ceaseless objective correction in their turn. This occurs in self- 
reflection, in the ferment of mental experience.' 728
Without the distraction of a supposed equivalence between the content of 
experience, the particular aspect in abstraction, and the subjective 
experience of the recipient, the utmost tension makes it possible for the I to 
catch a slight glimpse beyond the prison that it itself is. It is through the 
utmost exertion of an inclusive subject which, drawing on all its 
accumulated impulses and experiences to mediate the object, will yield in its 
immediacy to a moment of self-reflection that strikes at the static heart of all 
subject/ object dualisms. 'For a few moments the I becomes aware, in real 
terms, of the possibility of letting self preservation fall away.' 729
The shock to the I, an involuntary mimetic comportment preserved by 
the moment of tension, is the possibility of its own disappearance. In terms
of art,
'[...] this shock is the moment in which recipients forget themselves 
and disappear into the work; it is the moment of being shaken. The 
recipients lose their footing; the possibility of truth, embodied in the 
aesthetic image, becomes tangible. This immediacy, in the fullest 
sense, of relation to artworks is a function of mediation, of penetrating 
and encompassing experience it takes shape in a fraction 
of an instant, and for this the whole of consciousness is required, not 
isolated stimuli and responses. [...] Full comprehending experience 
which terminates in judgement on the non-judging work, 
demands a decision and, by extension, the concept.' 730
pair of succinct English concepts.'
728 "Quality and Individual," p. 47.
729 "Attitude to Praxis; Effect, Lived Experience, "Shudder," " p. 245.
730 "Attitude to Praxis; Effect, Lived Experience, "Shudder," " pp. 244-
245.
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As an element of objective truth the subjective experience is 
directed against the I in its limitedness. In its truth or untruth this is more 
than subjective experience. Subjective reaction at its most intense mediates 
the irruption of objectivity into the subjective consciousness. The shudder, 
aesthetic comportment, is a response, coloured by fear of the overwhelming 
'thus it is.' The ineluctable into which the I is submerged and transmuted 
can in the 'shudder' reveal limitations in the I. 731
'Shudder, radically opposed to the conventional idea of experience 
provides no particular satisfaction for the I; it bears no 
similarity to desire. Rather, it is a memento of the liquidation of the I, 
which shaken, perceives its own limitedness and finitude. This 
experience is contrary to the weakening of the I that the
culture industry manipulates.'
The withering of experience is the transformation of into 
a process allows no time for mimesis nor for consciousness to 
formulate a strategic response to events, for exchanging conscious 
experience for memory. The immediate binding of impressions, even in their 
difference, allows the turn around of events to take place much quicker, 
certainly more than if time was allowed for reflection. The result is an 
impoverishment of the internal narrative that gives structure to our lives. We 
sense that things are happening to us that hardly registers and that there is a 
loss of integrity in the content of experience.
The rapid calling forth of involuntary memory hastens the sense of 
dissolution. Conversely involuntary remembrance loosens or frees up earlier
731 cf "Theories on the Origin of Art," p. 331. 'Ultimately, aesthetic 
comportment is to be defined as the capacity to shudder, as if goose bumps were the first 
aesthetic image. What later came to be called subjectivity, freeing itself from the blind 
anxiety of the shudder, is at the same time the shudder's own development; life in the 
subject is nothing but what shudders, the reaction to the total spell that transcends the spell.
Mark Walker: 
experiences thereby keeping them alive. 'The interior where the soul 
accommodates its collection of memories and curios is derelict. Memories 
cannot be conserved in drawers and pigeon-holes; in them the past is 
indissolubly woven into the present.' 733 Where memories are controlled and 
objectified they tend to fade losing detail in the process. No memory is 
guaranteed against the empirical present. The present, immediacy, is 
constituted through the mediation of memory and in the process even the 
most blissful of memories can be irrevocably damaged by the substance of
later experiences.
The content of artworks are mimetic impulses that are drawn into the 
world of image, apparition, appearance. Aesthetically, this formal coherence 
and objective determination, is a product of and fulfils the desiderata of both 
that on which subjective activity takes place and the activity itself. Hence 
form is more than simply subjective activity. Artworks are not copies, they 
are auratic, unique. If mass reproduction threatens their mystery then 
critique, by penetrating the vanishing, salvages the ancient shudder in the 
measure of what it provokes. Thereafter, '[...] that shudder is permanently
c
reproduced in the historical antagonism of subject and object.'
Thought, negation, as micrological activity, as a particularized, 
intratemporal, motivated, and progressive motion, has macrological means,
Consciousness without shudder is reified consciousness.'
732 "Attitude to Praxis; Effect, Lived Experience, "Shudder," p. 245.
733 "All the Little Flowers," p. 166.
734 Cf Ibid 'He who has loved and who betrays love does harm not only to the image of 
the past, but to the past itself. Irresistibly evident, an impatient movement while waking up, 
a distraught tone of voice, a faint hypocrisy in pleasure, obtrudes itself hi memory and turns 
earlier closeness even then into the distance it has since become. Despair has the accent of 
irrevocability not because things cannot improve, but because it draws the past too into its
vortex.'
735 "Image Character," p. 84.
274
Mark Walker: 
the motion of history internalised in the structure of thinking. This raises the 
possibility that the universal as history may be located within the particular. 
As imaginative reproduction or perceived remembrance this trace of history 
is more than a fact-gathering branch of science.
'Ever since the fundament of knowledge came to be sought in 
supposedly immediate subjective data, men have been enthralled by 
the idol of a pure present. They would endeavour to strip thought of its 
historic dimension. [...] But their critique misconceived that tradition 
is immanent in knowledge itself, that it serves to mediate between 
known objects.' 736
If physics offers the possibility of breaking the subjective apriority of space, 
time, and causality it does so by arguing for the primacy of the object, an 
object that is more than factuality. But factuality, in the sense of binding 
statements, is here to stay and is one side of a dialectical relation within
Adorno's negative metaphysics.
Metaphysics is a compelling force that manifests itself in those 
experiences that lead to the question: Is that all? Adorno argues the situation
is one that mostly resembles fruitless waiting. The authenticity of this 
situation is not guaranteed. You would think that avidly constructing 
innumerable analysis thereby rendering each one worthless would be 
conducive to such an experience. 'But the consistency of its performance,
736 "Tradition and knowledge," pp. 53-54. Cf. "The Object not 
Datum," p. 187. 'Immediacy does call a halt to the idolatry of 
derivation, but it is also something abstracted from the object, a raw material for the 
subjective'process of production that served as a model for epistemology.'
737 cf uThe object not Datum," p. 188. Cf. "Argument and 
Experience," p. 29. 'The call for binding statements without a system 
is a call for'thought models, and these are not merely monadological in kind. A model 
covers the specific, and more than the specific, without letting it evaporate in its more 
general super-concept. Philosophical thinking is at the same as thinking in models; negative 
dialectics is an ensemble of analyses of models.'
738 £f «Lecture Eighteen," p. 143.
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